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INTRODUCTION
The opportunity for an individual debtor to obtain relief from in-
debtedness and begin anew as a productive member of soci-
ety-commonly termed the "fresh start policy"-has been an essential
principle of our bankruptcy laws for more than seventy-five years.' Al-
though bankruptcy legislation reflects a longstanding struggle to recon-
cile the debtor's ability to retain future earnings with her creditors' le-
gitimate desires to maximize their recoveries,2 the fresh start policy had
not been directly threatened until the passage of the Consumer Credit
1 See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (Bankruptcy law "gives
to the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the property
which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for
future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.");
see also Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (striking down section of state statute
that conflicted with the fresh start policy); Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380 (1966)
(suggesting right of bankrupt to "start out on a clean slate"). For commentary on the
fresh start policy, see A. COHEN, BANKRUPTCY, SECURED TRANSACTIONS AND OTHER
DEBTOR-CREDITOR MATTERS 182 (1981); T. JACKSON, THE LoGIc AND LIMITS OF
BANKRUPTCY LAW 225-52 (1986); Boshkoff, Limited, Conditional, and Suspended
Discharges in Anglo-American Bankruptcy Proceedings, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 69
(1982); Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankrujtcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393
(1985). For a general history of bankruptcy law and policy in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, see C. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY
(1935).
This Article does not, as a primary focus, address whether the fresh start policy
should be retained as a major component of the bankruptcy system. Analysis of the
theoretical justifications for discharge is an area of burgeoning scholarship, and, while
aspects of these theories appear at various junctures throughout this Article, their ap-
pearance herein is not intended as a systematic analysis of the fresh start policy.
2 See L. KING & M. COOK, CREDITORS' RIGHTS, DEBTORS' PROTECTION AND
BANKRUPTCY 777 (1985).
As a generalization, the bankruptcy law has two basic purposes: (1) to
provide an equitable distribution to unsecured creditors of the proceeds
from the debtor's nonexempt property; and, (2) to provide the honest
debtor with a discharge from the debts or, stated somewhat differently, to
permit the honest debtor a new financial life. Many cases have referred to
this as the 'fresh start' doctrine.
Id.
The effort to balance the respective rights of debtors and creditors is exemplified in
the scope of and exceptions to the discharge provisions, see 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 727, 1328
(1982 & Supp. III 1985), and the exemption provisions, see, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522
(1982 & Supp. III 1985). The determination of what specific debt should not be dis-
charged or what particular property should be exempt has generated considerable de-
bate. See, e.g., Organ, "Good Faith" and the Discharge of Educational Loans in
Chapter 13: Forging a Judicial Consensus, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1087 (1985); Zaretsky,
The Fraud Exception to Discharge Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 253 (1979); Note, Toward a Reform of the Six Year Bar to Discharge in Bank-
ruptcy, 97 HARV. L. REV. 759 (1984); Note, Dissolution of Marriage and the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1973: "Fresh Start" Forgotten, 52 IND. L.J. 469 (1977); Note, Belly Up
Down in the Dumps: Bankruptcy and Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 VAND. L. REV.
1037, 1051-54 (1985).
[Vol. 135:59
CONSUMER CREDIT AMENDMENTS
Amendments in July, 1984.' The Amendments were adopted in re-
sponse to concerted pressure from the consumer credit industry,4 osten-
sibly to eliminate perceived abuses5 of the Bankruptcy Code and the
' See The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28
U.S.C.). Subtitle A of Title III of Pub. L. No. 98-353 is entitled the "Consumer Credit
Amendments" [hereinafter "Consumer Credit Amendments" or the "Amendments"].
This Subtitle contains specific amendments to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326) (Supp. II
1978) [hereinafter the "Code" or the "Bankruptcy Code"]. It should be noted that, on
October 27, 1986, President Reagan signed into law the Bankruptcy Judges, United
States Trustees and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 1986
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) - [hereinafter "Bankruptcy Act of
1986"]. With several exceptions, the 1986 Act does not blunt the threat to the fresh
start policy that is the concern of this Article. All textual references to specific Code
sections are hereinafter cited as "section " or "§ "
" No single group officially represents the "consumer credit industry," but the
legislative hearings with respect to the Amendments produced testimony from a host of
groups that extended credit to consumers. These groups included the Credit Union
National Association, the National Association of Federal Credit Unions, the National
Consumer Finance Association, the American Retail Federation, and the National Re-
tail Merchants Association. While these groups may not have been in full accord with
respect to all the problems concerning individual debtors, their respective views evinced
certain common themes. For a summary of those views, see infra notes 62-66 and
accompanying text.
I See In re White, 49 Bankr. 869, 872 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985) ("The consumer
credit amendments . . . were the offspring of Congressional concern that credit costs
were being driven upwards by the ready availability of discharge via Chapter 7 to
persons seeking to sidestep consumer credit obligations who had the ability to pay.");
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 37 (1981) [hereinafter Senate
Hearings] (statement of Mr. A. Brimmer, economic and financial consultant) ("[I]t
appears that consumers may be taking advantage of the liberalized law to escape bur-
dens which could be assumed and which need not necessarily lead to bankruptcy."); S.
REP. No. 305, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1979) ("This amendment makes a change to
section 1325(a)(3) so that the court should determine that the payments in the plan
proposed by the debtor are the greatest that the debtor can reasonably pay so that the
liberal provisions allowing composition plans in Chapter 13 will not be abused by debt-
ors."); 130 CONG. REc. H7497 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (Congressman Brooks, speak-
ing on the proposed bankruptcy reforms, stated: "This bill will also make personal
bankruptcy reforms by eliminating the use of the bankruptcy system by debtors who
are not suffering economic hardship."); 130 CONG. REC. H1811-12 (daily ed. March
21, 1984) (Congressman Brooks stated: "These reforms, which have been proposed by
my good friend Congressman Mike Synar, seek to eliminate the abuse of the bank-
ruptcy system by debtors who are not suffering economic hardship-an abuse which
has occurred with alarming frequency in recent years."); 129 CONG. REc. S5326 (daily
ed. April 27, 1983) (Senator DeConcini stated: "Today there exists in the bankruptcy
statute an unconscionable loophole which makes it possible for [those] who have acted
with wilful, wanton, or reckless conduct and who have injured, killed or caused prop-
erty damage to others to escape civil liability . . . by having their judgment debts dis-
charged in Federal Bankruptcy court."); see also Cyr, The Chapter 13 "Good Faith"
Tempest: An Analysis and a Proposal for Change, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 271, 279
(1981) ("[M]any bankruptcy courts felt severely provoked by what they perceived to be
distressing abuses of the liberal debtor relief provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.");
Warren, Reducing Bankruptcy Protection for Consumers: A Response, 72 GEo. L.J.
1986]
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bankruptcy process by individual debtors.' A broadbased reading of the
Consumer Credit Amendments, however, as exemplified by the expan-
sive 7 paradigms developed in this Article,8 suggests that the effort to
correct abuses has not only shifted the balance of rights decisively in
favor of creditors but it has also threatened the eradication of the fresh
start policy for the segment of the debtor population that benefits most
from its application-namely, individuals.9
An individual debtor's statutory ability to obtain a fresh start has
its primary locus in the discharge and exemption provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code.10 Until passage of the Consumer Credit Amend-
1333, 1333 (1984) ("The 1978 Act had barely taken effect before creditor lobbying
groups began to complain that it protected debtors too much and seriously injured cred-
itors."). For a discussion of the perceived abuses, see infra text accompanying notes 62-
78. But see 130 CONG. REC. S7624 (daily ed. June 19, 1984) (Senator Metzenbaum
stated: "After reviewing the record, I was and am now convinced that the bankruptcy
laws are not being abused.").
' The term "individual debtor" is not defined in the Code. The general term
"debtor" is defined to mean "person or municipality concerning which a case under
this title has been commenced." 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1982). The term "person" in-
cludes but is not limited to an individual. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(33) (1982 & Supp. III
1985). Because certain categories of "individuals" are defined in the Code, see, e.g., 11
U.S.C. § 101(27) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) ("individual with regular income"), the
more general term "individual debtors," which is not defined in the Code, is used
herein to include all subcategories.
7As utilized in this article, the term "expansive" relates to the methodological
approach for interpreting statutory language broadly. Similarly, the term '.'narrow" de-
notes an approach for interpreting language in a restrictive manner. Neither term is
meant to refer to any particular ideological or otherwise "political" orientation.
I In a series of articles and rebuttals, Professors Eisenberg and Harris address
issues of bankruptcy policy under the Code, including the concept of discharge and
mandatory Chapter 13 cases. Although neither Professor Eisenberg nor Peofessor Har-
ris speaks in terms of an expansive or narrow paradigm, as those terms are used in this
Article, Professor Eisenberg's approach is similar to the expansive paradigm suggested
here and Professor Harris's approach is similar to the narrow paradigm. These articles
antedate the Amendments, but some of these commentators' observations can readily be
applied to the Amendments. See Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA
L. REv. 953 (1981) [hereinafter Eisenberg I]; Eisenberg, "Bankruptcy Law in Perspec-
tive": A Rejoinder, 30 UCLA L. REv. 617 (1983) [hereinafter Eisenberg II]; Harris,
A Reply to Theodore Eisenberg's "Bankruptcy Law in Perspective," 30 UCLA L.
REv. 327 (1983).
9 Cf Warren, supra note 5, at 1356 ("With adequate exemptions in place, the
bankruptcy statutes permit the working poor who have become hopelessly mired in
consumer debt to begin again the climb into the middle class with some assets intact.").
See generally Countryman, Bankruptcy and the Individual Debtor-And a Modest
Proposal to Return to the Seventeenth Century, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 809 (1983) (dis-
cussing past and modern treatment of individual debtors).
10 For the nonbankruptcy specialist, a general overview of the treatment indivi-
dual debtors are accorded under the Code prior to the 1984 Amendments may facilitate
an understanding of the changes wrought by the Consumer Credit Amendments.
Individuals are entitled to seek relief under Chapters 7, 11, 12, and 13 of the
Code, respectively. Each of these chapters has different goals and, to that extent, pro-
vides for different treatment of debtors. This Article will not deal with Chapter 12,
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•ments, an individual debtor could obtain a discharge under the Code in
which was added to the Code by the Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554,
1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) -.
Chapter 7 is a liquidation chapter. See R. AARON, BANKRUPTCY LAw FUNDA-
MENTALS § 1.03 (1986) . A debtor can seek relief under this chapter voluntarily or can
be the subject of an involuntary petition. There are no entry-level requirements for the
debtor who voluntarily seeks relief; she does not have to be insolvent nor does she need
a certain amount of debt or a debt of a particular nature. She does not even need to be
unable to pay her debts as they mature. In the context of an involuntary case, on the
other hand, creditors would have to show that the debtor was not paying her creditors
on a regular basis, although there would be no need to show insolvency. See id.
Under a Chapter 7 case, the debtor's property becomes property of the estate. See
11 U.S.C. § 541 (1982). Expressly excluded from this pool of assets are the future
earnings of the debtor, see § 541(a)(6) (excepting "earnings from services performed by
an individual debtor after commencement of the case"), which she is entitled to retain
for purposes of effectuating her fresh start. The Code also permits the debtor to retain
a portion of the property of the estate as exempt. See 28 U.S.C. § 541(b) (1982).
Simply stated, although the Code broadly defines property of the estate, the debtor is
allowed to keep certain specifically identified property to assist her in her fresh start.
The amount of property a debtor is permitted to retain is determined in certain circum-
stances by federal bankruptcy law and in other instances by state law. In either event,
after the debtor keeps the property to which she is entitled, the remaining (non-exempt)
property is distributed to unsecured creditors in accordance with a priority scheme
stated in the Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1982).
The Code provides that a debtor who has turned over her non-exempt assets to
creditors (via a trustee) is entitled, subject to certain specific exceptions described below,
to a discharge; thereafter, creditors are prohibited from collecting the balance of what is
owed them, absent an agreement by the debtor to the contrary. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 524,
525 (1982). There are, however, several key restrictions on discharge. For example, a
discharge is not permitted if the debtor has perpetrated a fraud on her creditors or
failed to disclose assets. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1982). The Code also contemplates
that, while a debtor may be able to obtain a discharge of her debts generally, certain
specific categories of debt will be nondischargeable, notwithstanding that the debtor has
exhibited none of the prohibited conduct that would preclude a general discharge. See
11 U.S.C. § 523 (1982). The specific categories of debt excepted from discharge reflect
social, political, and economic policy decisions. For example, one cannot discharge one's
obligation to pay alimony and child support and one cannot discharge certain student
loans from a governmental unit. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1982).
An individual with regular income and secured and unsecured debts, within cer-
tain statutory limits, is entitled to seek relief under Chapter 13. There can be no invol-
untary Chapter 13 cases. The purpose of Chapter 13 is to allow a debtor to repay her
creditors out of future income over an extended period of time. The theory has been
that creditors will get more (and are required by the Code to get at least as much) as
they would receive in a Chapter 7 case. See generally R. AARON, supra, at § 1.06
("The basic idea of chapter 13 is an installment repayment by composition or extension
by use of income received after the commencement of the case."). As a technical matter,
all of the debtor's property, including her future income, becomes property of the estate,
see 11 U.S.C. § 1306 (1982), but the debtor chooses how much her creditors receive
and over what period of time, up to a maximum of three (although the court, for cause,
may extend the period to five) years. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a)(1), 1322(c) (1982).
Under a Chapter 13 plan, the debtor does not give up any of her existing assets; none
of her property is sold for the benefit of her creditors.
Confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan is conditioned upon several distinct statutory
requirements. For example, the Chapter 13 plan must be in the best interests of the
creditors and proposed by the debtor in good faith. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (1982). All
creditors of a like class must be treated equally, thereby promoting equality of distribu-
19861
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one of two ways: either by surrendering non-exempt assets that then
tion among similarly situated creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1) (1982). Creditors
may not vote on the Chapter 13 plan, but they may object to its confirmation. How-
ever, if the statutory provisions are satisfied, a court can confirm a plan even though
creditors are dissatisfied with what they are to receive. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (1982).
This makes Chapter 13 particularly appealing to debtors. Recalcitrant and angry credi-
tors cannot block a debtor's efforts to reorganize.
Once a plan is confirmed and a debtor makes all of the required payments under
the Chapter 13 plan, she is entitled to a discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (1982). The
discharge in a Chapter 13 is substantially broader than the Chapter 7 discharge de-
scribed above. With the exception of alimony and child support, virtually all debts are
discharged, even those incurred through fraud, nondisclosure, and other wrongdoing.
While the breadth of the Chapter 13 discharge has been the subject of considerable
controversy, it does enable a debtor, after completion of plan payments, to begin anew.
In circumstances involving a hardship, a debtor can obtain a discharge even though she
has not completed payments under the plan and such discharge will have much of the
breadth of the discharge obtained when there is full compliance with plan provisions.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (1982).
Chapter 11, for which an individual is eligible, is also a reorganization chapter,
although it is designed for the corporate debtor. A Chapter 11 case can be filed volun-
tarily or involuntarily. There are no entry-level requirements to be a debtor in Chapter
11, akin to Chapter 7 and unlike Chapter 13. For an involuntary petition to succeed,
there must be a showing, as in the context of an involuntary Chapter 7 case, that the
debtor is not paying her debts as they mature. See J. ANDERSON, CHAPTER 11 REOR-
GANIZATIONS § 6.10 (1984) ("Because of the seriotisness of the involuntary proceed-
ing, counsel for the petitioning creditors should make an investigation as to whether the
debtor is making payments to other creditors as they come due."). See generally R.
AARON, supra, at § 1.04.
As in Chapter 7, all of the debtor's assets in a Chapter 11 case become property of
the estate except the individual debtor's future income. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(b) (1982).
The Code contemplates the creation of one or more creditors' committees to oversee the
organization process, see 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (1982), a concept that may be workable
with large debtors in the corporate arena but that is difficult to implement in the small,
oft-times no-asset, cases of individuals. See LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Con-
trol-System's Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 57 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 99 (1983). Unlike a Chapter 13 case, where there is a standing trustee, the debtor
in a Chapter 11 case remains fully in control, unless a trustee is appointed. See 11
U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1982).
In a Chapter 11 case, the debtor is required to propose a plan of reorganization,
and, if she fails to do so in the requisite time period, her creditors are entitled to file a
plan for her, a feature that distinguishes Chapter 11 from Chapter 13. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1121 (1982). Furthermore, a Chapter 11 plan requires disclosure to and voting by
creditors. Subject to certain statutory exceptions, the Chapter 11 plan must be approved
by one-half in number and two-thirds in amount of all creditors who voted. See 11
U.S.C. § 1126 (1982). Unlike a Chapter 13 case, there are no limits on the duration of
a Chapter 11 plan, although the contents of the plan must comport with certain statu-
tory mandates. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (1982).
Assuming confirmation of the Chapter 11 plan, a debtor is entitled to a discharge.
None of the debts generally or specifically excepted from discharge in Chapter 7, how-
ever, are discharged in Chapter 11. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3)(C) (1982). This result
is significantly different from that which occurs under Chapter 13. Further, the dis-
charge is technically effective earlier.in a Chapter 11 case. The narrow discharge in
Chapter 11 makes it considerably less appealing to individual debtors.
The differences between Chapters 7, 11, and 13 mean that individuals must care-
fully evaluate what they need to achieve under the federal bankruptcy laws and the best
way of attaining those goals. For a more detailed analysis of the options available to
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would be distributed to her creditors by a trustee in a Chapter 7 (liqui-
dation) case" or by readjusting her outstanding indebtedness in a
Chapter 13 (reorganization) plan through which her creditors would
receive, from payments derived from her ongoing earnings over a three
to five year period, at least the value of her non-exempt assets. 2
Whether she ultimately filed under Chapter 7 or under Chapter 13, an
individual debtor could, and in many instances did, obtain relief from
prefiling indebtedness by paying her creditors no more than the value
of her then available assets.' 3 Consequently, a debtor was able to retain
a significant portion of her future earnings, thereby preserving her self-
respect and creating incentive for her to work again.1
4
The statutory threat to the fresh start policy is found primarily in
three specific sections of the Consumer Credit Amendments. Section
312 (now section 707(b) of the Code) provides that an individual
debtor's access to a Chapter 7 case can be eliminated if the court deter-
mines that such a filing would be a "substantial abuse," even though
the statute does not identify the subject of such abuse.' 5 Section 317
(now section 1325(b) of the Code) mandates that, if a creditor objects to
an individual debtor's Chapter 13 plan, a bankruptcy court should not
confirm the plan (or grant a discharge) unless the debtor utilizes all of
her "projected disposable income" over the next three years to make
payments under her plan.16 Lastly, section 319 (amending section
individual debtors, see A. COHEN, supra note 1. As to whether some of the underlying
assumptions surrounding choices for individual debtors are in fact substantiated, see
Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, Folklore and Facts: A Preliminary Report from the
Consumer Bankruptcy Project, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 283 (1986).
11 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 522 (exemptions), 523 (exceptions to discharge), 524 (effect
of discharge), 726 (distribution of property of the estate) (1982 & Supp. 111 1985).
11 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322 (contents of plan), 1325 (confirmation of plan), 1328
(discharge) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
13 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
14 See, e.g., Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763,
785 (1983) ("One reason for giving the debtor a fresh start is to counteract the self-
hatred he may feel, having mortgaged his entire future in a series of past decisions he
now regrets."); Schuchman, An Attempt at a "Philosophy of Bankruptcy," 21 UCLA
L. REv. 403, 458-64 (1973) (discussing utilitarian underpinnings of discharge and con-
cluding that "individuals will perceive that their personal bankruptcy brought about, on
the whole, more good than bad consequences").
1" For a detailed discussion of § 707(b), see infra notes 104-224 and accompany-
ing text.
16 For a detailed discussion of § 1325(b), see infra notes 225-352 and accompa-
nying text. This Article does not address § 1325(b)(2)(B), which attempts to define
disposable income in the context of businesses operating in a Chapter 13. For an analy-
sis of this particular subsection, see Morris, Substantive Consumer Bankruptcy Reform
in the Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1984, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 91, 159
(1985). For an analysis of the import of the distinction between consumer and business
debts in Chapter 13, see Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, supra note 10, at 302-11.
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1329(a) of the Code) permits an unsecured creditor to seek an increase
in an individual debtor's payments under a Chapter 13 plan. 17 Because
these sections raise the barriers to discharge, they substantially curtail
the availability of a discharge and the individual debtor's influence in
cases filed under Chapters 7 and 13 of the Code."' As such, they have
provided the courts with the power to destroy the fresh start policy as
applied to individual debtors.
The potential for interpreting these three statutory provisions so as
to annihilate the fresh start policy arises from a combination of factors.
First, the language of all three sections is expansive. 9 Second, to the
extent that definitional provisions are included at all, they are far from
concrete.20 Third, there is a paucity of clear legislative history and,
therefore, a resulting lack of definitive interpretive guidance. 21 Lastly,
17 For a detailed discussion of § 1329(a), see infra notes 353-393 and accompany-
ing text.
1" King and Cook have recognized that such heightened standards do not comport
with bankruptcy policy:
[I]t is not necessary that the debtor have property available for distribution
to creditors in order to be entitled to a discharge. There is no such quid
pro quo requirement. As a matter of fact, it is this very lack which renders
the United States law so radically different from the law in most other
nations.
L. KING & M. COOK, supra note 2, at 777.
1" Cf Breitowitz, New Developments in Consumer Bankruptcies: Chapter 7 Dis-
missal on the Basis of 'Substantial Abuse,' 59 AM. BANKR. L.J. 327, 344 (1985)
[hereinafter Breitowitz, Installment I] (noting fact that § 707(b) does not define "sub-
stantial abuse," and that there is no legislative history to explain what Congress
meant); Breitowitz, New Developments in Consumer Bankruptcies: Chapter 7 Dismis-
sal on the Basis of 'Substantial Abuse,' 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 33, 67 (1986) [hereinafter
Breitowitz, Installment II] (concluding that the important issue to be resolved is
whether the "vague, undefineable standard" of what constitutes "substantial abuse"
should be read to foreclose certain debtors from relief, "even if their conduct is not in
fact 'abusive' "). See generally Morris, supra note 16, at 164 (discussing the Amend-
ments and concluding that "the Bankruptcy Amendments Act may have been based on
an overstatement of the problems under the 1978 Code, and significant inadequacies
and injustices may occur when the amended Code provisions are applied").
20 See, e.g., In re Kitson, 65 Bankr. 615, 618 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986); In re
Hudson, 64 Bankr. 73, 75-76 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986); In re Kress, 57 Bankr. 874,
877 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1986); In re Kelly, 57 Bankr. 536, 538 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1986);
In re Mastroeni, 56 Bankr. 456, 460 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Edwards, 50
Bankr. 933, 936 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re White, 49 Bankr. 869, 871-73 (Bankr.
W.D.N.C. 1985).
21 There is actually very little "official" legislative history accompanying the 1984
Amendments. The Amendments were passed without an official report from the House
or the Senate. Hearings were held on a myriad of proposed changes to the Code dating
back to March of 1979 and there were statements made on the floors of each of the
House and Senate on the date of passage of the Amendments, namely June 29, 1984.
See, e.g., 130 CONG. REC. H7489-7500, S8887-8900 (daily ed. June 29, 1984); 130
CONG. REC. S7615-25 (daily ed. June 19, 1984); 130 CONG. REc. H1796-1854 (daily
ed. March 21, 1984); see also S. 658, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 5027-32
(1979) (bill to correct technical and minor substantive errors in 1978 version of Bank-
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to date, there are no rules implementing the practice and procedure
under section 707(b), although such rules clearly were contemplated by
the Amendments.22 In November, 1985, the Judicial Conference circu-
lated preliminary drafts of implementing rules but, in their present
form, the draft rules fail to resolve the interpretive difficulties raised by
the Amendments.
2 3
These elements have combined to give judges and lawyers consid-
erable discretion in interpreting and applying the Amendments. This
interpretive latitude already has been evidenced by the growing number
of individual debtor cases decided in which the Amendments have been
ruptcy Code). Thus, while there is a great deal of information that was elicited at
hearings with respect to various proposed legislative changes, there is no single report
or text that definitively evidences the congressional intent behind any given section.
This dilemma was recognized by Representative Hyde who, at a hearing on March 21,
1984, stated, "We avoid providing a sound, authentic basis for legislative history, that
unique resource most relied upon by the courts to plumb the legislative intent of this
learned body." 130 CONG. REc. H1796-1854, H1809 (daily ed, March 21, 1984); cf.
In re Grant, 51 Bankr. 385, 388-93 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (attempting to cull from
the "unofficial" legislative history an interpretation of § 707(b)).
Difficulties in determining legislative intent with respect to the Code have arisen
with regularity. This can be partially explained by the fact that the key House and
Senate reports to the Code antedate the actual date of passage of the Code. See, e.g., S.
REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1978) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]; H.R. REP.
No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]. Because changes
were made to the Code right up to the date of its enactment, the reports are "incom-
plete." Thus, for a fuller understanding of the Code, one must look at statements made
in the House and Senate up to and including the dates the bill was passed in each
respective congressional body. For a welcome explanation of the legislative history of
the Code, see In re Keniston, 60 Bankr. 742, 744-45 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1986); Klee,
Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Code, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 275, 276
(1980); see also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
22 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
353, § 320, 98 Stat. 333, 357 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (Supp. III 1985)), pro-
vided that the Supreme Court would prescribe the rules to be followed under § 707(b).
2' The Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference
of the United States proposed amending existing Rule 1017, dealing generally with
dismissal and suspension, by, among other changes, adding a new subsection (e) that
provides:
(e) Dismissal of Individual Debtor's Chapter 7 Case for Substantial
Abuse. An individual debtor's case under Chapter 7 may be dismissed for
substantial abuse only after a hearing on notice to the debtor and the trus-
tee and such other parties in interest as the court directs. The notice shall
advise the debtor of all matters which the court will consider at the
hearing.
Proposed Amendment to Rule 1017, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 21,017 (1986); see also
Central Nat. Bank of Woodway-Hewitt v. Spark, 61 Bankr. 285, 286 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1986). The Committee note adds only that the failure of the debtor to attend the
required hearing is not a basis for dismissal under § 707(b).
The newly enacted Bankruptcy Act of 1986 addresses at least some aspects of the
procedural problem of who can bring a motion under § 707(b). See Bankruptcy Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 219, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100
Stat.) -.
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construed.24 In the burgeoning case law under sections 707(b), 1325(b),
and 1329(a), many courts have given an expansive interpretation of
these sections.25 This broad interpretation has resulted in the dismissal
of an increasing number of Chapter 7 cases, 26 heightened standards for
confirmation of Chapter 13 plans in which the principal issue has been
the amount of projected disposable income that will be available to
creditors, and an increasing willingness to permit amendments to ex-
isting plans.17 These decisions take on added significance in view of the
fact that, for obvious economic reasons, individual debtors are unlikely
to appeal many of the decisions adverse to their interests.
One material consequence of an expansive interpretation of the
Amendments is the possibility that, in certain circumstances, an indi-
vidual debtor could be precluded from filing a Chapter 7 case simply
because she would be found able to repay creditors in full, by applica-
tion of her projected disposable income for the succeeding three years,
under a Chapter 13 plan." Thus, the Code as amended may effectively
require an individual to work for her creditors (who could demand in-
24 See, e.g., In re Jones, 55 Bankr. 462 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985); In re Festner,
54 Bankr. 532 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985); In re Grant, 51 Bankr. 385 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1985); In re Edwards, 50 Bankr. 933 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Bryant, 47
Bankr. 21 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1984). To date, there have been approximately two
dozen cases under §§ 707(b), 1325(b), and 1329(a) addressing the specific issues high-
lighted in this Article.
2 See, e.g., In re Rogers, 65 Bankr. 1018 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986); In re
Tracy, No. 86-A-0481 (Bankr. D. Md. Oct. 17, 1986); In re Kitson, 65 Bankr. 617,
620-21 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986); In re Hudson, 64 Bankr. 73 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1986); In re Campbell, 63 Bankr. 702 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986); In re Shands, 63
Bankr. 121 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985); In re Keniston, 60 Bankr. 742 (Bankr. D.N.H.
1986); In re Saunders, 60 Bankr. 187 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986); In re Red, 60 Bankr.
113 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986); In re Kress, 57 Bankr. 874, 878 (Bankr. D.N.D.
1985); In re Kelly, 57 Bankr. 536, 539 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1986); In re Colton, ABI
Newsl., June, 1986, at 10 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1985), affd, ABI Newsl., June,
1986, at 10 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1985); In re Koonce, 54 Bankr. 643 (Bankr. D.S.C.
1985).
26 See, e.g., In re Hudson, 64 Bankr. at 75; In re Kress, 57 Bankr. at 878; In re
Kelly, 57 Bankr. at 539; In re Colton, ABI Newsl., June, 1986, at 10 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1985), affd, ABI Newsl., June, 1986, at 10 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 21,
1985); In re Grant, 51 Bankr. at 394-97; In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. at 24-26; cf. In re
Edwards, 50 Bankr. at 935 (Although the court did not dismiss the Chapter 7 petition,
it articulated in dicta a very high standard of screening Chapter 7 petitions when evalu-
ating them for "substantial abuse." This standard, the court reasoned, would lead to
either more dismissals of Chapter 7 cases or more conversions to Chapter 13.).
2 See, e.g., In re Rogers, 65 Bankr. at 1021-22; In re Kitson, 65 Bankr. at 622;
In re Red, 60 Bankr. at 116; In re Jones, 55 Bankr. 462, 466 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985);
In re Krull, 54 Bankr. 375, 378 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985); In re Peterson, 53 Bankr.
339, 341 (Bankr. D. Or. 1985).
28 See, e.g., In re Kitson, 65 Bankr. at 622; In re Hudson, 64 Bankr. at 75-76; In
re Kress, 57 Bankr. at 878; In re Colton, ABI Newsl., June, 1986, at 10 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1985), affd, ABI Newsl., June, 1986, at 10 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 21,
1985); In re Edwards, 50 Bankr. at 937 & n.3.
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creased payments on an ongoing basis) for three years as a condition to
discharge. Strong bankruptcy policy considerations militate against such
a result.S" In addition, it can be argued-and has been argued in the
context of prior legislative proposals the effect of which closely parallel
those resulting from an expansive interpretation of the Amend-
ments-that an expansive interpretation of the Amendments violates
the spirit if not the letter of the thirteenth amendment, as enforced by
the anti-peonage laws.30 While an expansive interpretation of the
29 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 21, at 94, 120. The term "mandatory Chapter
13" is used frequently in this context although the term has not been specifically de-
fined. In a very general sense, it might be defined as the "forced reorganization of
individuals." One of the central issues is how "forced" something must be to be truly
mandatory. The concept of a mandatory Chapter 13 has had its proponents, see, e.g.,
Eisenberg I, supra note 8, at 980 ("[L]inking the discharge to some effort to repay out
of future earnings can lead to a more efficient self-regulating mechanism under which
debtors themselves avoid questionable bankruptcies."), and its opponents, see, e.g.,
Ayers, Reforming the Reform Act: Should the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 Be
Amended to Limit the Availability of Discharge to Consumers, 17 NEw ENG. L. REv.
719, 728 (1982) ("[T]he attempt to make chapter 13 mandatory ignored significant
constitutional and practical objections and was specifically rejected by the proponents of
the Improvements Act."); Boshkoff, supra note 1, at 116 (noting that "Congress re-
jected the view that debtors should be coerced into entering Chapter 13"); Countryman,
supra note 9, at 826-27 ("[The consumer credit industry] is proposing what it was
proposing before the new Bankruptcy Code was adopted: a modest proposal for a re-
turn to the indentured servant device of seventeenth-century colonial days . . . along
with a severe restriction on the availability of the voluntary petition introduced in this
country in 1841 . . ").
SO For instances in which this argument has been made, see Bankruptcy Reform:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 257, 257 (1983) (statement of Lawrence P. King, Professor of Law,
New York University School of Law) ("[Proposal] while perhaps not violative of the
13th Amendment to the Constitution comes very close to it in word and spirit."); Sen-
ate Hearings, supra note 5, at 142 (statement of Vern Countryman, Professor of Law,
Harvard University Law School) ("We would be turning our backs on our history...
if we were now to enact a mass peonage statute whereby the debtor's discharge is to be
delayed for a 15-year period of bondage during which his future earnings are seques-
tered for the benefit of his existing creditors."); cf. Wage Earner Plans Under the
Bankruptcy Act: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. of the Judici-
ary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 105 (1967) (statement of J. Doherty) (noting that a coercive
Chapter 13 plan "raises serious questions of personal liberties and rights"); Uniform
System of Bankruptcy: Hearings Before the Subcomms. of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. 535, 546 (1932) [hereinafter Uniform 'Hearings]
(statement of H. Feibelman) ("[T]he stringent provisions of this proposed amendment
[are] absolutely out of step with our conception of liberty.").
The argument has also been made in some bankruptcy opinions. See, e.g., In re
Deaton, 65 Bankr. 663, 665 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986) (rejecting notion that Congress
intended a mandatory Chapter 13 because such a proposal would place unbearable
stress on the bankruptcy court system); In re Graham, 21 Bankr. 235, 238 (Bankr.
N.D. Iowa 1982) (quoting HOUSE REPORT, supra note 21, at 120) (noting congres-
sional refusal to create an involuntary Chapter 13 because of constitutional prohibition
of involuntary servitude); In re Noonan, 17 Bankr. 793, 799 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981)
("Congress acted to dispel even the remotest possibility of involuntary servitude by
prohibiting involuntary chapter 13 cases."); In re Markman, 5 Bankr. 196, 198-99
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Amendments does not result in a direct constitutional violation, it does
violate the policy and philosophy underlying the antipeonage laws,
thereby further eroding the fresh start policy. 1
These serious adverse consequences of the Consumer Credit
Amendments can be eliminated, however, by according the Amend-
ments a narrow interpretation that is fully consistent with established
principles of statutory construction. This Article proposes an interpre-
tive approach to the Amendments that would permit the realization of
the legitimate objectives of the legislation 2 without compromising the
fresh start policy that is at the core of our bankruptcy laws. This pro-
posed approach requires that the Amendments be read in the context of
the Code as an integrated whole against a background of bankruptcy
philosophy generally. If one recognizes that Congress did not intend to
change the fresh start policy's status as a cornerstone of the bankruptcy
system, then the suggested reading is justified and necessary.
The narrow statutory interpretation suggested in this Article
through the development of narrow paradigms may also avoid a critical
anomaly. If the Amendments continue to be accorded the broadbased
interpretation that has been increasingly reflected in recent cases, 83 it is
possible that fewer debtors will seek relief under the Code. Creditors
may find themselves having to rely upon time-consuming, nonuniform,
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (quoting HousE REPORT, supra note 21, at 120) (same). The
sentiment concerning the interrelationship between bankruptcy and the thirteenth
amendment is encapsulated in the following passage from the HousE REPORT, supra
note 21, at 120 (issued in conjunction with the passage of the Code in 1978) (footnotes
omitted):
As under current law, chapter 13 is completely voluntary. This Committee
firmly rejected the idea of mandatory or involuntary chapter XIII in the
90th Congress. The thirteenth amendment prohibits involuntary servitude.
Though it has never been tested in the wage earner plan context, it has
been suggested that a mandatory chapter 13, by forcing an individual to
work for creditors, would violate this prohibition. On policy grounds, it
would be unwise to allow creditors to force a debtor into a repayment
plan. An unwilling debtor is less likely to retain his job or to cooperate in
the repayment plan, and more often than not, the plan would be pre-
ordained to fail.
31 To date, there has been no systematic analysis of whether a "mandatory"
Chapter 13 would violate the thirteenth amendment. Professor Eisenberg rejects, on the
basis of "ignorance of constitutional law," the concept that a mandatory Chapter 13 is
violative of the thirteenth amendment. See Eisenberg I, supra note 8, at 988-89. To
date, there has been no case holding that that provision of the Code violates the thir-
teenth amendment. Given the frequency, however, with which the argument is raised
by courts and Congress, see supra notes 29-30, it is high time for a detailed analysis of
this issue. Cf. In re Kress, 57 Bankr. 874, 877 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1986) ("Neither the
statute as drafted nor its framers meant it as a method of forcing consumer debtors into
Chapter 13.").
832 See infra notes 159-68, 312-19, 390-93 and accompanying text.
3' See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
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costly, and often ineffective state law remedies to collect what is owed
them with absolutely no assurance that recoveries will match what was
available under the Code prior to adoption of the Amendments."' By
explicitly noting that bankruptcy law should be a "last resort,"' 5 con-
gressional proponents of the Amendments suggest a desire to eliminate
the use of the federal bankruptcy laws as a "safe haven" by individual
debtors. By choosing to aid the credit industry by reducing individual
bankruptcy filings, rather than by seeking to ensure increased creditor
recoveries on claims that are made, creditors may be forced to turn to
those state law collection methods that provided the very impetus for
federal bankruptcy reform."
Although it is reasonable to question whether the Consumer
Credit Amendments should have been adopted in the first instance, 7
34 Cf H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 171 (1973) ("[11n states
where there are excessive exemptions, creditors have difficulty understanding a system
that allows a debtor to retain property of a value of several hundred thousand dollars,
while at the same time obtaining a discharge which precludes recovery of the creditors'
claims."). See D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM
1-17, 41-106 (1971) thereinafter BROOKINGS STUDY] (general overview of provisions of
and problems inherent in bankruptcy law, including a discussion of state bankruptcy
remedies); see also Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, supra note 10, at 311-35 (discuss-
ing debtors' ability to repay and the 1984 Amendments).
" The HOUSE REPORT, supra note 21, at 117-18 (emphasis added), in summa-
rizing the purposes of Chapter 13, states:
This bill attempts to cure these inadequacies in the Bankruptcy Act
and to prevent the frequent problems confronting consumer debtors that
have occurred both in the bankruptcy court and out. First, the bill simpli-
fies, expands, and makes more flexible wage earner plans . . . . Second,
many of the provisions in the current bankruptcy law that enable private
action to undo the beneficial effects of bankruptcy are changed. Third, the
debtor is given adequate exemptions and other protections to ensure that
bankruptcy will provide a fresh start. Fourth, the bankruptcy system is
modified to eliminate the close relationship between a bankruptcy judge
and a trustee that often works to the consumer debtor's detriment. The
premises of the bill with respect to consumer bankruptcy are that use of
the bankruptcy law should be a last resort; that if it is used, debtors
should attempt repayment under chapter 13 . . .; and finally, whether the
debtor uses chapter 7, Liquidation, or chapter 13, Adjustment of Debts of
an Individual, bankruptcy relief should be effective, and should provide
the debtor with a fresh start.
36 See authorities cited supra note 34.
'7 For arguments questioning whether the amendments should have been adopted
at all, see Countryman, supra note 9, at 826-27 (criticizing the proposed bankruptcy
amendments as the credit industry's attempt to use the federal bankruptcy courts for
"free collection services"); Ginsberg, The Proposed Bankruptcy Improvement Act: The
Creditors Strike Back, 3 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 1, 72 (1982) thereinafter Ginsberg, The
Proposed Bankruptcy Improvement Act] ("Such fundamental changes in bankruptcy
philosophy require considerably more study and effort than has gone into the BIA.");
Ginsberg, The Bankruptcy Improvements Act-An Update, 3 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 235,
251 (1983) [hereinafter Ginsberg, Update] ("Frankly, the OBIA seems to be an at-
tempt by creditor interests to swin1g the bankruptcy law pendulum as far their way as
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and one's response might well be that the Amendments do not make
sense, the possibility of yet another major Code revision in the near
future is improbable at best."8 Therefore, rather than criticize the inad-
equacies of the Amendments and argue for their repeal or modification,
this Article will attempt to provide practical interpretive guidance to
aid courts and lawyers in their almost daily confrontation with the
problems the Amendments raise.
To that end, this Article begins with an overview of the Consumer
Credit Amendments and the historical events that preceded their pas-
sage."9 The Article then analyzes how sections 707(b), 1325(b) and
1329(a) can be and have already been interpreted in an overly expan-
sive fashion and suggests, in contrast, the beneficial and operative fea-
tures of a narrow statutory interpretation, aspects of which have been
adopted recently by a small number of the courts.40 In that context, the
Article probes the expansive paradigm, examining the reasons for con-
cluding that it violates bankruptcy policy and the spirit of the thirteenth
amendment and the antipeonage laws.41 The Article concludes by har-
monizing a narrow interpretation of the Consumer Credit Amendments
with the fresh start policy and reflecting on how such an interpretation
they think they can get away with in the current political environment."); Sullivan,
Warren & Westbrook, Limiting Access to Bankruptcy Discharge: An Analysis of the
Creditors' Data, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 1091, 1146 [hereinafter Sullivan, Warren &
Westbrook, Limiting Access] ("We should not permit purveyors of high risk credit to
lure the undisciplined further into debt and then to use the great, expensive engine of
the law to collect their debts by making the undisciplined live for five years at the
poverty level ... ."); Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, Rejoinder: Limiting Access to
Bankruptcy Discharge, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 1087, 1088 [hereinafter Sullivan, Warren
& Westbrook, Rejoinder] (arguing that an influential study in the adoption of the
amendments was deeply flawed both in its methodology and in its failure to consider
broader policy issues implicated by a bankruptcy scheme); Warren, supra note 5, at
1357 ("[Tlhe credit industry's continuing assertions of a bankruptcy 'crisis'. . . [may]
result in important concessions-even though no one has proven any underlying need
for bankruptcy reform.").
" Given the passage of new legislation in 1986, see supra note 3, it is unlikely
that a new comprehensive legislative scheme will be passed in the near future. Even
though specific concerns surrounding the Consumer Credit Amendments were in exis-
tence at the time of the 1986 legislation, little was done to address the needs of the
consumer debtor. In fact, to the extent changes were made, they strengthen the rights of
creditors. See infra note 105.
11 See infra text accompanying notes 43-103.
40 See infra text accompanying notes 104-393. This approach has been adopted by
a small number of courts to date. See, e.g., In re Deaton, 65 Bankr. 663, 664-65
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986); In re Gaukler, 63 Bankr. 224, 226 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1986);
In re Green, 60 Bankr. 547 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986); In re Tinneberg, 59 Bankr. 634
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986).
4 See cases cited supra note 40.
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inures, in both the long and short term, to the benefit of debtors and
creditors alike.42
I. BACKGROUND OF THE CONSUMER CREDIT AMENDMENTS
Individual debtors have long been accorded special treatment
under the federal bankruptcy laws.41 Provisions designed to assist indi-
vidual debtors in achieving a fresh start were included in the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898 and strengthened by the adoption of the Chandler
Amendments in 1938.44 All of the individual debtor protections con-
tained in the Code are premised on the belief that, although recourse to
bankruptcy is not a preferred course of action and individuals ought to
repay their debts, there is nothing inherently wrong with being unable
to repay one's debts or with seeking the relief that the Code provides.45
42 See infra text accompanying notes 394-408.
41 Statutory relief for the financially distressed wage earner has been available to
some extent as early as the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517. See Perry v.
Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 394 (1966); see also In re Perry, 272 F. Supp. 73,
77 (D. Me. 1967) ("[T]he idea of a program for the amortization of personal debts was
conceived in 1931, as one of the developments of the Donovan investigation of bank-
ruptcy conditions in New York City in 1929 . . . ."); In re Scher, 12 Bankr. 258, 261
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("When Congress saw fit during the final years of the last
century and the first 79 years of this one to focus its attention on the plight of the
financially pressed wage-earner, it was not writing on a clean slate."). See generally
Countryman, supra note 9 (tracing the historical development of provisions relating to
-individual debtors).
44 It is in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 that we see the first clear-cut effort to
consider the difficulties of wage earners in a manner separate from and better than that
available to other debtors. The Act provided for voluntary and involuntary filings. See
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 4, 30 Stat. 544, 547. When one recognizes that our
first bankruptcy law had no provisions for involuntary bankruptcy, this provision takes
on added significance. The import of the provision is enhanced by the recognition that
the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 39, 14 Stat. 517, 536, permitted involuntary
proceedings against "any person," including farmers and laborers. In contrast, the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 expressly provided that no involuntary proceeding could be
commenced against a wage earner. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 4(b), 30
Stat. 544, 547. The term "wage earner" in the 1898 Act was defined as "an individual
who works for wages, salary or hire, at a rate of compensation not exceeding one thou-
sand five hundred dollars per year." See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 1(a)(27),
30 Stat. 544, 545. Although wages due to laborers, clerks, or servants were entitled to
priority under § 64(b)(4), 30 Stat. at 563, the term "wage earner" only appears for
substantive purposes in § 4(b), 30 Stat. at 547. One has to suppose that the effort to
limit the filing of involuntary proceedings against wage earners-in direct contrast to
the Act of 1867-reflects a congressional policy of according special treatment to wage
earners.
" See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934); see also In re Johns-
Manville Corp., 36 Bankr. 727, 736 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (quoting Report of the
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 137, pt. 2,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 75, 79 (1977)) ("A 'principal' goal of the Bankruptcy Code is to
provide 'open access' to the 'bankruptcy process. . . . The rationale behind this 'open
access' policy is to provide access to bankruptcy relief which is as 'open' as 'access to
the credit economy.' "); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 21, at 94, 120; Countryman,
supra note 9, at 817 (quoting with approval Local Loan Co., 292 U.S. at 244).
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With the virtual abolition of debtor's prisons, where one was punished
simply for being a debtor,46 our bankruptcy laws have struggled to per-
mit an individual to repay debts without being stripped of dignity.
Preservation of self-worth has been a prized value-if a debtor's self-
respect can be preserved throughout a case, it has been argued, the
individual debtor will have the incentive to begin a new life and to
reestablish herself as a productive member of society.
47
Individual debtor protection has taken a variety of forms over the
years. The ability to obtain a discharge-a release of all prepetition
indebtedness-and to retain exempt property-assets that cannot be
reached by one's creditors-has been the mainstay of debtor protection.
However, the effort to preserve a debtor's dignity also can be seen in
other bankruptcy provisions. Chapter 13 (formerly Chapter XIII)4 s
was designed, for example, to provide a simple, cost-efficient way to
encourage debtors to repay their creditors over time without the per-
ceived stigma of a liquidation proceeding.49 In part, the theory behind
Chapter 13 is that if a debtor voluntarily chooses to repay her creditors
from future income, as opposed to being ordered to repay them, the
likelihood of payment will in fact increase."0 The ever-expanding defi-
46 See Countryman, supra note 9, at 814; Ford, Imprisonment for Debt, 25
MICH. L. REV. 24, 32-34 (1926); Nehemkis, The Boston Poor Debtor Court, 42 YALE
L.J. 561, 578 (1933).
47 See Local Loan Co., 292 U.S. at 244; Williams v. United States Fidelity Co.,
236 U.S. 549, 549-54 (1914); see also T. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 1447 ("[A]
nonwaivable right of discharge protects the individual from his own impulsive or biased
decisions that lead him to overconsume credit, and it protects others from the externali-
ties produced by these decisions."); BROOKINGS STUDY, supra note 34, at 197 ("[W]e
have seen that bankruptcy is inevitable and necessary. The process ends a deteriorating
but unresolved situation so that those involved can make a fresh start."); Kronman,
supra note 14, at 785 ("The right to a discharge is usually justified in terms of the
debtor's need for a fresh start, unhampered by earlier debts.").
48 Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, §§ 601-686, 52 Stat. 840 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1086), repealed by Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, title IV,
§§ 401(a), 402(a), 92 Stat. 2682.
41 See REMINGTON ON BANKRUPTCY § 3747, at 418-19 (J. Henderson 6th ed.
1955); see also Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 395 (1966) ("[Chapter
XIII] gave-and was intended to give-to the wage earner a reasonable opportunity to
arrange installment payments to be made out of future earnings."); In re Scher, 12
Bankr. 258, 262-63 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("Chapter XIII was framed to permit the
wage earner . . . to pay his creditors from his future wages as earned.").
50 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 21, at 120; see also Warren, supra note 5, at
1336 (criticizing theory that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 failed to achieve Con-
gress's goal of promoting more substantial repayment of debt under Chapter 13).
It should be noted that § 72 7 (a)(8) was not enacted in the manner contained in
the Senate bill, S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). Rather, § 727(a)(9), as enacted,
contemplates that a debtor could get a discharge in a Chapter 7 case, even if she had
filed a Chapter 13 case within the previous six years, if payments under the plan in the
previous case totaled at least 100% of the allowed unsecured claims in that case, or 70%
of such claims, and if the plan was proposed in good faith and represented the debtor's
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nition of "wage earner" (the person entitled to relief under Chapter 13)
suggests the importance placed over the years on offering individuals in
financial trouble an opportunity to restructure their prior obligations.51
The dramatic growth of consumer credit subsequent to World
War II and the consequent increase in the volume and complexity of
financial problems of individual debtors rapidly eclipsed the adequacy
of the pre-Code provisions to achieve their objectives. 2 For example,
courts handled confirmation of Chapter XIII cases differently from ju-
risdiction to jurisdiction and the effort to create simple, cost-efficient
methods of relief for debtors faltered.53 Accordingly, in 1968, Congress
began active consideration of a complete revision of the federal bank-
ruptcy laws. 4 At the heart of this effort was a congressional bias in
favor of preserving and promoting the rights of individual debtors and
encouraging them to utilize the federal bankruptcy system to achieve a
best effort. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(9) (1982). For a recent case encouraging the use of
Chapter 13, see In re Lepper, 58 Bankr. 896, 903 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986).
51 The term "wage earner" was expanded at various times over the years prior to
the passage of the Code in 1978. For example, in 1938, the term "wage earner" was
defined as "an individual who works for wages, salary, or hire. . . which, when added
to all his other income, does not exceed $3600 per year." See Bankruptcy Act, ch. 575,
§ 606(8), 52 Stat. 840, 931 (1938). Interestingly, for the purpose of limiting who could
be put into an involuntary case, the Act retained the limitation of $1500 with respect to
wage earners. Thus, the definition of wage earner that appeared in the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898, ch. 541, § 1(a)(27), 30 Stat. at 842, for purposes of § 4(b), 30 Stat. at 547,
*differed from that contained in § 606(8), 30 Stat. at 931. See supra note 44 and accom-
panying text. According to a text prepared in 1938 on the Chandler Amendments,
"[t]he new figure [$3600] is not entirely arbitrary; it is a fair approximation, in the
light of experience with wage earner bankruptcies under the old Act, at a line of de-
marcation which will be likely to reach the wage earners most in need of the relief of
this chapter." J. WEINSTEIN, THE BANKRUPTcY LAW OF 1938, at 337 (1938). The
term "wage earner" was amended in 1950 to raise the ceiling on wages earned for
purposes of Chapter XIII to $5000. See Act of December 29, 1950, 64 Stat. 1134. In
1959, the statute was again amended, this time deleting any monetary ceiling with
respect to Chapter XIII; the only requirement was that the debtor be a wage earner,
which was defined as an individual "whose principal income is derived from wages,
salary or commissions." See Act of May 13, 1959, 73 Stat. 24; see also 9 REMINGTON
ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 49, at § 3748 U. Henderson ed. 1955 & Supp. 1978)
(discussing, inter alia, meaning of "wage earner").
" See H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 33 (1973), which
stated: "The largest cause of public concern about the Bankruptcy Act since the Chan-
dler Act revisions at the end of the 1930's has stemmed from the enormous increase in
the number of Act cases during the quarter century that has followed World War II."
Id. Moreover, the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in most jurisdictions also
created interpretive difficulties both within and outside the bankruptcy context.
" See id. at 157. "Although the use of . . . [Chapter 13] does seem to
predominate in certain parts of the country, diversity in use can be found among states
in the same geographical region . . . and there is a surprising variety in the usage of
the Act among individual residents in the same state." Id.
For a comprehensive discussion of the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Act
of 1978, see Klee, supra note 21.
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fresh start.5 5 The resulting legislation-the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978-substantially simplified the procedures for individual debtor re-
course to bankruptcy relief and, despite the consumer credit industry's
considerable opposition, expanded the rights of and protections ac-
corded to individual debtors under the federal bankruptcy laws.
56
The six year period between adoption of the Code and the Con-
sumer Credit Amendments was marked by several important but some-
what self-contradictory developments. The consumer credit industry,
despite its stated conviction that the Code had improperly shifted the
balance of rights in favor of individual debtors, 57 intensified its market-
ing efforts to increase consumer borrowing. 58 As double digit inflation
fueled the needs of consumers to borrow, rising interest rates en-
couraged creditors to lend. 59 Added to the growth of the total volume of
consumer credit and the resulting mounting interest burden was the
dramatic increase in unemployment."0 The inevitable consequence was
an upsurge in individual debtor loan defaults and recourse by individ-
ual debtors to the federal bankruptcy laws.61
The reaction of the consumer credit industry was predictable. De-
spite its continued promotion of consumer credit and the existence of
5' For a discussion of the fresh start policy, see supra notes 1-14 and accompany-
ing text.
51 See Biery, Debt Adjustment Under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 473, 474 (1979); Chatz, Costello & Gross, An Overview
of the Bankruptcy Code, 84 CoM. L.J. 259, 259 (1979); Cohen & Klee, Caveat Credi-
tor: The Consumer Debtor Under the Bankruptcy Code, 58 N.C.L. REv. 681, 681
(1980).
57 See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 452, 453 (1983) [hereinafter Hearing]; Warren, supra note
5, at 1333.
58 See Hearing, supra note 57, at 493 (chart reflecting increase in amount of
consumer credit outstanding).
59 See Schuchman & Rhorer, Personal Bankruptcy Data for Opt-Out Hearings
and Other Purposes, 56 AM. BANXR. L.J. 1, 2 (1982) (noting that, in August of 1981,
consumer installment credit totaled $324.65 billion, an increase of 6.2% from one year
earlier) (quoting Wall St. J., Oct. 8, 1981, at 8, col. 1); see also Noble, Bankruptcies
Soaring as High Interest Rates Cause Cash Shortages, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1981, at
1, col. 1 (attributing rising rate of bankruptcy to the 1980 recession, the increase in the
demand for credit, and the rise of interest rates).
60 See Note, Filing for Personal Bankruptcy: Adoption of a "Bona Fide Effort"
Test Under Chapter 13, 14 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 321, 321 (1981) (chart showing rela-
tionship between unemployment, inflation, Gross National Product, and bankruptcies).
For a discussion of the effect of unemployment as well as other economic factors on the
rate-of individual debtor failures, see Shepard, Personal Failures and the Bankruptcy
Act of 1978, 27 J.L. & EcoN. 419, 430-34 (1984).
61 In general terms, the total number of bankruptcy filings rose from approxi-
mately 250,000 in 1975 to 520,000 in 1982. See T. EISENBERG, DEBTOR AND CREDI-
TOR LAw 438-39 (1984); see also Schuchman & Rhorer, supra note 59, at 1 (noting a
constant increase in the per capita frequency of personal bankruptcy filings since
World War II).
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statistics demonstrating that the actual number of individual debtor fil-
ings under the Code as a percentage of total credit dollars extended had
not increased, the industry continued to criticize the enhanced individ-
ual debtor protection provisions of the Code. 62 The post-Code experi-
ence had merely intensified the credit industry's resolve. Its representa-
tives argued that the Code's liberalized exemptions, expanded discharge
provisions, and diminished Chapter 13 entry-level requirements were
responsible for the proliferation of bankruptcy filings by individual
debtors.6 The industry argued that those individuals filing for relief
under Chapter 7, many of whom had no non-exempt assets, were ob-
taining discharges from indebtedness that could have been repaid in
major part under Chapter 13. The credit industry further suggested
that those debtors who did utilize Chapter 13 were obtaining confirma-
tion of plans that allowed them to pay less than they were capable of
paying on an ongoing basis, and that they were receiving relief through
the broadbased discharge provisions in Chapter 13 from prefiling in-
debtedness that would be nondischargeable in a Chapter 7 proceed-
ing.64 Bolstered by media attention to the rising rate of bankruptcies
and by the apparent ability of individual debtors to avoid their obliga-
tions through the bankruptcy laws,65 the industry maintained that its
recoveries were unnecessarily diminished solely because abusive debtors
were manipulating the Code to their advantage.
66
The consumer credit industry's lobbying efforts prompted various
legislative proposals following passage of the Code that predated the
62 For a summary of the credit industry's criticism of the Code, see Hearing,
supra note 57, at 486-493; see also Countryman, supra note 9, at 822-26 (criticizing
assumptions used in Purdue study, PURDUE UNIVERSITY CREDIT RESEARCH CENTER,
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY STUDY (1981) [hereinafter PURDUE STUDY], reprinted in
Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 23); Sullivan, Warren, & Westbrook, Limiting Ac-
cess, supra note 37, at 1103-38 (criticizing the design, execution, and analysis of the
Purdue Study); Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, Rejoinder, supra note 37, at 1101-02
(concluding that the credit industry's own data undermine the claim that limiting access
to bankruptcy would result in 1.1 million dollars in savings to creditors and
consumers).
63 See Hearing, supra note 57, at 488-89. But see Sullivan, Warren & West-
brook, supra note 10, at 308-09 (noting that credit industry's assumption that all debt
is consumer debt fails to recognize the large percentage of business debt owed by indi-
vidual debtors).
64 See Hearing, supra note 57, at 487.
65 See Young, When Relief Exceeds the Need . . . The "Straight" Bankruptcy
Ripoff reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 448. Part of what some mem-
bers of Congress saw as evidence of abuse were advertisements for bankruptcy relief.
See Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 113-14, 445-46 (samples of newspaper adver-
tisements from bankruptcy specialists, including one that featured the headline "Provo
Couple Gets Free of Debt in Only 24 Hours!").
68 See Hearing, supra note 57, at 488.
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Consumer Credit Amendments."7 None of these proposals, however,
was adopted.68 Although the proposals addressed a number of concerns,
two are of critical significance to this analysis: the standards for confir-
mation of a Chapter 13 plan and the entry-level requirements for a
Chapter 7 case.
The credit industry focused its attention on one of the most liti-
gated sections of the Code, section 1325(a)(3), which included among
the requirements for confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan that it be pro-
posed in good faith. 9 Although the term "good faith" was by no means
new to the federal bankruptcy laws, 0 courts had conflicting views of its
meaning in the context of a Chapter 13 plan." Some courts held that a
debtor had to make payments at least equal to seventy percent of her
outstanding unsecured indebtedness over the term of the plan, while
others approved plans involving zero or minimal payments. 2 Although
67 See S. 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 2000, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., re-
printed in 127 CONG. REC. S15,712 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1981), amended by 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 4786, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); see also Ginsberg, The
Proposed Bankruptcy Improvement Act, supra note 37, at 1 n.1 (discussing bills pro-
posed by Senators Dole and Butler that sought, among other things, to restructure
bankruptcy and other federal courts); Ginsberg, Update, supra note 37 (examining the
consumer credit amendments proposed in the Omnibus Bankruptcy Improvements Act
of 1983).
88 See Ginsberg, Update, supra note 37, at 248.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1982) (providing that the court shall confirm a
plan if "the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by
law").
70 See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 550 (current version at 11
U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1982)), which read, in relevant part: "The judge shall confirm a
composition if satisfied that . . .the offer and its acceptance are in good faith."
71 See Cyr, The Chapter 13 "Good Faith" Tempest: An Analysis and Proposal
for Change, 55 Am. BANKR. L.J. 271, 275 n.17 (1981) ("There is nothing in Chapter
13 itself or in its legislative history to support, much less prompt, the various unprece-
dented interpretations given 'good faith' by the majority of courts to date."); see also
Note, Bankruptcy: Good Faith and the Zero Payment Plan in Chapter 13, 69 Ky.
L.J. 327, 344 (1981) ("A number of courts have remained unconvinced that good faith
requires some minimum payment to unsecured creditors under Chapter 13."). For a
summary of several cases on § 1325(a)(3), see Ordin, The Good Faith Principle in the
Bankruptcy Code, 38 Bus. L.J. 1795 (1983).
7' For examples of cases applying the 70% standard, see In re Burrell, [1978-81
Transfer Binder] Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 67,382 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1980), rev'd,
[1983-84 Transfer Binder] Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 69,062 (N.D. Cal. 1982); In re
Heard, 6 Bankr. 876, 882 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1980); In re Raburn, 4 Bankr. 624
(M.D. Ga. 1980). As suggested by some of the courts adopting the 70% standard, the
70% standard might be rooted in § 727(a)(9), which limits the rights of a debtor to
obtain a discharge in Chapter 7 if within the prior six years she has obtained a dis-
charge in Chapter 13. Under § 727(a)(9), the debtor can avoid such a limitation if the
Chapter 13 plan provides creditors with 100% payment of the allowed unsecured
claims or creditors received payments equal to 70% of their claims, and if the plan is
proposed in good faith and represents the debtor's best effort. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 727(a)(9) (1982).
For examples of cases permitting zero or minimal payments, see Barnes v. Whe-
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many courts examined the debtor's future earning capability, it was but
one of many factors considered. The inconsistent results of the applica-
tion of section 1325(a)(3) spawned a number of proposals suggesting
that the present good faith requirement be augmented by a further re-
quirement that a Chapter 13 plan represent the debtor's "ability to
pay," "bona fide effort," or "good faith effort." 3 Irrespective of lan-
guage differences, all of these proposals reflected one common theme,
namely that a Chapter 13 plan ought not to be confirmed unless the
debtor manifested a serious effort to repay her creditors, as opposed to
a mere good faith proposal in the plan to do so. 74 Various accompany-
ing committee reports indicate that these suggested reforms were
designed not to change bankruptcy policy but merely to clarify it.
75
These reforms would have done more, however, than merely clarify.
The focus of these reforms differed from that of the Code by consider-
ing the debtor's future income as the essential criterion, rather than
merely as one of several criteria, for determining repayments under a
Chapter 13 plan.
Concern with the entry-level requirements for a Chapter 7 case
was reflected in a Senate proposal that would have precluded an indi-
vidual debtor from filing a Chapter 7 case if the debtor would have
been able to repay a reasonable portion of her indebtedness out of fu-
ture income.76 This standard, dubbed the "future income test," was
subject to considerable criticism. As noted by Senators Metzenbaum
and Kennedy, because the proposal conditioned the availability of relief
under Chapter 7 on the amount of a debtor's future income, it "repre-
sented a radical departure" from the tradition of according individuals
Ian, 689 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1982); In re Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426 (7th Cir. 1982); In
re Moss, 51 Bankr. 122 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980); In re Faust, 12 Bankr. 679
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1981); In re Methvin, 11 Bankr. 556 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1981); see
also In re Green, 60 Bankr. 547, 551 n.6 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986) (offering a current
compilation of these cases).
73 See, e.g., Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1981, S. 863, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 128(b) (1981) (bona fide effort test); S. 658, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 128(b) (1980)
(good faith effort test); S. REP. No. 150, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19 (1981) (ability to
pay test).
71 See Cyr, supra note 71, at 281-88 (comparing the "good faith effort," "bona
fide effort," and "ability to pay" tests); Ginsberg, The Proposed Bankruptcy Improve-
ment Act, supra note 37, at 61-62 (Amendments require that a Chapter 13 debtor
demonstrate a "bona fide effort which is consistent with the debtor's ability to repay his
debts after providing for himself and his dependents"); LoPucki, "Encouraging" Re-
payment Under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 347, 351
(1981) ("This good faith requirement has been a part of Chapter XIII continuously
since 1938 . . ").
See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1195, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1980).
78 See S. 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
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a fresh start. 7 In various prior suggested changes to the bankruptcy
laws, Congress had repeatedly defeated any legislation that took away a
debtor's right to liquidate her assets and begin anew."
The defeat of this proposed threshold requirement for Chapter 7
filings did not, however, eliminate further creditor efforts at "re-
form."7 Notwithstanding a variety of legislative defeats along the way,
portions of the credit industry's proposals were adopted by Congress,
aided at least in part by several key factors outside the industry's con-
trol.80 First, in 1982, the United States Supreme Court determined that
7 S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 90 (1983).
78 See id. (remarks of Senators Kennedy and Metzenbaum) ("In the name of cur-
ing a few well-publicized abuses of the Bankruptcy Code, a well-orchestrated creditor
lobby attempted to turn back the clock on basic bankruptcy protections. Instead of a
fine-tuned approach designed to weed out possible abuses, creditors attempted a broad
assault on our Bankruptcy Code.").
In looking at our bankruptcy history, similar concern was expressed in 1932 when
Congress contemplated adding the concept of "suspended discharge" into the law. This
legislation proposed, in general terms, that individuals who could repay more than 50%
of their indebtedness would not initially get a discharge. Rather, it would be held in
abeyance while the debtor paid creditors out of future income and non-exempt prop-
erty. See Joint Hearings Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. of the Judiciary on a
Uniform System of Bankruptcy, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 535, 546-52 (1932) [hereinafter
Joint Hearings].
This proposed legislation never saw the light of day. In objecting to its passage,
the Dade County Bar Association expressed its view that the legislation went "too far"
in trying to punish the alleged wrong-doing debtor. As expressed in the Bar Associa-
tion's report, "the proposed act, in its effort to apprehend the fraudulent merchant,
necessarily would prevent many good citizens from starting life anew after an unfortu-
nate failure." Id. at 545 (statement of Herbert U. Feibelman).
Herbert U. Feibelman, chairman of the bankruptcy section of the Dade County
Bar Association, stated further:
If the bar of this country could be made thoroughly familiar with that
provision [suspended discharge], I think a protest would arise that would
sound from one end of the country to the other. In my opinion, it is so
decidedly un-American as to shock the conscience of anyone who is im-
bued with the most superficial feeling of liberty.
We seem to have gone so far in this country that we are apparently
willing to foist upon the public an act that absolutely destroys all exemp-
tions guaranteed under the constitutions of the several states, and that
make a free-born American citizen come into court and stultify himself by
telling what money he needs for clothing, food and shelter for his family.
How far have we gone in this country when Congress will even consider
such a proposition as that?
Id, at 546-47.
79 See infra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
8 The legislation that was passed and supported by the consumer credit industry
contained a "compromise" provision with respect to Chapter 7 cases. Interestingly, the
legislation adopted the suggestion of the National Bankruptcy Conference with respect
to Chapter 13, namely the "disposable income" provisions now found in § 1325(b). See
11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Cyr, supra note 71, at 281-85. The
irony is that the National Bankruptcy Conference opposed the adoption of § 707(b),
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the expanded jurisdiction accorded federal bankruptcy courts under the
Code was unconstitutional." The Supreme Court stayed the effect of
its 1982 decision until December 24, 1983, in the hope that Congress
would adopt a revised bankruptcy court system by that date. 2 The fact
that the court system established under the Code expired by its own
terms on March 31, 1984 provided a further incentive for legislative
action." Nonetheless, Congress did not reach a consensus by December
1983 and, in fact, was forced to extend on various occasions the expira-
tion of the entire court system."' In spite of the delays and ensuing
extensions, Congress did feel the need to act quickly in response to the
Supreme Court's decision. 5 Because of the pressure on Congress to
pass some type of bankruptcy legislation, various special interest groups
saw this period as an ideal time to pressure Congress into adopting
their proposals as part and parcel of the changes to the bankruptcy
court system.86 In short, it was the perfect moment for logrolling."s
Second, in 1984, Congress was given added incentive to revise
more than the jurisdictional aspects of the Code when, in NLRB v.
Bildisco and Bildisco,8 the Supreme Court permitted a Chapter 11
see 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1982 & Supp. 111 1985), and had proposed the section on
disposable income as an alternative to that section. The consumer credit industry suc-
ceeded in convincing Congress to retain both provisions, thereby undercutting the origi-
nal intent of what is now § 1325(b).
81 See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87
(1982); see also Chatz & Schumm, 1984 Bankruptcy Code Amendments-Fresh From
the Anvil, 89 CoM. L.J. 317, 318-22 (1984) (summarizing jurisdiction, judges, and
procedures under the Code subsequent to the Marathon decision); Miller & Bienen-
stock, Bankruptcy Restructuring Promises Few Reforms, LEGAL TIMES, July 30, 1084,
at 30.
83 See Marathon, 458 U.S. at 88.
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, title IV, § 404, 92
Stat. 2549, 2683 (as amended in the transition provisions).
" See Hearing on Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co. Decision Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1983) [hereinafter Marathon Hearings] (statement of Senator
Heflin) (summarizing the various extensions). For a summary and critique of the re-
sulting rules, see King, Jurisdiction and Procedure Under the Bankruptcy Amend-
ments of 1984, 38 VAND. L. REV. 675 (1985).
"' See Marathon Hearings, supra note 84, at 5 (statement of Senator
Metzenbaum).
86 See, e.g., id. at 451-513 (submissions from various special interest groups re,
lated to consumer credit); id. at 514-19 (repurchase agreements); id. at 519-94 (shop-
ping center tenancy amendments).
8 The term "logrolling" has generally meant mutual aid among politicians, as by
reciprocal voting for each other's bills. The effects of this practice are not new to bank-
ruptcy law. For a summary of historical congressional compromising in the context of
bankruptcy law, see C. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 30-45
(1935).
88 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
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debtor to reject unilaterally a collective bargaining agreement.8 9 The
decision produced an uproar from organized labor, which argued that
debtors would now use Chapter 11 merely to get out from under their
allegedly onerous collective bargaining agreements. 90  While the
Bildisco case did not involve individual debtors, its result was yet an-
other indication to Congress that the Code had enabled debtors to file
for relief at the expense of their creditors.
Third, the political climate in 1984 favored creditors. Unlike the
composition of Congress in 1978 when the Code was passed, the House
and Senate had become decidedly more conservative in 1984. A con-
servative Republican President was in office, moreover, as compared to
the considerably more liberal Democratic President in office in 1978.
With increased congressional and presidential support of the business
community and a waning interest in social programs and consumer
protection, the credit industry found a sympathetic audience for its
concerns.
9 1
In sum, the confluence of a disastrous economy, a conservative po-
litical environment, and pressure created by two Supreme Court deci-
sions, together with some legitimate creditor concerns over the opera-
tion of the Code, assisted the credit industry in successfully lobbying for
major changes in the treatment of individual debtors. While many com-
mentators expressed concerns that the severity of debtor abuse was not
nearly as great as that portrayed by the credit industry and that this
level of abuse did not require massive changes to the Code, 2 Congress's
capitulation to the creditors' position is no surprise.
8 See id. at 532-34; see also Note, The Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agree-
ments in Chapter 11 Reorganizations: The Need for Informed Judicial Decisions, 134
U. PA. L. REV. 1235, 1238-43 (1986) (summary of the Supreme Court's decision in
Bildisco and a description of Congress's response to that decision).
90 Because rehabilitation is the paramount goal of Chapter 11, see In re Pine
Lake Village Apt. Co., 16 Bankr. 750, 753 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982), companies that
are in financial difficulty have not found it extraordinarily difficult to satisfy the tests
under 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1982). These tests reflected an effort to balance the needs of
debtors and creditors alike, following what was perceived as the decidedly "anti-labor"
effect of the Bildisco decision. For a summary of the tests under § 1113, see Chatz &
Schumm, supra note 81, at 327. For recent decisions under § 1113, see In re Salt
Creek Freightways, 47 Bankr. 835, 838 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985); In re American Pro-
vision Co., 44 Bankr. 907, 908 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984). Although § 1113 has not
resolved all of the concerns of organized labor, cases like the recent Third Circuit opin-
ion in In re Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 791 F.2d 1074, 1089 (3d Cir. 1986),
have given new hope to the union cause. For an assessment of the value of § 1113 as a
means of protecting collective bargaining agreements, see Note, supra note 89, at 1243-
52.
9" See N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1984, at 26, col. 1 (asserting that Congress was
bowing to special interests led by unions and the consumer credit industry).
"' See, e.g., Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, supra note 10, at 308-09; Warren,
supra note 5, at 1357.
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The Consumer Credit Amendments change approximately twenty
provisions of the Code9" as well as various Rules of Bankruptcy Proce-
dure"' and certain of the Official Bankruptcy Forms. 95 Some of the
Amendments modify existing statutory provisions;96 others create en-
tirely new provisions or subsections.9 Almost all have substantive im-
pact, even those which purport to be mere procedural changes.9 In
light of the historical backdrop, it is not surprising that, with few ex-
ceptions, the Amendments shift the balance of rights decidedly in favor
of creditors.9 Because of that shift, virtually all provisions of the
'3 See Consumer Credit Amendments, Pub. L. No. 98-353, §§ 301-320, 98 Stat.
333, 352-57 (1984) (codified at and amending 11 U.S.C. §§ 109, 342, 349, 362, 521,
522, 523, 524, 525, 547, 704, 707, 1301, 1302, 1307, 1322, 1325, 1326 & 1329).
See id. § 321, 98 Stat. 357 (amending Bankruptcy Rule 2002).
9 See id. § 322, 98 Stat. 357 (amending Official Bankruptcy Form No. 1).
98 See, e.g., id. § 303, 98 Stat. 352 (amending 11 U.S.C. § 349 (1982)); id.
§ 302, 98 Stat. 352 (amending 11 U.S.C. § 342 (1982)).
" See, e.g., id. § 312, 98 Stat. 355 (amending 11 U.S.C. § 707 (1982)); id.
§ 317, 98 Stat. 369 (amending 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (1982)). Section 707 was amended by
adding a new subsection (b), which contains the provision for dismissal of a Chapter 7
case based on a determination of "substantial abuse." See infra text accompanying
notes 110-224. For a detailed analysis of the application of § 707(b), see generally
Breitowitz, Installments I and II, supra note 19.
Section 1325 was amended by adding a new subsection (b), which contains the
provision requiring the debtor to propose to pay out all of her monthly disposable
income to the creditors under the plan. See infra text accompanying notes 225-353.
" An example of a purely procedural change appears in Act of July 10, 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 314, 98 Stat. 369 (amending 11 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (1982)).
That section amends § 1302(b) to provide that the trustee, in addition to other previ-
ously enumerated duties, must dispose of monies received in a Chapter 13 case under
the regulations issued by the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts. See id. For a discussion of procedural changes that have more substantive im-
pact, see infra text accompanying notes 135-38.
" See 129 CONG. REC. S5359 (daily ed. April 27, 1983) (statement of Senator
Metzenbaum) ("Now I want it understood that I believe S.445, either in its original
form or by amendment, because it is identical, still tips the balance unnecessarily in
favor of creditors at a most inappropriate time. This is still a creditors [sic] bill.").
While the clear majority of the Consumer Amendments are "adverse" to the interests of
debtors, there is at least one change that, on its face, negatively impacts on the con-
sumer credit industry. New subsection (h) of 11 U.S.C § 362 (1982) provides that a
willful violation of the automatic stay pursuant to which an individual is injured will
result in actual damages and may give rise to punitive damages. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(h) (Supp. III 1985). One other section that might produce an adverse result to
creditors is § 109(0, 11 U.S.C. § 109(0 (1982), which prohibits, for one of two speci-
fied reasons, a debtor whose case has been dismissed from filing another case for a
period of 180 days. This language was included to protect creditors from debtors who
became repeat filers. Unfortunately, the wording of this section suggests that, in the
interim period of 180 days, the very same debtor could not be the subject of an involun-
tary case because only persons who can be debtors can be the subject of involuntaries.
See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1982). Under this analysis, a debtor could have a "free ride" for
180 days, let the preference period expire for preselected creditors, and then refile on
the 181st day. By this point, assets could have been dissipated and particular creditors
preferred with other creditors left without remedy under the very Code that inserted
this provision to protect them.
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Amendments impinge in some respect on the individual debtor's ability
to obtain a fresh start. This result is a natural consequence of shifting
the balance of rights between the debtor's desire to obtain a discharge
of prefiling indebtedness and her creditors' desire to maximize the re-
covery of sums due them.
There is, however, a marked difference between shifting the
balance of rights between debtor and creditor and entirely eliminating
the debtor's side of the balance. An expansive interpretation of the
changes effected by the Amendments in sections 707(b), 1325(b), and
1329(a) raises this latter risk. Although the consumer credit industry
sought to curtail a variety of specifically identifiable debtor abuses of
Chapters 7 and 13, it is noteworthy that the changes to these sections
neither explicitly adopted the credit industry's position nor addressed
specific debtor abuses.' 00 In fact, several proponents of the legislation
indicated that the Amendments were designed in large part to remedy
the high cost of credit for middle-class America. These proponents
based their argument on the theory that the large number of filings and
the small amount of distributions to creditors were principal causes of
the high consumer interest rates and limited individual access to
credit.' 0 ' Under such a theory, the Amendments constitute a response
100 Congressman Gingrich's characterization of the bill is an appropriate one:
I would suggest that political scientists in the future will look on the
machine rule by which this bill was drafted, shipped, packaged, and deliv-
ered as probably of the quality that former Mayor Daley of Chicago
would have admired. This is an example of raw power that was magnifi-
cent. It was the old-time politics that Speaker Cannon would have loved.
130 CONG. REC. H1888 (daily ed. March 21, 1984).
101 The argument suggested by several proponents of the Amendments is not per-
suasive. As a threshold matter, one has to question whether the initial premise of the
proponents of the Amendments, namely, that the credit industry will extend credit more
freely or cheaply if the Code tightens the standards for obtaining relief in bankruptcy,
is correct. Many have argued that there is no trouble obtaining credit in the market-
place. See Note, Equal Credit for All-An Analysis of the 1976 Amendments to the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 326, 326 (1978) (noting that two-
thirds of all American families use credit for day-to-day expenses). If anything, too
much credit already is being extended to people who cannot repay in the first instance.
See Countryman, supra note 9, at 825 (noting that 28 of those interviewed for the
Purdue Study, supra note 62, said that credit was "too easy to get"). More impor-
tantly, there is no indication that the costs of credit bear a direct correlation to the
bankruptcy laws. Credit costs are based, among other factors, on the likelihood of the
borrower's repayment-whether within or outside bankruptcy-and what the market
will bear. Credit will continue to be expensive if borrowers are willing to pay high
sums to get it in the first instance. See N.Y. Times, supra note 59, at D8, col. 1
(explaining that large companies are willing to borrow at high interest rates and simply
pass costs on to the consumer).
If pending legislation is any indicator of the present thoughts of Congress, there is
currently a movement afoot to limit the cost of consumer credit by limiting the interest
rates charged by lenders. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1981, at 22, col. 1 (detailing contro-
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to a sense that prior law was unfair to both creditors and nondebtors
and that certain debtors should not be entitled to the benefits of the
federal bankruptcy laws.
10 2
The effort to codify relief from this vague sense of unfairness to
creditors and nondebtors yielded an imprecise result that is susceptible
to wide interpretive latitude. It is precisely this opportunity for an ex-
pansive interpretation that raises the spectre of destruction of the fresh
start policy and conflict with the policies underlying the thirteenth
amendment, consequences far beyond those that Congress, and even the
credit industry itself, envisioned. 103 As this Article demonstrates, a nar-
row interpretation of the Amendments gives greater weight to the Code
itself, particularly those provisions not changed by the Amendments,
and to the philosophy underlying it. Such an approach accords less
weight to the host of political, judicial, and economic factors that ante-
dated the adoption of the Amendments and that are, in large part, ex-
ternal to bankruptcy philosophy.
II. SECTION 707(b)
Section 707 of the Code sets forth the bases for dismissal of Chap-
ter 7 cases, whether filed by or against individual or nonindividual
debtors.1 04 As modified by the Amendments, the section consists of two
versy over proposed bill to limit interest rates on consumer loans in New York State).
For example, interest rates on consumer credit card debt are currently between 16 and
21% per annum. Interest rates in the corporate marketplace for creditworthy borrowers
are now between 9 and 11%. Creditors are unwilling to lower rates now because they
do not need to do so. They are making plenty of money and people are anxious to
borrow. It is likely that, upon the first indication that there will be a mass decline in
borrowing by credit card customers, the credit industry will lower the rates. See N.Y.
Times, Apr. 7, 1980, at 7, col. 1 (showing correlation between increasing demand and
increasing costs between 1976 and 1977 for Master Charge). Absent such an indica-
tion, however, the credit industry is likely to retain its high borrowing rates (even if
repayment improves), unless Congress steps into the picture by enacting debtor protec-
tion measures. By such an analysis, it becomes evident that there is no reason to believe
that restricting the debtor's ability to obtain a discharge will change one iota the availa-
bility or cost of credit to nondefaulting middle class America.
For a myriad of views on the relationship between the cost of credit and amend-
ments to the bankruptcy laws, see generally The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 41
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1977) [hereinafter Reform Symposium].
102 See Chatz & Schumm, supra note 81, at 317 ("Despite the maneuvering in
public and behind the scenes, it is fair to say that [the Act] represents a rational com-
promise among intensely conflicting interests.") (emphasis added).
... See supra note 80.
104 Section 707, as modified by the Amendments, reads as follows (with 1986
amendments in italics):
(a) The court may dismiss a case under this chapter only after notice and
a hearing and only for cause, including-
(1) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors;
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subsections. Subsection (a) is virtually identical to that which previ-
ously comprised the entirety of the section. Subsection (b) is entirely
new, however, and provides, in pertinent part, that a Chapter 7 case
filed by an individual whose indebtedness consists primarily of con-
sumer debts may be dismissed by the court on "its own motion and not
at the request or suggestion of any party" if it finds that the granting of
relief would be a "substantial abuse" of the provisions of Chapter 7.1
05
or
(2) nonpayment of any fees or charges required under chapter 123
of title 28; or
(3) failure of the debtor in a voluntary case to file, within fifteen
days or such additional time as the court may allow after the filing
of the petition commencing such case, the information required by
paragraph (1) of section 521, but only on motion by the United
States trustee.
(b) After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own
motion or on a motion by the United States trustee, but not at the request
or suggestion of any party in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an indi-
vidual debtor under this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts
if it finds that the granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the
provisions of this chapter. There shall be a presumption in favor of grant-
ing the relief requested by the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 707 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), as amended by Bankruptcy Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-554, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) -.
.05 Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 312, 98 Stat. 333-55 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (Supp. III 1985)). For further analysis of this section,
see generally Breitowitz, Installments I and II, supra note 19; see also In re Campbell,
63 Bankr. 702, 705 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986); In re Jones, 60 Bankr. 96 (Bankr. W.D.
Ky. 1986); In re Whitby, 51 Bankr. 184, 186 n.1 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985); In re
Christian, 51 Bankr. 118 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1985), affd, 804 F.2d 46 (3d Cir. 1986).
One issue of practical import with respect to § 707(b) concerns how a court will
become apprised of abuse in the first instance where, as is now the case, creditors are
precluded from raising the issue. This issue has been resolved at one level by passage of
the Bankruptcy Act of 1986. Under the Act, the United States Trustee program will
become virtually a nationwide system. Congress amended § 707(b) in order to permit
the Trustee to bring a dismissal motion under the section. Therefore, both the bank-
ruptcy judge and the administrative arm of the bankruptcy process will be able to pur-
sue such an action. Given the phase-in requirements of the United States Trustee sys-
tem, however, the effect of this change may not be felt for some time.
The issue becomes more complex in view of the bifurcation between the adminis-
trative and adjudicative functions in the bankruptcy context when the court brings a
707(b) motion itself. See Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-7 (1973) (summarizing the
policies supporting the bifurcation between the administrative and adjudicative func-
tions of the bankruptcy system). One of the purposes behind the Code was to allocate to
judges the adjudicative functions alone and to leave case administration to trustees,
court administrators, and the Office of the United States Trustee, which was then only
in the pilot districts. See id. One approach suggested in the recent case law is for judges
to undertake an initial review of debt, income, and expense data. See, e.g., In re Ed-
wards, 50 Bankr. 933, 934 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). Because of the volume of cases
that will be reviewed, according to one court, "[c]ertain petitions simply leap out as
unusual." Id. at 941. The critical question concerns what exactly leaps out-the
amount of a debtor's income, the nature of the debtor's expenditures, or the nature of
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Subsection (b), unlike subsection (a), is applicable only to a spe-
cific class of debtors (individuals) whose debt itself falls within a spe-
cific category (consumer debts).10 6 Moreover, it attempts to establish a
specifically identifiable basis for dismissal of the cases of that narrow
debtor class without defining the principal operative term (substantial
abuse) upon which dismissal of such petitions can be based.10 7 Distinc-
the indebtedness. Cf. In re Almendinger, 56 Bankr. 97, 98 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985)
(The court noted the difficulties in "being cast in the dual role of adducer as well as
arbiter of the evidence in deciding its section 707(b) motion.").
108 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (Supp. III 1985); cf. In re Bell, No. 85-02150-R
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 1986) (vacating previous order of dismissal because debts
at issue were not consumer debts); In re Keniston, 60 Bankr. 742, 744-45 (Bankr.
D.N.H. 1986) (noting possible constitutional objections to treating consumer debt dif-
ferently from other types of debt); In re Kress, 57 Bankr. 874, 877 (Bankr. D.N.D.
1985) (noting court discretion to dismiss where consumer debt); In re Kelly, 57 Bankr.
536, 538-39 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1986) (discussing court's discretion in consumer debt
cases); In re Bryant, 51 Bankr. 729, 731-32 n.1 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1985) (examining
inconsistencies between the Amendments and other sections of the Code regarding the
eligibility and treatment of the term "individuals"); In re White, 49 Bankr. 869, 872-
73 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985) (interpreting the term "consumer debt").
107 In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. 21, 25-26 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1984), was the first case
to be decided under the amended § 707. In dismissing Bryant's Chapter 7 petition, the
court initiated an expansive interpretation of the term "substantial abuse" by going as
far as to examine the debtor's lifestyle and then suggesting that the debtor could possi-
bly make payments pursuant to a Chapter 13 plan. See id. at 24. Other courts have
utilized different terms to give content to the "substantial abuse" test. See, e.g., In re
Hudson, 64 Bankr. 73, 75-76 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986) (focusing on debtor's income
schedules to find "substantial abuse" and questioning, without defining, debtor's good
faith and credibility); In re Kelly, 57 Bankr. at 539 ("[Tlhe Code provides no guidance
as to what is meant by the 'substantial abuse' provision under section 707(b) . . .");
In re Hamze, 57 Bankr. 37, 39 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985) (noting failure of Congress
to delineate "any substantive guidelines to assist [bankruptcy judges] in determining
which cases should be deemed abusive"); In re Bell, 56 Bankr. 637, 641 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1986), vacated on other grounds, No. 85-02150-R (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept.
26, 1986) (holding that the ability to repay creditors in a Chapter 11 or Chapter 13
plan and the election not to do so was the "primary, if not exclusive, factor" to be
considered in determining substantial abuse); In re Grant, 51 Bankr. 385, 393-94
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (noting several factors to be taken into account in determin-
ing substantial abuse, including ability to fund a Chapter 13 plan, bad faith in filing,
last minute spree-buying, and catastrophic events that befell the debtor); In re Ed-
wards, 50 Bankr. 933, 935-36 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (Although holding that the
debtor's petition was not a substantial abuse of the provisions of Chapter 7, the court
applied an expansive analysis of the term "substantial abuse" by establishing as the
proper yardstick of abuse the possibility of a 100% payment of the principal of the
debtor's debts under Chapter 13.); In re Colton, ABI Newsl., June, 1986, at 10
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1985), affd, ABI Newsl., June, 1986, at 10 (W.D.N.Y.
Nov. 21, 1985) (finding substantial abuse under § 707(b) where debtors were able to
repay 100% of their unsecured debt over a 36 month period while maintaining an
appropriate amount of money for miscellaneous living expenses).
Interestingly, in Bryant and Grant, the debtors not only failed to repay their cred-
itors and spent "excessively," but also they failed either to disclose or to complete the
information required by the courts with respect to their assets and liabilities. Therefore,
although the courts dismissed these debtors' Chapter 7 cases under § 707(b), these
courts had alternative grounds on which to reach the same result. In Bell, however, the
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tions between classes of debtors and categories of debt exist throughout
the Code."0 8 The paramount issue in each instance is whether a partic-
ular distinction, as well as the consequences thereof, can be justified as
consistent with the framework of the Code and bankruptcy philosophy
generally. When expansively interpreted, as has been evidenced by the
reasoning and, in some instances, the actual holdings of the growing
number of cases decided since its adoption,'0 9 section 707(b) is unjusti-
fiable in terms of both the framework of the Code and bankruptcy pol-
icy generally. The development and critique of a paradigmatic expan-
sive interpretation of section 707(b) provide an appropriate starting
point in this analysis. This paradigm is then compared to and con-
trasted with a narrow interpretation of the same provision.
A. The Expansive Paradigm
Prior to the adoption of the Consumer Credit Amendments, the
lament of the credit industry was, as has been noted, that too many
debtors were availing themselves of the relief accorded by the Code and
that these debtors should not be entitled to the benefits of a discharge
without suffering greater detriment." 0 Although they provide no clear
objective standards for finding such abuse of the bankruptcy process,
the sparse "legislative history" of the Amendments and the more pro-
lific background surrounding prior drafts of the legislation are rife with
the same subjective sense that some debtors were abusing the federal
bankruptcy laws."'
Since the Amendments became effective, several courts appear to
have adopted virtually intact the views advanced so vigorously by the
consumer credit industry and suggested in the "legislative history."
"Substantial abuse" has been interpreted as a fundamentally improper
court's holding could not be premised on such alternate grounds, and the court dis-
missed the debtor's claim under a clear-cut example of the expansive paradigm.
For an overview of the facts in the Bryant, Edwards, and Grant cases, see Note,
Congressional Intent and Judicial Response: The Consumer Credit Amendments of
the 1984 Bankruptcy Act, 21 LAND & WATER L. REv. 181, 195-198 (1986).
108 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 109 (establishing who can be a debtor under each
chapter), 523 (differentiating between different classes of debt for the purpose of pro-
viding exceptions to the discharge provision), 726 (distinguishing between different
classes of debts for purposes of priority of distribution of property of the estate), 727
(establishing different classes of debtors in the context of discharge, as a discharge will
only be granted to an individual debtor and not a corporate debtor under Chapter 7)
(1982).
109 See supra note 107.
10 See supra text accompanying notes 64-66.
I'l See supra text accompanying notes 62-92; see also In re Kress, 57 Bankr. 874,
877-78 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985) (discussing legislative history of § 707(b)).
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use of the bankruptcy process.11 2 Courts have found such improper use
where the debtor decides to file for relief under Chapter 7 even though
she is fully capable of repaying all or a significant portion of her debts
out of future income s Under this expansive interpretation of section
707(b), the sine qua non of substantial abuse is the debtor's election not
to repay creditors when it is probable that she could do so out of future
earnings.'14 As stated by one court, a debtor who could repay creditors
at least a significant portion of her indebtedness out of future earnings
but who instead seeks a discharge in Chapter 7 "is not suffering from
112 See, e.g., In re White, 49 Bankr. 869, 874 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985) (stating
that the term "substantial abuse" implies that the debtor has obtained "some kind of an
unfair advantage . . . against his creditors"); In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. 21, 24 (Bankr.
W.D.N.C. 1985) (stating that Congress intended the Bankruptcy Code's discharge pro-
visions as relief for "financially troubled persons," and not as a means for the "unscru-
pulous" to avoid their creditors).
113 See, e.g., In re Hudson, 64 Bankr. 73, 74-75 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986); In re
Kress, 57 Bankr. 874, 878 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985); In re Bell, 56 Bankr. 637, 641
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986) vacated on other grounds, No. 85-02150-R (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. Sept. 26, 1986); In re Grant, 51 Bankr. 385, 394 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985); In
re Edwards, 50 Bankr. 933, 937 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Colton, ABI Newsl.,
June, 1986, at 10 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1985), af'd, ABI Newsl., June, 1986, at
10 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1985); cf. In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. at 24-26 (not specif-
ically holding that the test for "substantial abuse" was whether a debtor could pay a
substantial portion of her debt, but including such a factor in its analysis).
114 See In re Hudson, 64 Bankr. at 75 (finding substantial abuse under Chapter 7
where debtors could have supported a Chapter 13 plan without undue hardship on
themselves); In re Kelly, 57 Bankr. at 540 ("[T]hese debtors have not suffered any
unforeseen calamity such as unemployment or serious illness which have [sic] rendered
them unable to pay their creditors or entitle them to seek a fresh start under the provi-
sions of Chapter 7."); In re Bell, 56 Bankr. 637, 641 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986) ("This
court concludes that the primary, if not exclusive, factor to be considered in determining
whether a debtor's petition constitutes a substantial abuse of the Bankruptcy Code
under § 707(b) is whether the debtor will have sufficient income to repay a meaningful
part of his or her debts, within the context of either Chapter 11 or Chapter 13."),
vacated on other grounds, No. 85-02150-R (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 1986); In re
Colton, ABI Newsl., June, 1986, at 10 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1985), affd, ABI
Newsl., June, 1986, at 10 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1985) (finding substantial abuse where
debtor could repay over a three year period). These cases indicate that the expansive
paradigm presents not only a theoretical but also a very real threat indeed. Professor
Breitowitz also suggests looking at whether a debtor can repay creditors under a Chap-
ter 13 plan as a basis for dismissing a case under § 707(b). See Breitowitz, Installment
II, supra note 19, at 44 ("[A] court determining the existence of substantial abuse
should consider only the percentage or dollar amount of debt that would be paid under
a three year chapter 13 plan . . . ."). Professor Breitowitz attempts to justify this con-
clusion by stating: "The debtor may indeed avoid the utilization of all his disposable
income . . . by remaining outside of the bankruptcy system . . . ." Id. at 44. Profes-
sor Breitowitz also relies on the "legislative history" of proposed but not enacted legis-
lation and divines from this history that Congress intended "substantial abuse" to relate
solely to "the percentage of debt that could be repaid under a chapter 13 plan . .. .
Id. at 43. For a criticism of this view, see In re Deaton, 65 Bankr. 663, 664-65 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1986) (refusing to find substantial abuse even though debtor could have filed
Chapter 13 plan).
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sufficient economic hardship to warrant use of Chapter 7. ' ' 6 A similar
sentiment was expressed by another court, which observed that "it was
not the design of the bankruptcy laws to allow [a] [d]ebtor to lead the
life of Riley while his creditors suffer on his behalf.""'  This approach
is stated even more emphatically when one court noted that its conclu-
sion to dismiss under section 707(b) rested "upon the simple judgment
that it is unfair and inequitable for a debtor to request that this Court
discharge his debts while he accumulates substantial disposable income
over the next several years while living a relatively high life style.
1" 7
This approach notwithstanding, there is nothing in the Code or in
underlying bankruptcy philosophy that provides a persuasive basis for
the view that the hardship to be suffered by the debtor on a go-forward
basis is the determinant of whether such a debtor can obtain a Chapter
7 discharge or for the view that, in essence, there is a quantifiable eco-
nomic "price" that a debtor must pay to obtain relief from prefiling
indebtedness."' Certainly, there is no basis for imposing any such cri-
teria solely upon the individual debtor burdened primarily with con-
sumer debts. Indeed, the legislative history of the Code suggests that the
term "consumer debt," which is defined as debt incurred by an individ-
ual primarily for personal, family, or household purposes is derived
from various statutes intended to protect the consumer from various
abusive practices by creditors, and that the use of the term or its defini-
tional components in the Code, other than in the context of section
707(b), is fully consistent with an approach that emphasizes consumer
protection.' 9
The theory behind an expansive interpretation of substantial abuse
is highlighted when the paradigm is stated somewhat differently. Both
the Code and the Amendments stress the importance of apprising debt-
ors of the differences between a filing under Chapter 7 and a filing
under Chapter 13.120 An operating premise in the Code's treatment of
1115 In re Edwards, 50 Bankr. at 937.
111 In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. at 26.
117 In re Bell, 56 Bankr. at 643.
118 See L. KING & M. COOK, supra note 2, at 777.
119 The term "consumer debt" is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(7) (1982). The leg-
islative history of this section indicates that the definition is adopted from the definition
used in various consumer protection laws. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 21, at 309.
Other sections in the Code using the term "consumer debt" in a protective manner
include 11 U.S.C. § 522(0 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); 11 U.S.C. § 722 (1982); see also
In re Bell, No. 85-02150-R (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 1986) (distinguishing sums
expended with profit motives from "consumer" debt); In re Kress, 57 Bankr. 874, 877
(Bankr. D.N.D. 1985) (applying the § 101(7) definition of consumer debt to § 707(b)
context); In re Almendinger, 56 Bankr. 97, 99 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (sums ex-
pended with profit motive not consumer debts).
120 See 11 U.S.C. § 342(b) (Supp. III 1985) (requiring the clerk to give notice to
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individual debtors has been that if individuals are fully informed as to
the benefits of a Chapter 13, they will choose to reorganize rather than
liquidate.12 x If an individual makes such an election, she will have the
rights of the expanded Chapter 13 discharge and, particularly under
the Amendments, creditors will get more than they would have gotten
in a Chapter 7 case. 22
The expansive archetype of section 707(b) takes this emphasis on
a debtor's choosing Chapter 13 over Chapter 7 one step further. Ex-
pansively interpreted, substantial abuse under section 707(b) implies
the failure on the part of an individual consumer debtor to proceed
under Chapter 13, where all of her future earnings would be available
to repay her outstanding indebtedness. 23 Although the recent case law
has not gone as far as to hold that a debtor must actually file a Chapter
13 case if she is able to repay her creditors, 24 courts have left the dis-
tinct impression that this is the case.125
an individual with primarily consumer debts of the various chapters under which such
individual may file); 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Official Form
1, Exhibit B (Supp. III 1985) (requiring the debtor's attorney to attest to the fact that
she advised the debtor of the advantages of each chapter available to such debtor).
121 See HousE REPORT, supra note 21, at 331-32; see also Sullivan, Warren &
Westbrook, supra note 10, at 311-20 (assessing debtors' ability to pay).
122 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 21 at 13 ("[Successfully completed Chapter
13 plans have] provided great self-satisfaction and pride to those debtors who complete
them and at the same time effect a maximum return to creditors."); HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 21, at 122-23 (stating that a Chapter 13 plan must pay creditors more than
they would have received had the debtor liquidated under Chapter 7 if a plan is to be
approved).
12 In re Bell, 56 Bankr. 637, 641-42 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986), vacated on
other grounds, No. 85-02150-R (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 1986), suggests that a
court in determining whether substantial abuse exists should also look to whether an
individual is able to reorganize under Chapter 11. In Bell the debtor's obligations ex-
ceeded the statutory entry-level requirements for Chapter 13, and, hence, the court
looked at whether the debtor could have reorganized under Chapter 11. See id. at 642.
The Bell court's approach would have eliminated the interpretive difficulties encoun-
tered by the court in In re Mastroeni, 56 Bankr. 456, 459 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). In
Mastroeni, the court found that the debtor was ineligible for reorganization under
Chapter 13 and found Chapter 11 relief an unacceptable alternative. The court there-
fore allowed the debtor's Chapter 7 petition to proceed, despite its conclusion that the
debtor-who earned $73,000 a year in income-could pay back most of his debts. See
id. For the text of § 1325(b), see infra note 227.
124 Several courts have gone out of their way to avoid dismissing a Chapter 7 case
based solely on a debtor's eligibility for relief under Chapter 13, primarily to preserve
the debtor's choice of bankruptcy relief. See, e.g., In re Deaton, 65 Bankr. 663, 664-65
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986); In re Mastroeni, 56 Bankr. 456, 459 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1985); In re Edwards, 50 Bankr. 933, 939 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
125 One could argue that the courts in these cases concluded that the combination
of a debtor's ability to repay her creditors through a Chapter 13 plan and her deliber-
ate choice not to do so in and of itself constituted substantial abuse. See, e.g., In re
Hudson, 64 Bankr. 73, 75 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986); In re Grant, 51 Bankr. 385, 394
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985); In re Edwards, 50 Bankr. at 937; In re White, 49 Bankr.
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Recent Chapter 7 case law indicates that, in addition to looking to
the availability of Chapter 13 to test whether there has been substantial
abuse, courts should also look to Chapter 13 to determine whether a
debtor could satisfy that chapter's confirmation requirements.'26 Be-
cause Chapter 13 is oriented toward debtors who have income with
which to pay creditors, the standard for relief under Chapter 7 implies
a "forced" reorganization. Such a reorganization runs contrary to the
Code's express prohibition of the enforcement of a debtor's waiver of
her right to convert a Chapter 13 case to a Chapter 7 case, a provision
that encourages debtors to liquidate if they do not want to
reorganize.
11
7
1. Consequences of the Expansive Paradigm
If the expansive paradigm continues to be adopted by courts,
whether in holding or dicta, then the credit industry will achieve indi-
rectly what they would not convince Congress to adopt directly, namely
a threshold entry-level standard for utilization of Chapter 7 by individ-
ual debtors. 2 ' Under section 109 of the Code, which was unchanged by
the Amendments, any person, including an- individual, can be a debtor
under Chapter 7 unless she falls within one of several limited excep-
tions, none of which apply to consumer debtors and none of which are
predicated upon anticipated income.' 29 Nothing in the Code mandates
that a debtor be insolvent to file for relief; a solvent person may deter-
mine that she needs relief from indebtedness under Chapter 7.'30 Noth-
ing in the language of the Code prohibits a debtor's election to dis-
charge her debts by liquidating her non-exempt assets in lieu of making
continuous payment to creditors over an extended period of time.' 3'
869, 874 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985); In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. 21, 25-26 (Bankr.
W.D.N.C. 1985).
12" See, e.g., In re Kress, 57 Bankr. 874, 878 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985); In re Grant,
51 Bankr. at 385; In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. at 25. But see In re Deaton, 65 Bankr. at
664-65 (criticizing Kress).
127 The debtor may convert a Chapter 11 case to a Chapter 7 case at any time.
Any waiver of the right to convert under this subsection is unenforceable. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1307(a) (1982); see also In re Penland, 11 Bankr. 522, 524 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981);
In re Doyle, 11 Bankr. 110, 111 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
12 See In re Deaton, 65 Bankr. 663, 664-65 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986).
128 Railroads, domestic insurance companies, banks, savings and loan associations,
credit unions, and industrial banks and their foreign equivalents are not permitted re-
lief under Chapter 7. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1982).
180 Neither 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1982), which governs the filing of voluntary peti-
tions, nor 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1982), which defines who can be a debtor under each of
the chapters, requires that the individual be insolvent or generally unable to pay her
debts.
181 Section 109(b) governs who may file under Chapter 7. Section 109(e) governs
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The fact that the issue of whether a debtor is paying her debts is raised
only in the context of an involuntary case reinforces these observations.
The test of solvency in that context is to protect the debtor from those
creditors who may seek to recover sums owed them by unnecessarily
forcing a debtor into a bankruptcy case.1"' Although courts have read
into the Code a good faith requirement, applicable to all chapters of the
Code, on the part of debtors in filing cases, this requirement has been
liberally construed by most courts in order to accord a debtor access to
relief at the earliest possible time in the course of her dealings with her
creditors.
1 33
Expansively interpreting section 707(b) to impose on a consumer
debtor a future income standard for access to Chapter 7 is inconsistent,
then, with the language of section 109. Indeed, had the text of the
Amendments as finally presented to Congress included a narrowing of
the scope of eligible debtors under section 109, such a change would
probably not have survived because Congress had previously rejected a
eligibility for relief under Chapter 13. See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (b), (e) (1982). It should be
noted that although nothing in the Code precludes a debtor from choosing to liquidate
rather than reorganize, the Code may preclude an individual from reorganizing within
Chapter 13 if such debtor's debts exceed the monetary limits set out in § 109(e) for
filing a Chapter 13 petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1982) (setting limits of $100,000
in unsecured debt and $350,000 in secured debt); cf In re Mastroeni, 56 Bankr. 456,
459 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (observing that certain interpretive difficulties arise from
the debt limits in Chapter 13). Chapter 7 has no such monetary limit on the debtor's
allowable amount of debt. For an interesting decision on how to determine a debtor's
eligibility for relief under Chapter 13, see In re Crescenzi, 54 Bankr. 557 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1985).
132 See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). It should also be noted that
§ 303 was amended in 1984 to provide more debtor protection by limiting the circum-
stances under which a creditor or creditors can put a debtor involuntarily into bank-
ruptcy. Section 303(b)(1) was amended by the addition of the words "or the subject [of]
a bona fide dispute." These words were also added to subsection (h)(1) to indicate that
in the case of an involuntary petition, it must be shown that debts subject to a bona fide
dispute are not to be included in the calculation of whether or not the debtor is regu-
larly paying her debts. See Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 426, 98 Stat.
333, 359 (codified at 11 U.S.C § 303(h)(i) (Supp. III 1985). The "generally not pay-
ing" standard is distinct from insolvency. The Code defines insolvency as balance sheet
insolvency. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(29) (Supp. III 1985). Thus, a debtor need not be
insolvent in this sense to be subjected to an involuntary filing.
"' For an examination of the different contexts in which courts have "read in" a
requirement of good faith, see Ordin, The Good Faith Principle in the Bankruptcy
Code: A Case Study, 38 Bus. LAW. 1795 (1983), reprinted in H. MILLER, BANK-
RuPT CY REORGANIZATION 102-157 (1983); see also In re Waldron, 785 F.2d 936, 939
(11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (noting broad definition of good faith applicable to vari-
ous sections of the Code); In re Johns-Manville, 36 Bankr. 727, 737-38 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating that the good faith requirement should only be used to deny
relief to fraudulent debtors).
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proposed draft of the Amendments that contained a future income test
as a condition to the availability of Chapter 7 to individual debtors. 34
2. Section 521
The expansive paradigm of denying access to Chapter 7 because of
a consumer debtor's anticipated ability to repay creditors over time is
facilitated by another of the Amendments. Section 521 has been modi-
fied to accelerate the date of the debtor's required disclosure of antici-
pated income and expenditures.1 35 Armed with this information early
in the course of a Chapter 7 case, a court could make a purely quanti-
tative comparative analysis and could conclude, as several courts have
suggested, that a substantial excess of projected income over projected
expenses constitutes substantial abuse.38' Alternatively, a court could
evaluate projected expenses as a percentage of income on the basis of
statistical formulae such as those provided by the Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics.'3 7 A court could also proceed, as some have, to make a qualita-
tive analysis, imposing subjective value judgments on the nature as well
as the amount of the debtor's projected expenditures, and by clear in-
ference, her lifestyle.' If expenditures were too high, a court could
114 See 130 CONG. REC. S7624 (daily ed. June 19, 1984) (Senator Metzenbaum
stated: "I am, therefore, opposed to any consideration of future earnings that could cut
off an individual's right to secure bankruptcy relief."); see also In re Deaton, 65 Bankr.
663, 664-65 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986) (noting congressional refusal to adopt a
mandatory Chapter 13).
135 See Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 305, 98 Stat. 303, 352
(amending 11 U.S.C. § 521 (1982)). Subsection (1) was amended by including therein
a requirement that the debtor file a schedule of current income and expenditures. For
an examination of the consequences of such a requirement, see In re Grant, 51 Bankr.
385, 394-95 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985); In re Wright, 48 Bankr. 172, 174 (Bankr.
E.D.N.C. 1985); see also In re Colton, ABI Newsl., June, 1986, at 10 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1985), affd, ABI Newsl., June, 1986, at 10 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 21,
1985) (court relying heavily on schedules to find substantial abuse).
136 See, e.g., In re Kress, 57 Bankr. 874, 876 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985); In re Kelly,
57 Bankr. 536, 538 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1986); In re Edwards, 50 Bankr. 933, 939
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Colton, ABI Newsl., June, 1986, at 10 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1985), affd, ABI Newsl., June, 1986, at 10 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 21,
1985).
137 For a discussion of these statistics and their use in the context of Chapter 13
cases, see In re Jones, 55 Bankr. 462 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985); S. REP. No. 65, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 20-22 (1983). Given that, for many courts, the determination of sub-
stantial abuse hinges in part on whether a Chapter 13 plan could be confirmed, it is
appropriate to examine methods of determining Chapter 13 plan payments by way of
analogy. For examples of the use of this analogy, see generally Breitowitz, Installments
I and II, supra note 19.
138 See, e.g., In re Hudson, 64 Bankr. 73, 75 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986) (noting
that debtors' expenses did not conform to court's conception of what an average family
of five, might spend to maintain a reasonable standard of living); In re Shands, 63
Bankr. 121, 124 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985) (finding that debtor's main purpose in
filing was to frustrate her husband); In re Hamze, 57 Bankr. 37, 39 (Bankr. E.D.
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demand that a debtor adjust her lifestyle if she is to obtain a Chapter 7
discharge.
3. Difficulties in Application of the Expansive Paradigm
None of these approaches is particularly satisfactory. The purely
quantitative approach is simply a different method of creating a future
income test. While easy to apply, the approach is premised on the erro-
neous assumption that the availability of future income is always syn-
onymous with abuse. 39 The statistical approach suffers from being in-
flexible by treating each debtor on the basis of predetermined norms
rather than by her individual circumstances.
The qualitative approach presents two major problems of its own.
First, it replaces the debtor's judgment of the way she wants to live
with that of the court.' 40 Second, by permitting courts to make such
judgments, it creates the potential for considerable inconsistency in the
way in which similarly situated debtors are treated under the Code.
The result of such inconsistent treatment is compounded by the fact
that section 707(b), by its terms, is only applicable to a specific subcat-
egory of debtors and within that grouping, to those debtors with a par-
ticular type of debt. For example, an individual debtor whose indebted-
ness consists primarily of an unsatisfied judgment for the purchase
price of household furniture could potentially be subjected to different
treatment than an individual in virtually identical economic circum-
stances whose indebtedness consists primarily of an unsatisfied judg-
ment for a tort.' 4 ' The very real prospect of inconsistent results runs
Mich. 1985) (finding no substantial abuse where debtor's large expenditure was to visit
his family in Lebanon after his family's village was bombed); In re Bell, 56 Bankr.
637, 642 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986), vacated on other grounds, No. 85-02150-R
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 1986) (stating that, among other expenses, debtor's costs
for meals at restaurants and for maintaining a luxury car were excessive given his
financial status); In re Grant, 51 Bankr. 385, 394-96 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (detail-
ing debtors' excessive spending habits and finding their proposed household budget sim-
ilarly excessive); In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. 21, 25-26 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985) (ques-
tioning debtor's payment schedule and accusing him of trying to maintain an
exhorbitant lifestyle during his bankruptcy period); see also infra text accompanying
notes 140-46.
1'9 In In re Edwards, 50 Bankr. at 933, for example, although the court recog-
nized that an excess of income over expenses can constitute abuse, see supra notes 113-
14 and accompanying text, the court went beyond the data supplied on the debtors'
schedules to find that the debtors were about to have a fourth child and that this would
result in a loss of future income that was not predicted in the projected schedules.
140 See In re Kitson, 65 Bankr. 615, 621 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986).
'41 See In re White, 49 Bankr. 869, 875 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985). Another
anomalous result occurs if a debtor could not have been a debtor in Chapter 13, see 11
U.S.C. § 109(e) (1982) (limiting who may be a debtor under Chapter 13), and there-
fore had to reorganize under Chapter 11. The results for the debtor would now be
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contrary to one of the very goals of the Amendments, namely the crea-
tion of a relatively consistent approach to debtors wherever they may
file. 142 Consistency in approach is beneficial to creditors as well as
debtors. It enables creditors to evaluate the risks presented by a filing
should a prospective borrower subsequently become unable to repay
what is owed and permits borrowers to be aware of the risks of filing
for relief.
Although some courts have expressed reservations about the quali-
tative approach, recognizing the difficult issues inherent in such value
judgments, others have shown little, if any, reluctance in examining the
nature of a debtor's proposed expenditures in order to assess the degree
of hardship that the debtor might avoid by obtaining a Chapter 7 dis-
charge as opposed to reorganizing under Chapter 13.143 As expressed
by the court in In re Bryant:
Even assuming arguendo these figures to be appropri-
ate, the nature and extent of the Debtor's expenses make his
attempt to maintain this standard of living while in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding rather suspect. Consider that the Debtor's
family has for its personal use both a 1983 Buick and a 1984
Buick. To maintain these vehicles costs the Debtor's family
some $731.00 per month . . . . This is more than most
families spend on home mortgage payments. Were the
Debtor to eliminate just one of these vehicles and apply the
savings to a Chapter 13 plan, as much as $400.00 per month
would be available to satisfy his debts.
In like measure, the Debtor claims expenses of $100.00
per month for dining out and for going to the movies. He
claims another $65.00 per month for cable television ...
vastly different than those that would arise under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (1982). See
infra notes 225-352 and accompanying text. Therefore, "similarly" situated debtors
would be subject to markedly different treatment.
142 As has already been noted, see supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text, the
Amendments were intended to aid in resolving the inconsistencies resulting from the
different interpretations courts had given the term "good faith" under § 1325(a)(3); see
also In re Campbell, 63 Bankr. 702, 704 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986) (Inconsistent inter-
pretations led to the enactment of § 707(b), which made the bankruptcy judge the
exclusive arbiter of substantive abuse.).
143 For examples of cases expressing reservations to this type of approach, see In
re Kitson, 65 Bankr. at 621-22; In re Gaukler, 63 Bankr. 224, 226 (Bankr. D.N.D.
1986); In re Christian, 51 Bankr. 118, 120-21 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1985), affd, 804 F.2d
46 (3d Cir. 1986); In re Edwards, 50 Bankr. 933, 940 n.9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
For cases expressing no such reservations, see, for example, In re Grant, 51 Bankr.
385, 395-97 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985); In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. 21, 21 (Bankr.
W.D.N.C. 1985).
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[T]he court has serious questions about their appropriateness
for a Debtor in Chapter 7.144
A similar sentiment can be seen in In re Grant where the court
observed:
Both Robert and Cherry Grant testified to making
costly purchases of clothing-a $700 men's suit from Saks
Fifth Avenue, and $2100 in women's clothing from an exclu-
sive dress shop. The Grants' Christmases must be quite an
extravaganza; Robert Grant testified that the $9,000 loan of
November, 1983 from Joe Huggins was primarily for
Christmas items. Curious, as well, is Robert Grant's practice
of sending by U.S. Mail $400 in cash each month to his son
who is attending college out-of-state.14
On its face, admittedly, section 707(b) does not suggest that the
expansive interpretation adopted increasingly by the courts is imper-
missible. Indeed, as has been suggested, the passage of the Amendments
in an environment sympathetic to the credit industry's position might
permit the argument that such an interpretation is mandated." The
argument fails, however, because, as it has also been noted, neither the
language of the existing Code provisions nor Congress's defeat of a
threshold test for Chapter 7 suggests an expansive interpretation.
14 7
The Amendments might well have been intended to reestablish an ap-
propriate balance between the interests of debtors and creditors, given
the perception that the balance had shifted in favor of debtors. There is,
however, no evidence that Congress intended to alter fundamental
bankruptcy policy.
1 48
144 In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. at 25-26.
'll In re Grant, 51 Bankr. at 396.
146 See, e.g. In re Kress, 57 Bankr. 874, 877-78 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985) (relying
on Amendments' legislative history to find that substantial abuse is determined by the
debtor's ability to repay her debts in three years).
114 For a contrary view, see In re Kelly, 57 Bankr. 536, 539 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
1986) (quoting Rep. Anderson) ("[T]he bankruptcy court could dismiss a chapter 7
filing if in its opinion the filing constitutes a 'substantial abuse' of the Bankruptcy Code
because the debtor is found capable of fulfilling the terms of a chapter 13 repayment
agreement.").
148 Both the House and Senate reports observed in connection with original
§ 707: "The section does not contemplate, however, that the ability of the debtor to
repay his debts in whole or in part constitutes adequate cause for dismissal. To permit
dismissal on that ground would be to enact a non-uniform mandatory chapter 13, in
lieu of the remedy of bankruptcy." SENATE REPORT, supra note 21, at 94; HousE
REPORT, supra note 21, at 380; accord In re Williams, 15 Bankr. 655 (E.D. Mo.
1981), affd, 696 F.2d 999 (8th Cir. 1982). Even the court in In re Grant, 51 Bankr.
385, 392 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985), which expansively interpreted § 707(b), recog-
nized that Congress did not intend to do away with the debtor's fresh start. Accord In
re Kress, 57 Bankr. at 538; In re Edwards, 50 Bankr. 933, 936 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
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Thus, while courts in a number of recent cases have adopted the
expansive approach in holding or dicta, some appear to have strained to
avoid the result dictated by their own reasoning, a result that would
eradicate the fresh start policy.114 For example, in several cases dis-
missing petitions under section 707(b), courts have sought out grounds
for dismissal other than the debtor's ability to pay out of future income
and her election not to do so, that is, grounds that would enable the
courts to sidestep the conflicts inherent in a broadbased reading of sec-
tion 707(b). In the cases of In re Hudson,15 0 Grant, and Bryant, for
example, the debtors either failed to disclose or inaccurately disclosed
financial data, and these issues, coupled with the other factors, enabled
the respective courts to apply section 707(b) to dismiss the cases.1 5' In
looking at section 707(b), then, one need ask how a court might inter-
pret this provision in a manner consistent with both fundamental bank-
ruptcy policy and Congress's legitimate legislative purposes in enacting
the Consumer Credit Amendments.' 52
4. The Meaning of Substantial Abuse
While the case law under section 707(b) increasingly has adopted
the position that dismissal on the basis of substantial abuse is only
available in the context of a case involving an individual debtor with
consumer debts,153 such a reading is not mandated by the statute. A
court may dismiss a case on the grounds of substantial abuse under
1985).
" See, e.g., In re Mastroeni, 56 Bankr. 456, 459 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (be-
cause debtor was ineligible for Chapter 13 relief, and Chapter 11 was not a meaningful
alternative, court found no substantial abuse); In re Edwards, 50 Bankr. at 939 (be-
cause court was satisfied that debtors had little prospect of being able to propose or to
complete a meaningful Chapter 13 plan, it granted debtor a Chapter 7 discharge).
180 64 Bankr. 73, 75-76 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986).
181 See In re Hudson, 64 Bankr. at 75-76; In re Grant, 51 Bankr. at 397; In re
Bryant, 47 Bankr. 24, 26 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985). There are, however, cases where a
court ordered dismissal solely on the ground that the debtor was able to pay her debts
in a reorganization chapter. See In re Bell, 56 Bankr. 637 (Bankr. E.D. Mich 1986),
vacated on other grounds, No. 85-02150-R (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 1986); In re
Colton, ABI Newsl. June, 1986, at 10 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1985), affd, ABI
Newsl., June, 1986, at 10 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1985). For cases wherein a court has
expressed reluctance towards adopting a per se rule, see In re Shands, 63 Bankr. 121,
124 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985).
182 For general guidance on statutory construction, see 2A SUTHERLAND, STAT-
UTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.12 (N. Singer ed. 1984) (discussing
"golden rule" of "reasonable" statutory interpretation).
153 See, e.g., In re Grant, 51 Bankr. 385, 389 (Bankr. E.D. Ohio 1985); In re
Whitby, 51 Bankr. 184, 186 n.1 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985); In re Edwards, 50 Bankr.
933, 935 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re White, 49 Bankr. 869, 871 (Bankr. W.D.N.C.
1985); In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. 21, 24 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1984).
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section 707(a) if it finds, in its discretion, that such abuse constitutes
"cause." In lieu of a definition of "cause," section 707(a) offers two
examples under the nonexclusive prefatory term "including," thereby
permitting substantial abuse to fall within the scope of "cause." 1" Con-
gress thus has made explicit, in the context of consumer debtors, what
always was implicit in the context of all debtors, namely that a court
may dismiss a case if it finds that the debtor is abusing the bankruptcy
process.
One plausible interpretation of section 707, then, is that it is in-
tended-even while making explicit an existing basis for dismissal-to
narrow the parties that can seek dismissal on the grounds of substantial
abuse. By its terms, section 707(a) would permit creditors and a court
to dismiss any case for substantial abuse. The section is silent, however,
as to who could bring the issue to the court's attention.155 Arguably,
then, what section 707(b) does is to take away the right creditors them-
selves had to raise the issue of abuse. Thus, the creditor arsenal, in the
context of consumer debtors, has been limited to some extent by section
707(b).
A close analysis of the actual wording of section 707(b) provides
some insight into what might have been intended by this section. The
term substantial abuse is followed by the words "of the provisions of
this chapter."1 56 This phrase suggests that section 707(b) is applicable
only to violations of the specific provisions of Chapter 7, as distin-
guished from violations of the Code as a whole. 5 This wording sug-
I" See 11 U.S.C. § 102(3) (1982).
15 Section 707(a) provides that "a court may dismiss a case," but it is silent as to
who may bring the issue to the court's attention. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (1982 & Supp
III 1985), amended by The Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) - . Section 707(b), on the other hand,
provides that "the court, on its own motion, or on a motion by the United States trus-
tee, but not at the request or suggestion of any party in interest, may dismiss . .. .
See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985), amended by The Bankruptcy Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (100 Stat.) -.
The court in In re Christian, 51 Bankr. 118, 122 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1985), affd, 804
F.2d 46 (3d Cir. 1986), examined this apparently clear section before the 1986 amend-
ments and determined that it meant exactly what it said-the court only on its own
motion and not at the request of any party in interest may dismiss a case. Accord In re
Campbell, 63 Bankr. 702, 704 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986); In re Love, 61 Bankr. 558
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986); In re Jones, 60 Bankr. 96, 98 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1986); In re
Whitby, 51 Bankr. at 186 n.1.
156 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (Supp. III 1985), as amended by Bankruptcy Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-554, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) -.
157 This is to distinguish dismissal under § 707(b) from other Code provisions
relating to dismissal and denials of discharge. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 305, 523,
727 (1982).
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gests that the term substantial abuse can and should be narrowly
construed.15
Such a narrow reading is consistent with the fact that no provision
within Chapter 7 prohibits an individual from seeking relief when she
could be a debtor under Chapter 13. Nor does the language of Chapter
7 suggest that a discharge should be conditioned on a debtor's lack of
future income. Therefore, no matter how the term substantial abuse is
interpreted, it should not be interpreted to mean the election not to
repay one's creditors out of future income. Such a principle neither ex-
plicitly nor implicitly constitutes an abuse of the provisions of Chapter
7. The issue, then, of what "wrong" violates Chapter 7, but which is
not covered elsewhere within that Chapter, becomes a crucial one.
B. The Narrow Paradigm
A nonexpansive interpretation of section 707(b) that would not
eviscerate the section might suggest that 707(b) was designed to codify a
court's implied right to dismiss any Chapter 7 case involving consumer
debtors that subverts the purposes of filing under the Chapter. Phrased
differently, this narrow interpretation suggests that section 707(b)
makes explicit the longstanding ability of a court to dismiss a Chapter
7 case for lack of good faith1 9 Both Chapters 11 and 13 have express
good faith provisions as prerequisites for relief thereunder.1 60 The
reading of section 707(b) to include a good faith standard is not
equivalent to stating, as do proponents of the expansive paradigm,1 6'
that the availability of future income is a basis for dismissal. This lack
of equivalency is supported by the case law of Chapter 13. Prior to the
passage of the Amendments, creditors expressed concern that the inclu-
sion of a good faith standard in Chapter 13 had not been read consist-
ently by the courts to mean that a debtor must give all of her future
income to her creditors.' It is because good faith did not imply a re-
quirement that all available income be applied to pay creditors that
creditors fought for the adoption of the more explicit provision of sec-
158 See In re Christian, 63 Bankr. 71, 73-74 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986), affid, 804
F.2d 46 (3d Cir. 1986).
151 The bankruptcy courts historically have had ample discretion to dismiss a
Chapter 7 petition where the petition has been "filed in bad faith." See In re Ericson,
26 Bankr. 973, 976 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1983). But see Ginsberg, Update, supra note
37, at 239 (indicating that "substantial abuse," in a precursor to § 707(b), must have
meant "something different than bad faith").
160 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (1982); 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1982).
101 See supra notes 110-34 and accompanying text.
162 For a discussion of the credit industry's view, see supra notes 69-73 and ac-
companying text.
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tion 1325(b). 6 ' Accordingly, creditors cannot reasonably suggest that
the insertion of a good faith standard in Chapter 7 achieves something
they knew it never accomplished in the context of a Chapter 13 case.
Section 707(b), as interpreted under a narrow paradigm, would
permit a court to dismiss a Chapter 7 case where an individual debtor's
conduct in incurring the debts that she seeks to have discharged was of
a nature sufficient, in the words of one court interpreting this section,
"to shock the conscience of the Court."' The question of whether a
case should be dismissed under section 707(b) ought to be decided on a
case-by-case analysis, rather than on the basis of a rigid predetermined
test keyed to future income alone. Under a narrow paradigm, section
707(b) is intended to cover those very few cases in which the debtor's
conduct does not fit squarely within any of the explicit standards for
dismissal or nondischargeability set out in Chapter 7,165 but in which
the debtor's conduct is of such a nature that recourse to the provisions
of Chapter 7 generally, particularly in view of the attendant injury to
creditors, would contravene the most fundamental notions of fairness
and the purposes of Chapter 7. The phrase "of the provisions of Chap-
ter 7" in section 707(b) should be read, then, to apply to either implicit
or explicit violations of the provisions and philosophy underlying
Chapter 7 cases.
A narrow interpretation of section 707(b) would require courts to
make a very different analysis from that which they have made and
may continue to make under an expansive interpretation. Rather than
focusing on the single, rigid standard of whether a debtor can repay
creditors out of future income, courts will focus on the nature of Chap-
ter 7 and the debtor's obligations, with a view towards determining
whether this debtor is what one could term an "honest" as distin-
guished from "dishonest" debtor. Such an inquiry is consistent with a
prevailing theme in bankruptcy jurisprudence: the bankruptcy laws
should protect honest debtors who have unfortunately incurred obliga-
tions that they cannot repay, but not debtors who have systematically
defrauded their creditors. 66
The credit industry might argue that the act of incurring debt that
one cannot repay is itself the essence of debtor dishonesty, but such a
view finds no support in past or present bankruptcy philosophy. In
fact, one might argue that the credit industry is equally blameworthy.
163 See id; see also supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
164 In re Christian, 51 Bankr. 118, 121 n.3 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1985), affd, 804 F.2d
46 (3d Cir. 1986).
165 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 727 (1982).
168 See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
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One of the very reasons individual debtors are in the position of owing
more than they can repay to their creditors is the fact that the creditors
themselves have extended too much credit. 1 7 The ease with which the
credit industry has extended unsecured credit to individuals who, given
their income level and the state of the economy, may well be unable to
repay, is at the root of many a debtor's problems."6 The very person
who puts a debtor into financial difficulty will be hard pressed to sug-
gest that such a debtor is dishonest for being in that predicament. If
there is any "dishonesty" in these situations, it is that of the creditors,
aggressively seeking to maximize profits knowing that the subject of
their practices will be unable, either over the long or short term, to
repay what is owed.
1. A Comparison of Results Under the Paradigms
The problems caused by an expansive interpretation of the
Amendments and the benefits of a narrow interpretation are clearly
illustrated in a series of hypotheticals. Consider a physician who is just
completing her residency at a major teaching hospital and who is con-
templating entry into a lucrative private practice. Assume that in all of
the following hypotheticals the doctor would be able to repay her credi-
tors in full in a Chapter 13 case but that she does not, at present, have
sufficient non-exempt assets to do so.1" 9 As such, her creditors would
get only a meager distribution in a Chapter 7 case.
Hypothetical One: The doctor has several unsecured trade creditors to
whom she is paying minimum monthly installments as required. The
doctor also owes money to a secured creditor who has sold an automo-
bile to the debtor. The doctor is behind in these payments, and the
creditor is threatening foreclosure. Assume that the automobile is the
debtor's second car. The doctor seeks relief under Chapter 7 merely to
postpone the foreclosure on the second car. Assume that the debtor has
determined that she wants the second car sold but that she wants to sell
167 See Ayers, supra note 29, at 738 ("[W]hile the credit industry blames its losses
upon the ready availability of bankruptcy, it seems clear that they are also responsible
for a certain portion of the bad debt losses.").
168 See id.; Countryman, supra note 9, at 825 ("[I]mprovident credit extenders
not only get unsophisticated debtors into trouble by overloading them with debt, but
also jeopardize the loans made earlier to the same debtors by prudent credit extend-
ers."). For an overview of the interrelationship between economic. considerations in the
context of amendments to the Code, see Reform Symposium, supra note 101, at 1.
16 Cf In re Campbell, 63 Bankr. 702, 703 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986) ("[D]octors
may be slow pay but always eventually pay because they all become rich . . ... "); In
re Kress, 57 Bankr. 874, 876 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985) (court "cannot and does not ig-
nore" a doctor's earning capacity).
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it at a time and in a manner of her choosing. By filing, the doctor
believes that she will gain, in addition to time, leverage in terms of
persuading the secured creditor to wait to foreclose.
Hypothetical Two: The doctor incurs substantial, unsecured indebted-
ness from a variety of lenders for personal use. Assume that there is no
fraud on the debtor's part in obtaining these loans and, hence, they
would be dischargeable under applicable Code provisions. Assume also
that the doctor spent the loan proceeds on speculative ventures in the
stock market and that all of the monies were lost due to poor invest-
ments. In addition to these debts, the doctor owes other creditors for
goods and services provided. She has paid the latter group of creditors
in the ordinary course on an installment basis. The doctor seeks relief
under Chapter 7 principally to obtain relief from the losses in the stock
market.
170
Hypothetical Three: The doctor has incurred unsecured debt in the or-
dinary course. Some of this indebtedness is for "non-luxury" items such
as food, clothing, furniture, books, and other day-to-day expenses, in-
cluding cash advances. The doctor has also purchased several "luxury"
items, including a fur coat, a stereo, a hot-tub, and a vacation in the
Caribbean. She seeks relief from all of this indebtedness, because she
cannot satisfy the minimum monthly debt service.
Hypothetical Four: The doctor has incurred unsecured credit in the
ordinary course and is unable, at her present earning level, to meet the
requisite debt service payments. The doctor did not purchase any "lux-
ury" items but rather purchased clothing, furniture, books, food, and
other day-to-day expenses. She seeks relief under Chapter 7 to get out
from under excessive debts.
Prior to the adoption of the Amendments, no provision of the Code
expressly mandated dismissal or denial of a discharge in any of these
hypotheticals. Creditors have sought dismissal in cases analogous to
that in Hypothetical One by arguing that the debtor's delay was tanta-
170 For purposes of this analysis, there is an assumption that the debts incurred by
the doctor are "consumer debts," as § 707(b) is applicable only in such contexts. The
debtor borrowed the sums for "personal" use, even though the monies were ultimately
expended for nonhome use. A recent decision, In re Almendinger, 56 Bankr. 97, 99
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985), held that sums expended with a profit motive are not con-
sumer debts. In that case, the debtor used cash advances on his credit cards to repay
investment losses in the stock market and to reinvest in the market. By taking the
particular debt in question outside the scope of § 707(b), the court was able to avoid
dismissal under that section. The court could have reached the same result (nondismis-
sal) under a narrow interpretation, as is suggested by the solution to the variation of
Hypothetical Two. See infra text accompanying notes 185-90.
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mount to "cause" under former section 707.11 Creditors also have
sought dismissal in cases analogous to Hypothetical One under section
305,172 although it would be difficult to demonstrate that such a result
is in the debtor's best interest, which is a crucial inquiry of that provi-
sion. " Finally, in cases analogous to Hypothetical One, creditors have
urged courts to read into Chapter 7 an obligation of good faith that
would allow the court to dismiss the case on the ground that delay
caused by the filing constitutes bad faith. 7"
Similar arguments would have to be made in the context of the
next two hypotheticals. While a creditor might seek to have a court
dismiss these cases under former section 707, or section 305, or on the
basis of an implied good faith requirement, the likelihood of creditor
success is at best uncertain. Hypothetical Four would have presented
an even greater problem, because, unlike the other hypotheticals, the
only possible "cause" under section 707 would be the doctor's incurring
indebtedness that she cannot repay and her election to liquidate rather
than reorganize. A situation similar to that in Hypothetical Four was
presented in In re Graham, where a doctor filed for relief under Chap-
ter 7 and the debtor's former spouse tried to convert the case into a
Chapter 11 case. 175 In denying the request, the court observed that:
An order converting Dr. Graham's bankruptcy proceed-
ings from Chapter 7 to Chapter 11 would have the effect,
assuming a reorganization plan were subsequently confirmed
and complied with, of diverting some of the fruits of Dr.
Graham's future labors from himself to his pre-petition cred-
itors. In essence, a[] . . . conversion might amount to an or-
der to Dr. Graham to work for his pre-petition creditors and
171 See In re Lang, 5 Bankr. 371, 374 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980). It is important to
note that this case, although involving delay, is distinct from that in Hypothetical One,
because in that hypothetical the debtor did not delay in filing; rather, the filing itself
was for the purpose of delay or of gaining time. See id.
172- 11 U.S.C. § 305(a)(1) (1982) states, in relevant part: "The court, after notice
and a hearing, may dismiss a case under this title, . . . at any time if-[1] the interests
of ... the debtor would be better served by such dismissal or suspension .... "
171 See In re Whitby, 51 Bankr. 184, 185 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985); In re
Luftek, Inc., 6 Bankr. 539, 547-48 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980).
174 See In re Lang, 5 Bankr. at 374-75 (rejecting creditor's argument that debtor's
delay in filing petition amounted to a fraud, and implicitly, a lack of good faith on the
part of the debtor).
175 See In re Graham, 21 Bankr. 235, 236 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982). In Graham,
the debtor's former spouse contemplated that creditors could receive more in a Chapter
11 case, an observation that may be inaccurate in light of the fact that the debtor's
future income is not property of the Chapter 11 estate under § 541(a)(6). See 11
U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (1982); see also In re Fitzsimmons, 725 F.2d. 1208, 1210-11 (9th
Cir. 1984).
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would thus be like a mandatory Chapter 13
proceeding ....
• . . In the view of Congress, it is more important to
encourage a debtor to retain his or her employment, instead
of running the risk of a debtor's walking away from his or
her job in order to avoid working to fund a repayment plan
that primarily benefits someone else . . .. [I]t is better, for
Dr. Graham, and presumably, for society, that Dr. Graham
continue to service three hospitals instead of cutting back on
his services because of an unwillingness to fund a Chapter
11 reorganization plan.'
The problem of obtaining either a dismissal or nondischargeability
of certain debt in situations akin to all of these hypotheticals, and par-
ticularly Hypothetical Four, raised the ire of the consumer credit in-
dustry prior to the passage of the Consumer Credit Amendments.
17 7
From the creditor perspective, the facts in all four hypotheticals
presented instances of abuse requiring the dismissal of Chapter 7 cases.
It is not clear whether Congress shared this view or whether Congress
was more troubled by the situations raised by Hypotheticals One
through Three.
Following the passage of the Amendments, under the expansive
interpretation of section 707(b) noted above,178 courts would be likely
.to dismiss the Chapter 7 cases presented in each of the hypotheticals
because the debtor in each could repay her creditors out of future earn-
ings. The availability of future income would be the key factor in deter-
mining whether there was substantial abuse. Such an expansive inter-
pretation would permit dismissal even in the situation presented in
Hypothetical Four, where the debtor's only "wrong" was being in debt
above her present means while having the earning power to allow for
eventual repayment of such debt.
Under a narrow interpretation of section 707(b), a court still
would be likely to dismiss the cases presented in Hypotheticals One
and Two, although these results would be reached for very different
reasons than those suggested by an expansive interpretation.7 The sit-
uations in Hypotheticals Three and Four, however, would not warrant
178 Graham, 21 Bankr. at 238-39.
177 For a summary of the credit industry's view as to who should be eligible for
bankruptcy relief, see Hearing on S. 333 and S. 445 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 258 (1983) (statement of Jonathan M. Landers on
behalf of the National Coalition for Bankruptcy Reform).
178 See supra notes 110-38 and accompanying text.
179 See infra text accompanying notes 183-90.
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dismissal, although the "luxury" debts in Hypothetical Three would be
nondischargeable.180 This result achieves a better balance between the
needs of both debtors and creditors. Although, under an expansive in-
terpretation, the result in Hypothetical Three would be dismissal as
distinguished from nondischargeability, creditors should not be un-
happy with and may even prefer the result achieved through a narrow
interpretation, namely, nondischargeability.' 8' The result of non-
dismissal of Hypothetical Four, although likely to meet with dissatis-
faction among creditors, is fully consistent with the bankruptcy philoso-
phy that allows any debtor to seek relief when she cannot repay her
debts.
182
The dismissal of Hypotheticals One and Two under a narrow
paradigm stems from application of the term substantial abuse. Dismis-
sal would not be based on the fact that the debtor will be a high earner
following her residency and thus able to repay creditors in full. Rather,
180 The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, § 307(a)(2)(C), 98 Stat. 333, 353-54 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(2)(C) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)) provides, in pertinent part:
(c) consumer debts owed to a single creditor and aggregating more than
$500 for "luxury goods or services" incurred by an individual debtor on or
within forty days before the order for relief under this title, or cash ad-
vances aggregating more than $1000 that are extensions of consumer
credit under an open end credit plan obtained by an individual debtor on
or within twenty days before the order for relief under this title, are pre-
sumed to be nondischargeable; "luxury goods or services" do not include
goods or services reasonably acquired for the support or maintenance of
the debtor or a dependent of the debtor ....
181 Nondischargeability under Chapter 7 is governed by 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)
(1982 & Supp. III 1985). One distinction between dismissal and nondischargeability is
that when a case is dismissed the debtor can refile and seek discharge of the same
indebtedness. See 11 U.S.C. § 349(a) (1982). Refiling is not helpful to the debtor,
however, if the debts are nondischargeable. Thus, because of the possibility of refilings
after dismissals, creditors may be better off if the debts are nondischargeable, except
with respect to "luxury goods," where the nondischargeability is geared to the point in
time at which the debts are incurred in relation to the filing. See 11 U.S.C. § 523
(a)(2)(C) (Supp. III 1985). If, however, a specific debt is nondischargeable as a luxury
item and discharge of this item is precluded, what is to prevent the debtor from refiling
six months later to discharge this sum? Even if the debtor is unlikely to prevail, the
debtor's refiling causes creditors the same delay, due to the automatic stay that follows
a filing, see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985), in enforcing their claims as
did the refilings after dismissal. The creditors, however, might seek to have the stay
lifted. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
As presently drafted, the repeat filer exclusion of § 109 does not include within its
parameters repeat filings following dismissals under § 707(b). That exclusion of § 109
relates only to debtors who do not obey court orders. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(0(1) (1982
& Supp. III 1985). Although the drafting of § 109 to include dismissal might have
made dismissal a more serious sanction for the debtor, as the Code is presently drafted,
there is as a practical matter little to distinguish dismissal from nondischargeability of a
specific debt.
182 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
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the focus is on the debtor's motivation for seeking relief under the Code
and the nature of the indebtedness that she is seeking to have dis-
charged. In Hypothetical One, the debtor's filing serves only to delay
foreclosure. While delay has seldom been viewed as a basis for denial of
relief under Chapter 7, it has been used frequently in the dismissal of
Chapter 11 cases in which debtors seek not to reorganize but rather to
stall lender foreclosure.1 83 By analogy, where a debtor seeks relief
under Chapter 7 solely for purposes of delaying a creditor, and where,
at least in this instance, such action does not even eliminate the ulti-
mate result sought by the creditor, the essential purpose of a Chapter 7
case-the liquidation of debts in an organized fashion so that one can
begin anew-is eroded.'"
In Hypothetical Two, a narrow approach again suggests dismissal,
this time because of the nature of the indebtedness.1 85 Prior to the pas-
sage of the Amendments there was no express provision in either Chap-
ter 5 or Chapter 7 differentiating between the types and character of
debt for purposes of dismissal as distinguished from nondis-
chargeability. Sections 727 and 523 have, however; always highlighted
certain categories of debt that are nondischargeable. Such selections no
doubt reflect value judgments about the nature of the particular debt
involved and the circumstances surrounding the incurring and repay-
ment of that debt.186 Section 707(b) now also highlights a particular
type of debt, namely consumer debt, as "troublesome." 8 ' The Amend-
•ments add to the list of debt not subject to discharge through the adop-
"SI See, e.g., In re Odom Enter., 22 Bankr. 785, 785 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1982); In
re Missouri, 22 Bankr. 600, 602-03 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1982).
', Here, the debtor seeks to control one of several creditors because this creditor's
action is inconvenient. Such a case, in which delay is a debtor's sole objective, is readily
distinguishable from the delay that occurs as a natural consequence of a filing.
A recent example in which a court looked to motivation in filing is In re Shands,
63 Bankr. 121, 123-24 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986), where the court determined that the
debtor was seeking relief for spite, namely to get back at her husband. Similarly, albeit
in a different context, a court refused to grant a debtor relief under Chapter 7 where
the purpose of filing was relief from obligations under an executory contract. See In re
Carrere, [1985-86 Transfer Binder] Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 71,279 (Bankr. C.D.
. Cal. July 6, 1986).
185 For one bankruptcy court's disinclination toward gambling, albeit in a differ-
ent context, see In re Dolin, 759 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1986).
188 For a discussion of one such value judgment, see Kalevitch, Educational
Loans in Bankruptcy, 2 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 325, 336-37 (1982). Professor Kalevitch
argues that Congress limited the dischargability of educational loans in order to prevent
graduating college students from securing a financial "headstart" by discharging their
educational loans. See id. For examples of other nondischargeble debts, see 11 U.S.C.
§ 727 (1982) (listing ten items that will prohibit a debtor from receiving a discharge);
11 U.S.C. § 523 (1982) (listing nine classes of debt that are nondischargeable).
187 See Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 193-95 (assessment of the "trouble-
some" growth in consumer debt from Visa, U.S.A., Inc.)
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tion of section 523(a)(2)(C).8 8 This subsection prohibits the discharge
of recently incurred debt for luxury items."8 9 While nothing in the
Code, as amended, expressly prohibits discharging indebtedness in-
curred through speculation, the fact that the debtor incurred obligations
with the intent to gain all of the upside if successful and none of the
downside upon failure might be enough to convince a court of abuse. 9 '
Thus, while not-enumerated in sections 523 or 727, gambling debt is of
such a character that the debtor should continue to be obligated to re-
pay that debt.
Certainly in Hypothetical Two, a court must make a value judg-
ment about the nature of the debtor's indebtedness. Such a determina-
tion, however, can be distinguished from the value judgments made in
the context of an expansive interpretation of section 707(b). In Hypo-
thetical Two, the key issue is not whether the debtor's expenses ex-
ceeded those which a person of her means should have incurred nor is
it whether she had the ability to repay her lenders, due to her future
earning power. The key is that the debtor "abused" Chapter 7 because,
although her use of the money did not amount to fraud, she was unfair
to creditors who did not expect that the true personal use for which she
would borrow their money included virtually anything, even "gam-
bling" in the stock market. In fact, had she disclosed what she intended
to do with the money, the lenders would not have advanced the funds
in the first instance. Hypothetical Two thus presents a situation where
one would argue that the debt is nondischargeable. Although none of
the existing provisions are broad enough to permit such a result, there
has been an abuse of the spirit of section 727. Thus, a provision of
Chapter 7 has been substantially abused within the meaning of section
707(b) and dismissal should obtain through that section.
Hypothetical Two could be varied to suggest a different result. If
the debtor had not borrowed money and dissipated it through bad in-
vestment, but had instead gone to Las Vegas and obtained markers at a
18 See supra note 180.
189 See, e.g., In re Hussey, 59 Bankr. 573, 575 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1986) (con-
struing § 523(a)(2)(C)); In re Smith, 54 Bankr. 299, 301-03 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1985)
(construing § 523(a)(2)(0) but finding it inapplicable to the facts of the case).
190 The court in In re Mastroeni, 56 Bankr. 456, 457 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985),
observed that the debtor had "substantial speculative" trades in the stock market, but
the court refused to find abuse under § 707(b), in part because the debtor's excessive
debts made him ineligible for relief under Chapter 13. This argument creates an anom-
aly under the expansive paradigm. If one incurs debts over the statutory limits of
Chapter 13, then, because one was not an eligible debtor under Chapter 13, one's case
cannot be dismissed under Chapter 7 for failing to repay creditors under Chapter 13.
Thus, debtors are encouraged to increase their obligations so as to avoid the application
of § 1325(b). Consequently, the Amendments might serve to increase, rather than de-
crease, the incentive to incur debt that cannot be repaid.
[Vol. 135:59
CONSUMER CREDIT AMENDMENTS
casino through the use of a credit card, one is likely to be less sympa-
thetic toward the creditors."' 1 After allowing debtors to use credit cards
to obtain cash advances at a recognized gambling place, how can credi-
tors revisit that decision in the guise of finding debtor abuse? The risk
of loss from gambling in this variation of the hypothetical should per-
haps be on the creditor rather than the debtor. 92 Therefore, in pro-
ceeding under section 707(b), it is not enough for the courts to look at
the nature of the indebtedness to determine abuse; they should also
evaluate the way in which the debt was incurred.
Under a narrow paradigm, because of the existence of section
523(a)(2)(C), which was added by the Amendments, 9 3 Hypothetical
Three does not mandate dismissal under section 707(b). Section
523(a)(2)(C) provides that debts incurred from the purchase of luxury
goods and services and incurred in contemplation of filing are nondis-
chargeable. This section redresses a serious wrong experienced by cred-
itors prior to the adoption of the Amendments: debtors went "spree
buying" knowing full well that such obligations would be dis-
charged. 9 Thus, if the doctor incurred such debts in contemplation of
filing, a rebuttable presumption under the Amendments,'9" these debts
are nondischargeable, and the debtor should pay for them out of future
earnings.
Hypothetical Four best demonstrates the marked distinction be-
tween the expansive and narrow paradigms. The expansive approach
suggests that the mere incurring of debt beyond one's means and the
failure to repay such debts is cause for dismissal.' Such an approach
is, as has been noted, inconsistent with bankruptcy philosophy that
every debtor should be permitted to seek relief under the federal bank-
ruptcy laws when she cannot repay her debts.197 With the abolition of
debtor's prisons, our legal system did away with the stigma of punish-
191 See In re Almendinger, 56 Bankr. 97 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (debtor ob-
tained $119,486.00 from credit card cash advances and lost most of it through bad
investments).
193 For an overview of the interrelationship of law and economics and the alloca-
tion of the risk of loss, see A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CON-
TRACT LAW (1979). For a similar discussion in the bankruptcy context, see T. JACK-
SON, supra note 1, at 228-30; Eisenberg I, supra note 8, at 981-83.
193 See supra note 180.
19 See Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 83 ("The amendment to § 523(d) is
intended to address the second unconscionable or fraudulent practice: that of 'loading
up.' In many instances, a debtor will go on a credit buying spree in contemplation of
bankruptcy.").
'5 See supra note 189.
199 See supra notes 110-38 and accompanying text.
197 See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
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ment just for being a debtor.19 8 The fact that the Code's vocabulary
replaced the word "bankrupt" with the word "debtor" is further evi-
dence of the effort to decrease the stigma of bankruptcy.'9 9 Further, the
opening of access to many provisions of the Code encouraged debtors to
file.200 The expansive approach to section 707(b) undercuts all of these
policy choices in the name of curing abuse. A narrow interpretation, on
the other hand, permits a court to dismiss a Chapter 7 case where no
other provision of the Code, other than perhaps the court's powers
under section 105,201 would accord relief.20 2 The debtor in Hypotheti-
cal Four is not a "dishonest" debtor in the sense that she committed a
fraud on her creditors or enticed lenders to lend. Rather, she is an hon-
est debtor in financial trouble, albeit trouble not caused by a cata-
strophic or tragic event. 0 3 Moreover, as noted above,2 0 4 she got into
that trouble because of the actions of the very creditors that now are
trying to prevent her from obtaining relief. The bankruptcy laws can-
not protect creditors by serving both as their collection agent and as the
monitor of who is entitled to credit and who is a good credit risk.
One might argue, however, that Hypothetical Four presents cer-
tain difficulties under a narrow paradigm, especially since most Chap-
ter 7 cases occur in the context of a debtor with no non-exempt assets.
If the doctor cannot repay her creditors anything in a Chapter 7 case
because all of her existing assets are exempt, and if she then proceeds
to live "very well" following the filing because of her increased postfil-
ing income, one is left with a sense of unfairness to her creditors. Un-
like the posited hypotheticals where the creditors are receiving some-
thing in a liquidation case, albeit a small amount, one can question
whether dismissal of a Chapter 7 case is an appropriate result under
section 707(b) where a creditor receives nothing and the debtor is alleg-
edly "laughing all the way to the bank."
In some of the cases decided under section 707(b), there were few,
if any, non-exempt assets available for distribution to unsecured credi-
tors.20 5 In several of these cases, the debtor's situation involved some-
198 See supra note 46.
199 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 21, at 310.
'00 See id. at 311-12.
202 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1982) states: "The court may issue any order, process, or
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title."
202 See supra notes 159-68 and accompanying text.
103 For decisions suggesting that a calamitous event is required, see, for example,
In re Kress, 57 Bankr. 874, 878 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985); In re Kelly, 57 Bankr. 536,
540 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1986).
104 See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
205 See, e.g., In re Bell, 56 Bankr. 637 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986), vacated on
other grounds, No. 85-02150-R (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 1986); In re Grant, 51
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thing more than nonpayment of creditors coupled with an ability to
repay outstanding obligations in the future.2"6 In one case, the debtor
failed to disclose all of her liabilities.20 7 In another, the debtor over-
stated her current expenses.208 Several cases have confronted this is-
sue.200 Unfortunately, these courts did not specifically address the dis-
tinction between asset and no-asset Chapter 7 cases, although one is left
with the distinct impression that a distribution in a Chapter 7 case is
not a determinative factor as long as creditors are still receiving less
than they would receive in a Chapter 11 or 13 case.210
The analysis of the court in In re Mastroeni"1 is helpful, how-
ever, in forging an argument. In that case, the bankruptcy court issued
notice to the debtor to show cause why his petition for Chapter 7 relief
should not be dismissed. Although the court did not specify what initi-
ated its suggestion of dismissal, the opinion indicates that the court
found the debtor's stock market speculation to constitute abuse.212 It is
also noteworthy that, due to the amount of the debtor's obligations, he
was ineligible for relief under Chapter 13."' In evaluating the merits
of dismissal, the bankruptcy court acknowledged the debtor's "abusive"
behavior21 4 but stated that his postpetition earnings were not available
to creditors in Chapters 7 and 11,215 and, therefore, absent this money,
there was little hope of rehabilitation. 1 ' The court denied dismissal,
observing:
Bankr. 385 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985); In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. 21, 24 (Bankr.
W.D.N.C. 1984).
206 See supra note 107.
207 See In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. at 23.
208 See In re Grant, 51 Bankr. at 395.
209 In re Bell, 56 Bankr. 637 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986), vacated on other
grounds, No. 85-02150-R (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 1986); In re Colton, ABI
Newsl., June, 1986, at 10 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1985), affd, ABI Newsl., June,
1986, at 10 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, (1986).
210 See Bell, 56 Bankr. at 641. The Bell court's emphasis was on whether the
debtor could repay a "meaningful" part of his debts from his future income. This focus
suggests that the court was primarily concerned with maximizing the creditors' recov-
eries. Unless the asset distribution from the debtor's proposed discharge was compara-
ble to what would have been available to creditors through a Chapter 11 or 13 reorgan-
ization, it seems that the Bell court would not have considered the extent of the debtor's
non-exempt assets.
211 56 Bankr. 456 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
212 See id. at 457.
21 See id. at 458.
214 See id. at 458-59 (spending a $10,000 income tax refund on personal expenses
shortly before filing a bankruptcy petition).
215 See id. at 458.
216 See id. The court in Bell, 56 Bankr. at 641-42, recognized the argument raised
in Mastroeni and hence extended its analysis to Chapter 11 if the debtor was ineligible
for relief under Chapter 13. This goes even farther than the expansive interpretation
suggested herein.
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The fact that Chapter 13 relief is available to debtors
whose Chapter 7 petitions are questioned by bankruptcy
courts does not mean that such debtors must forego their
Chapter 7 route . . . . The new legislation contains ample
factors that lean in the direction of Chapter 7 relief. Firstly,
there is an express presumption. . . in favor of granting the
Chapter 7 relief requested by the debtor.
• . . Manifestly, the drafters of 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)
failed to take into account the fact that if repayment is the
desired goal under this section there should be no limitations
placed on the eligibility of debtors for relief under Chapter
13. This oversight, in addition to the omission of specific
standards to be applied in determining what constitutes a
substantial abuse of the provisions of Chapter 7, highlights
the inherent weakness in the efficacy of the statute.
2 17
Because section 707(b), with all of its ambiguities, created a pre-
sumption of relief under Chapter 7, the no-asset case should not be
dismissed solely on the ground that the debtor can repay in the future.
There is no reason to conclude that no-asset cases should be distin-
guished from asset cases for purposes of section 707(b). A small distri-
bution or even a large distribution neither answers the question of how
much a creditor would receive in a Chapter 13 case nor reveals some
difference in the moral quality of the debtor. The fact that a debtor has
some non-exempt assets may indicate only that she was not as "poor"
as the debtor with no non-exempt assets. This proves only that debtors
are not in the same financial posture when they seek relief. To suggest
that a debtor who has no non-exempt assets is somehow "more dishon-
est" than the richer debtor who happened to have accumulated more
wealth before filing turns the law on its head. Such reasoning would
protect the richer debtor because her case would be less strictly scruti-
nized than that of the poorer debtor.
If, however, there is evidence that, due to the nature of the indebt-
edness, the manner in which it was incurred, or the amount of disclo-
sure in the required schedules by the debtor in no-asset cases, there has
been substantial abuse of Chapter 7, then the presumption in favor of
debtor relief should be rebutted. This argument applies equally, as is
217 Mastroeni, 56 Bankr. at 459-60. A similar sentiment is expressed, in the con-
text of conversion of a Chapter 13 case to a Chapter 7 case, by the court in In re
Lepper, 58 Bankr. 896, 901 (Bankr. D. Md. 1986).
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suggested above,"'8 in the context of asset cases.21 9 In either case, a
situation meriting dismissal would be the exception rather than the
rule. Even in the case of inaccurate listings of liabilities and overstate-
ment of expenses, one should question whether dismissal is an appro-
priate remedy, for the particular debts in question, or perhaps all of the
debts, could be deemed nondischargeable.220 In short, even if the dis-
charge route is not explored, dismissal in no-asset cases should follow
the same pattern as that established for asset cases.
2. Consequences of the Narrow Paradigm
The narrow interpretation of "substantial abuse" as it relates to
section 707(b) should apply to section 707(a) as well. As observed, a
court has always been and should continue to be able to dismiss a case
if there is abuse of the Code.22 This basis for dismissal should apply
irrespective of whether the debtor incurred consumer or any other
debts. Thus, dismissal for substantial abuse is a tool to be employed by
a court with respect to all debtors and by creditors with respect to debt-
ors with nonconsumer debts where other provisions of the Code do not
expressly require dismissal.
222
If one does not adopt a narrow interpretation of section 707(b), in
addition to the considerable difficulties inherent in making value judg-
ments, an entire category of debtors will be precluded from filing cases
under Chapter 7, namely, those individuals who simply incurred in-
debtedness and chose to liquidate their assets rather than to repay debts
out of future income. All of these debtors will, if they want relief under
the federal bankruptcy laws, have to look to the provisions of Chapter
13.213 Many debtors will be precluded even though some of them
should not be deemed "abusers."
218 See supra notes 205-17 and accompanying text.
219 Even if one were to adopt the expansive test under § 707(b), a narrow inter-
pretation of what is required for purposes of confirming a Chapter 13 plan would
indicate that a debtor's future expenses are reduced in only limited circumstances. See
infra text accompanying notes 312-31. Therefore, under a narrow paradigm of
§ 1325(b), creditors would not be obtaining significant payments in Chapter 13, and,
hence, dismissal under § 707(b) is inappropriate. It is likely, however, that those who
interpret § 707(b) expansively will apply a similar approach to § 1325(b).
220 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523 (exceptions to discharge), 727 (discharge) (1982).
221 See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
222 One can ask whether this problem raises an equal protection problem, al-
though such claims in similar contexts have not been viewed with great favor. See In re
Keniston, 60 Bankr. 742, 745 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1986); Breitowitz, Installment II, supra
note 19, at 61-66.
222. It is recognized, however, that Chapter 11 may still be available for an individ-
ual debtor's reorganization. See In re Moog, 774 F.2d 1073, 1074-75 (11 th Cir. 1985)
(per curiam); In re Bell, 56 Bankr. 637, 642 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986), vacated on
other grounds, No. 85-02150-R (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 1986). Chapter 11,
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In sum, consumer debtors whom courts have deemed to have
abused substantially the provisions of Chapter 7 have two choices: they
can allow their creditors to seize their assets and garnish their wages or
they can file Chapter 13 petitions. In Chapter 13, as will be discussed
more fully,224 these individuals will either have to agree to repay their
creditors amounts determined by reference to future earnings or suffer
dismissal of their Chapter 13 cases, thereby freeing their creditors to
attack their assets. An evaluation of sections 1325 and 1329 brings the
difficulties of this choice, and the risks inherent in it, into better focus.
III. SECTION 1325(b)
Section 1325 sets forth the standards for confirming a Chapter 13
plan.225 Subsections (a) and (c) were unchanged by the Consumer
however, may not be appropriate for debtors in slightly different situations. In In re
White, 49 Bankr. 869 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985), for example, the debtor had only one
creditor. Thus, unless that creditor approved the debtor's Chapter 11 plan, the debtor's
plan would not be confirmed by the court. Moreover, due to the amount of indebted-
ness owed by the debtor to this single creditor, Chapter 13 was unavailable. Conse-
quently, if the court denied the debtor access to Chapter 7 pursuant to § 707(b), the
debtor would be precluded from all options under the Code. As expressed by the court:
Conversely, if this case is dismissed [under § 707(b)], the Petitioner
must elect between two unsavory options. First, he can remain outside the
protection of the bankruptcy system, leaving himself liable for this Judg-
ment. He would then labor, without incentive and without the opportunity
to improve his position that is so fundamental to what is referred to as the
"American way of life." . . . He would have little incentive to work and
might well become no more than a ward of the State.
Second and alternatively, this Petitioner could refile a Petition under
Title 11. . . . [Tjhe Petitioner would have to satisfy [the sole creditor's]
demands and conditions in order to get relief in bankruptcy. This would
likely mean that he would have to agree to pay most if not all of this
Judgment-over what could be a substantial and perhaps unlimited num-
ber of years. And again, the Petitioner's incentives to work and support
himself would be destroyed and his fresh start denied.
Id. at 873-74; see also In re Mastroeni, 56 Bankr. 456, 459 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(Although "there is no statutory reason why an individual consumer debtor may not
seek reorganizational relief under Chapter 11 . . . Chapter 11 does not appear to be an
acceptable alternative to relief under Chapter 7.").
It should also be noted that, under limited circumstances, debtors may now file
under Chapter 12, which was added to the Code on October 27, 1986. See supra notes
3, 10.
224 See infra notes 225-393 and accompanying text.
225 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Section 1325(a) established
six basic requirements for confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan: the plan must comply
with the provisions of the Code, pay applicable fees, be proposed in good faith and not
by any means forbidden by law, pay unsecured creditors at least what they would
receive in a Chapter 7 case, pay secured creditors at least the value of the liens securing
their claims, and be able to be completed in accordance with its terms. For an overview
of the confirmation requirements, see A. COHEN, supra note 1, at 242-57.
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Credit Amendments except to the extent that subsection (a) was made
subject to an entirely new provision-subsection (b).226 Subsection (b)
is divided into two parts.227 Subpart (1) prohibits the court from con-
firming a Chapter 13 plan over the objections of a trustee or unsecured
creditors unless either the unsecured creditors will be paid in full or the
debtor will apply to plan payments all of her projected disposable in-
come for the three year period commencing on the date the first pay-
ment is due.228 Although Chapter 13 plans vary229 and priority claims
must be paid ahead of other claims, 23 0 it is likely that in most instances
at least a portion of the debtor's projected disposable income (to the
extent that there is any such income) will inure to the benefit of her
unsecured creditors.23' Subpart (2) defines "disposable income" as that
228 See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-353, § 317, 98 Stat. 333, 356 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (Supp. III
1985)).
227 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) provides:
(b) (1) If the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to
the confirmation of the plan, then the court may not approve the plan
unless, as of the effective date of the plan-
(A) the value of the property to be distributed under the plan
on account of such claim is not less than the amount of such
claim; or
(B) the plan provides that all of the debtor's projected dispos-
able income to be received in the three-year period beginning
on the date that the first payment is due under the plan will
be applied to make payments under the plan.
(2) For purposes of this subsection, 'disposable income' means income
which is received by the debtor and which is not reasonably necessary to
be expended-
(A) for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a de-
pendent of the debtor; or
(B) if the debtor is engaged in business, for the payment of
the expenditures necessary for the continuation, preservation,
and operation of such business.
228 See id. For some insight into the difficulties of determining whether a creditor
has been paid in full for purposes of this new subsection, see Morris, supra note 16, at
153-55.
229 Cf 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a), (b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The Code requires
that a Chapter 13 plan contain certain provisions and permits such a plan to contain
other provisions that are discretionary. Therefore, while all Chapter 13 plans must
contain a certain category of provisions (although there can be considerable variation in
these provisions themselves-for example, the dollar amounts distributed and the spe-
cific mechanisms drafted for implementing distributions can be different), there is con-
siderable latitude in terms of the nonmandatory provisions. For a sample Chapter 13
plan, see D. EPSTEIN & J. LANDERS, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 391-95 (2d ed.
1982).
10 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
22. This assumes that the debtor will have some disposable income. If the debtor
has no disposable income, the question will be the same as that which existed under the
Code prior to the Amendments, namely, whether courts should approve zero payment
plans as not having been proposed in "good faith" as required by 11 U.S.C.
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income that is not reasonably necessary for the support and mainte-
nance of the debtor and her dependents. 2 Section 1325(b), therefore,
superimposes upon the six specific conditions for confirmation of a
Chapter 13 plan set forth in section (a)233 a new condition, namely,
that a debtor who is not repaying her unsecured creditors in full must,
if creditors object to confirmation,'" allocate to plan payments that
portion of her projected income for the forthcoming three years that is
above the amount deemed by a court to be necessary for the support
and maintenance of the debtor and her dependents.2"'
Section 1325(b) can be viewed as amending subsection
1325(a)(4)2 ' 6 by virtue of the exception contained in the prefatory lan-
guage of section 1325(a).237 Subsection 1325(a)(4) permits confirmation
of a Chapter 13 plan if the plan, in addition to satisfying the other
§ 1325(a)(3) (1982). For an overview of the manner in which pre-Amendments zero
payment plans were treated by the different courts, see Note, Good Faith, Zero Plans,
and the Purposes of Bankruptcy Code Chapter 13: A Legislative Solution to the Con-
troversy, 61 B.U.L. REv. 773 (1981).
22 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). For purposes of this
Article, the focus will be on Chapter 13 cases in which the disposable income is not
being used for business purposes. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. III
1985) (providing that disposable income does not include income reasonably necessary
for business purposes). While Chapter 13 may be utilized to reorganize small busi-
nesses in the form of sole proprietorships, see 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1982); see also 11
U.S.C. § 101(27) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (defining "individual with regular in-
come"), this Article addresses the use of Chapter 13 by individuals in a nonbusiness
capacity, if only because issues of personal freedom and voluntariness take on greater
significance in such a context.
222 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); supra note 225.
224 In all likelihood, creditors will object to confirmation in every instance where
they are not being repaid in full unless the Chapter 13 plan somehow provides pay-
ments in excess of what the debtor's disposable income for the succeeding three years
will be. Unless a Chapter 13 plan is being funded by an outside source, it is unlikely
that payments under a debtor's plan will ever exceed the debtor's projected disposable
income. It is, of course, possible that creditors will object to the debtor's plan as origi-
nally proposed only when the financial difference between what is proposed under the
Chapter 13 plan and what could be obtained under § 1325(b) is great and would
warrant the creditors spending the time and money to pursue the matter. The creditors
could, however, alert the trustee to the need to object and, hence, the creditors could
avoid the direct cost of objection. See Morris, supra note 16, at 149-53.
215 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. II 1985).
"s 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the court shall confirm a plan
if-
(4) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be
distributed under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured
claim is not less than the amount that would be paid on such claim
if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this
title on such date . . ..
237 See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
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conditions of section 1325(a), would enable creditors to receive at least
as much as they would have received in a Chapter 7 case. Termed the
"best interests" test,2"' subsection 1325(a)(4) is based on the principle
that creditors are entitled only to the value of the debtor's non-exempt
assets. In sharp contrast, but without formally deleting the best inter-
ests test, the addition of section 1325(b) significantly raises the mini-
mum amount necessary for confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan. How
high the benchmark may be for confirmation depends upon how expan-
sively one interprets the term "projected disposable income." However
the term is construed, compliance with the best interests test will no
longer be sufficient.2" 9 On the other hand, as pointed out, simply be-
cause one satisfies section 1325(b) does not mean section 1325(a)(4) has
been satisfied.240
Section 1325(b) also may be viewed as clarifying the area of con-
siderable judicial confusion concerning the application of Subsection
1325(a)(3).241 In the plethora of cases construing that subsection, courts
had looked to a number of factors to determine whether a debtor's
Chapter 13 plan was proposed in good faith. The basic test, albeit with
a host of variations, became whether the plan constituted an abuse of
the purposes, spirit, or provisions of Chapter 13.242 The courts consid-
238 "[Blest interests of the creditors" was the phrase used in the provision of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 that was the predecessor to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). See Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 12(d)(1), § 656(a)(2), 30 Stat. 544, 550. The phrase
was also used in the provision pertaining to confirmation of Chapter XI plans. Id.
§ 366(2), 30 Stat. at 550.
239 The benchmark will be higher only if there is any projected disposable income.
If the debtor utilizes all of her income to support herself and her dependents, then there
will be no sums available to fund the Chapter 13 plan. This would create the same
issue that arose in the context of pre-Amendments § 1325(a), namely, whether a court
should confirm a zero or minimal payment plan if creditors would get nothing in a
Chapter 7 case. Ironically, § 1325(b) was designed, at least in part, to eliminate the
possibility of minimal repayment plans under Chapter 13. See supra notes 69-75 and
accompanying text. What becomes evident is that § 1325(b) asks the same question
that pre-Amendments § 1325(a) did, albeit in a different way: Can a Chapter 13 plan
be confirmed if there is no projected disposable income? Courts may be unwilling to
say that a Chapter 13 plan is proposed in good faith (the requirement of § 1325(a)(3)),
even if § 1325(b) is deemed satisfied. Therefore, we have not solved nor progressed far
from the issues under § 1325(a) that plagued debtors, creditors, and courts. See supra
notes 69-72 and accompanying text. But see In re Green, 60 Bankr. 547, 554 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1986) (legislative history to § 1325(b) indicates that a Chapter 13 plan does
not always have to result in substantial repayment); In re Tinneberg, 59 Bankr. 634,
635 n.1 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986) (nominal or zero payment plans may be evidence of
bad faith, but do not constitute bad faith per se).
240 See In re Chinichian, 784 F.2d 1440, 1443-44 (9th Cir. 1986) (each element
of § 1325 must be satisfied before a court may approve a plan).
241 For a discussion of the confusion encountered in the application of
§ 1325(a)(3), see supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
242 See, e.g., In re Terry, 630 F.2d 634, 635 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); In re
Kull, 12 Bankr. 654, 659 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1981), affd sub nom. Kitchens v. Georgia
1986]
118 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
ered, among other factors, whether a debtor was making an honest ef-
fort to repay creditors.243 In making this determination, courts looked
to, among other things, the amount of a debtor's projected earnings.
244
For example, courts refused to confirm a Chapter 13 plan where only a
limited portion of a debtor's monthly surplus income was being allo-
cated to creditors. 245 Section 1325(b) seeks to eliminate the flexibility
once accorded courts in determining good faith2 48 by mandating a mini-
mum standard of good faith, namely, the payment to creditors of all of
the debtor's disposable income. Although satisfaction of the require-
ments of section 1325(b) is not necessarily synonymous with a finding
of good faith under subsection 1325(a)(3) 241 the inability to comply
with section 1325(b) would appear presumptively demonstrative of a
lack of good faith under subsection 1325(a)(3).
Although some view the ultimate version of the Consumer Credit
Amendments as less detrimental to debtors than prior drafts,248 section
1325(b) imposes a minimum statutory standard of good faith that,
when applied, can be far more detrimental to debtors than the prior
drafts would have been. As previously noted, earlier drafts would have
required that the debtor's Chapter 13 plan represent the debtor's good
faith, or her best or bona fide effort-standards that would have contin-
R.R. Bank & Trust Co., 702 F.2d 885 (11th Cir. 1983); accord In re Burns, 6 Bankr.
286, 288 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980); In re Tanke, 4 Bankr. 339, 340 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1980); In re Cloutier, 3 Bankr. 584, 587 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980).
243 See In re Hurd, 4 Bankr. 551, 560 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1980); In re Iacovoni,
2 Bankr. 256, 268 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980).
244 The court in In re Iacovoni, 2 Bankr. at 258, set out a four-point test that
made the question of whether the proposed payment was "meaningful" contingent
upon four separate evaluations, of which the second was the future income and pay-
ment prospects of the debtor. See also In re Estus, 695 F.2d 311, 317 (8th Cir. 1982)
(debtor's future income); Deans v. O'Donnell, 692 F.2d 968, 972 (4th Cir. 1982) (fac-
tors analyzed include "the debtor's employment history and prospects"); In re Kull, 12
Bankr. at 659 ("the ability of the debtor to earn and the likelihood of future increase or
dimunition of earnings").
141 See, e.g., In re Long, 10 Bankr. 880, 883 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1981); In re Schon-
galla, 4 Bankr. 360, 363 (Bankr. D. Md. 1980).
"48 This flexibility is reflected in In re Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426, 431 (7th Cir.
1982) (emphasis added) (stating that "'good faith' will have to be defined on a case-by-
case basis . . . in the administration of Chapter 13's provisions"); accord In re Kull,
12 Bankr. at 658 (In any Chapter 13 proceeding, "[elach case must be judged on its
own facts."); In re Burrell, 6 Bankr. 360, 366 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1980) (The bank-
ruptcy court cannot impose inflexible standards and "should proceed on a case-by-case
basis.").
. 24 It is still possible to argue that to satisfy the good faith requirement under
§ 1325(a)(3), the debtor must pay creditors 70% of their outstanding indebtedness, by
analogy to § 727(a)(9). Section 727, however, deals with discharge in Chapter 7, not
Chapter 13. See supra note 72.
248 See statements of Senators Metzenbaum and Kennedy, supra note 78.
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ued to permit considerable judicial discretion.24 By contrast, section
1325(b) appears to prescribe a specific test of good faith based upon
payments out of future earnings. Accordingly, such earnings become the
sine qua non of confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan.
Because confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan is the statutory prereq-
uisite to a Chapter 13 discharge, the addition of section 1325(b) has
made such relief more difficult for a debtor to obtain. Although not
rising to the dignity of a constitutional right,25 ° the discharge of an
individual's debts in Chapter 13 has always been viewed as among the
essential features of bankruptcy policy and, particularly, the policy be-
hind Chapter 13.2 5, First, the expanded scope of the discharge available
under Chapter 13, which is considerably broader than that available
under any other chapter of the Code, suggests the significance that the
Code has placed on a debtor's ability to obtain a discharge under Chap-
ter 13.252 Second, Congress attempted through Chapter 13 to encourage
individuals to repay their creditors voluntarily from future income,
thereby preserving a debtor's self-respect while simultaneously maxi-
mizing recoveries to creditors.2 53 For example, under Chapter 13, un-
like Chapter 11, unsecured creditors can neither propose nor vote to
accept or reject a debtor's repayment plan. 254 As such, great weight is
249 See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
250 See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973) ("There is no constitu-
tional right to obtain a discharge of one's debts in bankruptcy.").
25 See supra note 2.
252 The confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan discharges the debtor from all debts
under 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985), except for obligations that are
not fully paid until after the plan is completed, see 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (1982), and
spousal or child support obligations, see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1982 & Supp. III
1985). The discharge obtained in a Chapter 13 proceeding is substantially broader than
the discharge available under Chapter 7. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1982) (dis-
charging all debts except uncompleted scheduled payments and spousal support obliga-
tions) with 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1982) (Discharge does not include release from govern-
ment-made or insured educational loans, tort liabilities, or taxes.). This disparity has
caused considerable debate in the case law. See In re Estus, 695 F.2d 311, 313-16 (8th
Cir. 1982) (summarizing the judicial and legislative debate); In re Dalby, 38 Bankr.
107, 111 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984) (student loan debt dischargeable under Chapter 13
but not Chapter 7 and, thus, militated against Chapter 13 discharge); In re Gunn, 37
Bankr. 432, 435 (Bankr. D. Or. 1984) (existence of student loan debt that is not dis-
chargeable under Chapter 7 is one factor to be considered in denying discharge under
Chapter 13); In re Johnson, 36 Bankr. 67, 69 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1984) (fact that 84% of
debtor's unsecured debt was comprised of educational loans otherwise nondischargable
in a Chapter 7 case was evidence of "misuse of process"); In re Scher, 12 Bankr. 258,
267-73 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (summarizing the debate in Congress).
252 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(b) (giving debtor discretion as to framing of the
Chapter 13 plan), 1325 (providing that plan will be confirmed, subject to the excep-
tions, all of which are protective of creditors' interests, enumerated in this section)
(1982 & Supp. III 1985).
254 As to creditors' rights in Chapter 13 pertaining to the filing of the plan, see 11
U.S.C. § 1325 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). As to the creditors' rights in Chapter 11, see
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placed on the debtor's choice of a repayment plan, as opposed to a plan
imposed by creditors. Similarly, before the adoption of the Amend-
ments, the Code permitted a court to confirm and bind creditors by a
Chapter 13 plan that satisfied the requirements of section 1325(a),
whether or not the creditors were satisfied by the specific provisions of
the plan. In addition, several of the prior drafts of the Amendments, as
well as other provisions of the Amendments, contain incentives for the
use of Chapter 13."'
The significance of a discharge to an individual debtor is also evi-
denced by the fact that the Code does not permit enforcement of prepe-
tition contractual provisions under which an individual debtor may
have waived her right to a discharge.25 6 An individual may contract
away many rights when negotiating with her creditors, but the right to
a discharge is deemed so sacrosanct that Congress elected to subordinate
contractual freedom so that individual debtors might be encouraged by
the prospects of what could be accomplished under the federal bank-
ruptcy laws. The nonenforceability of any contractual provision repre-
sents an intrusion into free bargaining based upon a choice of values. In
this instance, the choice is between: (i) preserving an individual debtor's
opportunity for a discharge in the hopes that this will preserve her self-
respect and maximize recovery to all creditors, and (ii) preserving the
sanctity of a contractual provision designed to maximize the recovery of
a single creditor.257 By favoring the collective approach, the federal
bankruptcy laws protect the interests of the maximum number of credi-
tors while denying to the individual debtor the right to alienate her
most precious asset-herself.
25
The Code's effort to preserve the voluntariness of Chapter 13 also
is reflected in the fact that Chapter 13 cases can be filed only volun-
tarily.2 59 Creditors cannot commence an involuntary Chapter 13 case
against a debtor. 26 0 In addition, debtors can convert their cases under
11 U.S.C. §§ 1126, 1129 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
255 See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
258 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1982) allows for the approval of the debtor's waiver
only if it is in writing and executed after the order for relief. The court may not ap-
prove a debtor's prepetition waiver of her right to a discharge. For a discussion of this
issue, see T. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 230-48.
257 Limitations on contractual freedom are by no means new. See G. GILMORE,
DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974); Kronman, supra note 14.
258 For a general discussion of the social policy behind the nonwaivability of a
discharge in bankruptcy, see D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND
MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 732-42 (1985); Jackson, supra note 1, at 1398-1404;
Kronman, supra note 14, at 776, 785-86.
259 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303(a) (1982).
260 See 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1982); see also In re Graham, 21 Bankr. 235, 238
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982) (denying creditor's motion to convert the case from Chapter
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Chapters 7 or 11 to Chapter 13 without notice and a hearing.2"' Credi-
tors, on the other hand, are expressly prohibited from converting cases
pending under Chapters 7 or 11 to Chapter 13."' Further evidence of
this effort is reflected in the Code provisions prohibiting enforcement of
a debtor's contractual waiver of her right to convert her Chapter 7 case
to Chapter 13 and vice versa.2 3 Enforcement of a contractual waiver of
the right to dismiss a Chapter 13 case is also expressly precluded by
statute.26 By preventing enforcement of these waivers, the Code again
reinforces the significance of the debtor's free choice and promotes the
debtor's use of federal bankruptcy law in preference to state law. Like
the prohibition against enforcement of a waiver of discharge, the prohi-
bition with respect to waivers of conversion and dismissal represents a
choice between preserving an individual debtor's opportunity to choose
the mechanism under which she will repay creditors and preserving the
sanctity of contract.
To the extent that the adoption of section 1325(b) erodes the vol-
untariness of Chapter 13 and diminishes the impact of the unenforce-
ability of contractual waivers of discharge and conversion, Congress
may have created a disincentive for the debtor to use Chapter 13, par-
ticularly if the term "projected disposable income" is interpreted ex-
pansively.265 Such a result runs contrary to the entire purpose of Chap-
ter 13 as well as various other provisions of the Code.
26
1
7 to Chapter 13 because to do so would have the effect of an involuntary Chapter 13
case and thus be contrary to legislative intent); In re Noonan, 17 Bankr. 793, 799
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("Congress acted to dispel even the remotest possibility of in-
voluntary servitude by prohibiting involuntary Chapter 13 cases.").
281 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 706(a), (c), 1112(d) (1982).
262 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 706(b), (c), 1112(d) (1982).
213 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 706(a), 1307(a) (1982).
28 See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
285 If there is any validity to the creditors' assertion that the rise in filings post-
1978 was directly correlated to the liberalized provisions in the Code, see supra notes
57-66 and accompanying text, then the result of the Consumer Credit Amendments
should be to diminish, not increase, filings under Chapter 13. Creditors may find, al-
though there are no statistics on this issue as of yet, that the methods utilized to in-
crease distributions to creditors may accomplish the opposite, see supra note 35 and
accompanying text, and in the process sacrifice aspects of individual freedom as well.
See Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, supra note 10, at 311-35 for at least a preliminary
analysis of whether most debtors can successfully meet the requirements of a Chapter
13 plan. The authors suggest that some particularly well-situated debtors might be able
to complete a reorganization successfully, but argue that other debtors would find such
requirements almost "impossible" to meet. See id. at 334; see also Breitowitz, Install-
ment II, supra note 19, at 67 (arguing that debtors who are forced to apply all of their
disposable income to pay their creditors will either seek modification or dismissal of
their Chapter 13 plans, leaving to creditors "the little they can eke out" through state
garnishment laws).
28 Prior to the Consumer Credit Amendments, a Chapter 13 plan could be con-
firmed if the requirements of § 1325(a) were satisfied. As noted in 5 COLLIER ON
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A. The Expansive Paradigm
The effects of section 1325(b) are intensified if the term "projected
disposable income" is expansively construed. Unlike section 707(b), sec-
tion 1325(b) at least includes a partial definition of the key term
used. 6 7 Nevertheless, the term "disposable income" is capable of vary-
ing interpretations and, like the term "substantial abuse" in section
707(b), can be broadly or narrowly construed. This is due, in major
part, to the fact that the definition relies on terms that are themselves
subjective, such as "reasonably necessary. "268 Moreover, the word
"projected," which is used in conjunction with the term "disposable in-
come," is not defined at all.
Proponents of an expansive paradigm begin by noting that a deter-
mination of disposable income requires, as in the context of substantial
abuse, value judgments with respect to lifestyle. 69 As in the determina-
tion of substantial abuse, a determination of the amount of disposable
income might well permit a court to substitute its own judgment for
that of the debtor as to the propriety of the type and amount of the
debtor's expenditures.270 If a court finds that a particular debtor is
spending more to support her family than the court deems necessary, it
can demand that the debtor decrease these expenditures as the "price"
for a discharge.27' By correspondingly increasing the amount of the
debtor's disposable income, the court thus will have increased the avail-
able assets for distribution under the Chapter 13 plan, at least a por-
tion of which will inure to the benefit of unsecured creditors.
An example of the difficulties inherent in such an approach is re-
flected in In re Gunn27 2 where, in the context of determining whether
a Chapter 13 plan was proposed in good faith under subsection
1325(a)(3), the court observed that two married debtors going to school
in different cities would have fewer living expenses upon completion of
BANKRUPTCY § 1325.01[1] (L. King ed. 1985) (footnotes omitted), "The Code and its
legislative history are emphatic that confirmation is not discretionary with the court
once these criteria [contained in § 1325(a)] have been satisfied."
287 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. 111 1985) (defining "dispos-
able income") with 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (no definition of
"substantial abuse").
28 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
289 See In re Rogers, 65 Bankr. 1018, 1020-22 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986); In re
Kitson, 65 Bankr. 615 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986); In re Red, 60 Bankr. 113, 116
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986); In re Jones, 55 Bankr. 462, 465-67 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1985).
270 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 269.
2171 As stated by the court in In re Rogers, 65 Bankr. at 1022, the debtor was
merely "pampering her own psyche at the expense of unsecured creditors."
"72 37 Bankr. 432 (Bankr. D. Or. 1984).
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their education because they would be able to live together. Based in
part on this observation, the court concluded that the debtors' current
level of expenditures was merely temporary and that payments under
the debtors' plan should be increased.273 Such a determination does not
address the issue of what would happen if the debtors preferred to con-
tinue living apart after they completed school.
While the particular judge in question may not favor this new
social phenomenon, one is forced to ask whether a court, in its effort to
benefit creditors, should be empowered to dictate how a debtor ought to
live.274 In fact, it is the creditors who will raise objections to confirma-
tion that are the real framers of the debtor's future lifestyle. While
many of the decisions under subsection 1325(a)(3), as noted earlier, ad-
dressed the amount a debtor proposed to pay, based on future earnings,
and some spoke specifically to how expenses were to be calculated, 7 5
many cases did not focus as directly on a debtor's expenditures.2 7 6 The
language of section 1325(b) places an unmistakable emphasis on the
calculation of disposable income which, in turn, requires an investiga-
tion of the debtor's expenditures.
Courts have long struggled, in cases not brought in the context of
bankruptcy, with making determinations of income and expenditures.
For example, in determining what portion of a debtor's wages should
be garnished, state courts have looked at what amount a debtor needs to
support herself and her family and in some instances have precluded
273 See id. at 436. The court also objected to the level of the debtor's expenditures.
See id. at 435.
274 As Jacob I. Weinstein stated at the 1932 hearings:
There is no man who will see eye to eye with the other man as to how he
should live, and I would resent any person, court or otherwise, telling me
under those circumstances as to whether, for instance, if I have a boy go-
ing to school and I go through bankruptcy, I should stop that boy's career
in school.
Hearings on a Uniform System of Bankruptcy, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. 753 (1932). A
similar sentiment was expressed by Senator Metzenbaum, who stated in connection
with a future income test:
It would have forced bankruptcy judges to become soothsayers and engage
in the impossible task of predicting someone's earnings and financial obli-
gations; Bankruptcy relief would have become hostage to a judge's guesses
about how much an individual would earn, what their financial burdens
would be, whether they would become sick, unemployed, and so on. In
some cases, because judges are human, they simply would be wrong.
130 CONG. REc. S7624 (daily ed. June 19, 1984); see also In re Kitson, 65 Bankr.
615, 615-21 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986) ("This court [is hesitant] about deciding how
individuals should live their lives.").
275 See Boshkoff, supra note 1, at 120-22 (discussing and criticizing cases in
which judges specifically noted types of expenses they considered inappropriate).
278 See supra notes 241-47 and accompanying text.
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garnishment of these amounts.27 Recognizing the difficulties inherent
in such determinations, most garnishment statutes now permit garnish-
ment based on a percentage of total income,278 thereby eliminating or
minimizing the need for subjective evaluations of expenditures.
Similar issues arise in the context of alimony and child support
decrees where family courts routinely determine how much a support-
ing spouse is required to pay to support her former spouse and child-
ren. In making judgments in this context, courts have regularly looked
at such items as the amount the spouse is capable of paying, including
an evaluation of such spouse's past, present, and future earning capac-
ity.2" 9 While some courts have advised spouses that the essential test is
not what the supporting spouse deigns to earn but what she is capable
of earning in view of her capabilities,80 one theme that arises in these
decisions is the courts' sensitivity to a spouse's past lifestyle. In deter-
mining alimony and child support payments, courts do not disregard a
supporting spouse's choices as to lifestyle in favor of a judicial determi-
nation of how a supporting spouse ought to live.
28 1
Despite the models in other areas of law that have moved courts
away from making subjective decisions about lifestyle, the legislative
history accompanying prior versions of the Consumer Credit Amend-
ments suggests a very different approach-one that has had considera-
ble appeal among those courts that have decided cases under section
1325(b). 2 2 In attempting to tighten the standards for confirmation of a
Chapter 13 plan, the proponents of the legislation specifically identified
the need for debtors to alter their lifestyles. 2 8 For example, in explain-
217 See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 690.6 (West 1970) (repealed 1980);
IDAHO CODE § 11-604(2) (1975).
278 The Federal Government has put a ceiling on the amount above which the
state garnishment statutes may not exceed. Generally, the ceiling is 25% of the individ-
ual's disposable weekly income, with exceptions for court-ordered spousal or child sup-
port payments. See 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982).
2 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Dennis, 117 Wis. 2d 249, 275, 344 N.W.2d 128,
140 (1984) (Abrahamson, J., concurring) (evaluating father's past, present, and future
earning capacity to determine reasonableness of contempt order for failing to seek
higher paying employment).
28" See Brandt v. Brandt, 36 Misc. 2d 901, 903, 233 N.Y.S.2d 993, 995 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1962).
281 See, e.g., id. at 903, 233 N.Y.S.2d at 995; see also In re Felisa L D, 107 Misc.
2d 217, 220, 433 N.Y.S.2d 715, 717 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1980) (father's choice to be "house
husband," instead of seeking employment, factored into determination to reduce his
support obligations for prior marriage).
I82 See, e.g., In re Rogers, 65 Bankr. 1018 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986); In re
Kitson, 65 Bankr. 615 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986); In re Red, 60 Bankr. 113, 116
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986); In re Festner, 54 Bankr. 532, 533-34 (Bankr. E.D.N.C.
1985).
282 See 126 CONG. REC. 31154 (1980).
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ing that a Chapter 13 plan should represent a debtor's bona fide effort
to satisfy the claims of creditors, one proponent stated:
It means that the debtor should forego luxuries during the
term of the plan. For most debtors some sacrifice and adjust-
ment to the debtor's standard of living will be required.
There should be no such expenses as the purchase of new
cars or for that matter continuing to make payments on a
nearly new car at the expense of unsecured creditors under
the plan. The court should . . . in some cases, require the
debtor to pursue a more modest lifestyle.1
8 4
In fact, in portions of the "legislative history" accompanying the pro-
posed amendments to subsection 1325(a)(3), it was suggested that
courts make determinations of necessary expenditures in light of bud-
gets maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.28 The suggestion
raises questions as to whether a debtor with income higher than the
"lower living budget" should be required to adjust her lifestyle so as
not to require expenditures above that of the lower living budget, even
though this may require moving from a home to an apartment or from
one neighborhood to another or placing one's children in public as op-
posed to private schools.286 The adoption by a court of the approach
suggested in these pieces of the legislative history of prior but
unadopted versions of the Consumer Credit Amendments would lead
the court into the thicket of determining how individuals in financial
trouble should live while repaying their creditors.
If the growing number of decisions is any indication of how the
issues under section 1325(b) are going to be decided by future courts,
then the fears outlined above of the consequences of an expansive inter-
pretation are justified.28 7 In In re Jones,2"' for example, the court de-
termined that the expenses enumerated by the debtor were excessive
and were not reasonably necessary for the support of herself and her
family. These expenses included tuition for one child at a private col-
lege and tuition for another child at a private secondary school. Addi-
tional expenses criticized by the court included those for groceries and
housing. 9 In In re Rogers, the court objected to the debtor's retention
284 Id.
282 See S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1983).
286 See In re Jones, 55 Bankr. 462, 467 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (answering this
question in the affirmative).
287 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 282.
2s 55 Bankr. 462 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985).
289 See id. at 467.
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of a 1984 Corvette.290 Similarly, in In re Kitson, the court objected to
the amount the debtors expended for childcare. As that court stated, the
debtors could not expect to "go first class" when "coach" was availa-
ble.29 1 And, in In re Red, the court objected to the debtor's charitable
contributions.9 2
The Jones and Kitson courts' determinations were based, at least
in part, on an analogy between section 1325(b) and subsection
522(d)(10)(E). 29" The latter provision permits a debtor to treat as ex-
empt property payments received under a pension or similar plan only
if such payments are reasonably necessary for support.2 "4 The standard
utilized in several cases under this provision required that the amount
be "sufficient to sustain basic needs not related to [the debtor's] former
status in society or the life style to which he is accustomed ....
Adopting precisely this standard in the Chapter 13 context, the court in
Jones denied confirmation of the debtor's Chapter 13 plan and
observed:
I find that the list [of expenditures] includes several items
that are not within the standard. . . An expensive private
school education is not a basic need of the Debtor's depen-
dents, particularly in view of the high quality public educa-
tion in this country at both the collegiate and secondary
school levels. The $515 per month that the Debtor claims for
food for a family of four is high in my judgment. Lastly, the
290 In re Rogers, 65 Bankr. 1018, 1021-22 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986).
291 65 Bankr. 615, 621-22 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986).
292 60 Bankr. 113, 116 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn 1986).
295 See Kitson, 65 Bankr. at 619-20;Jones, 55 Bankr. at 466. The court in Kitson
looked at other discharge provisions that utilize the same language-for example, 11
U.S.C. §§ 522(d)(10)(D), 522(d)(11)(B) (1982)-as well as at the standard applied in
§ 523 relating to the dischargeability of student loans. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)
(1982). For an example of the difficulty a debtor has in obtaining such a discharge, see
In re Marion, [1985-86 Transfer Binder] Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 71,223 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. May 30, 1986), where the court suggested that there was no hardship, as the
debtor's wife did not work.
2- 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (emphasis added)
provides:
(d) The following property may be exempted under subsection (b)(1) of
this section:
(10) The debtor's right to receive-
(E) a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing an-
nuity, or similar plan or contract on account of illness, disability,
death, age, or length of service to the extent reasonably necessary
for the support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
211 In re Taff, 10 Bankr. 101, 107 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981); accord In re Kochell,
732 F.2d 564, 566 (7th Cir. 1984) (quoting Taff, 10 Bankr. at 107).
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monthly house payment of $989 is well above the amount
necessary to provide adequate housing for a family of
four.
2 9 6
Reference to exemption provisions such as subsection
522(d)(10)(E) for purposes of interpreting section 1325(b) is superfi-
cially appealing in light of the latter provision's inclusion of a statutory
standard and the existence of case law interpreting virtually identical
language.297 When examined further, however, the analogy is spurious.
Section 522 addresses the determination of what property should be
removed from the reach of creditors in any case involving individual
debtors. It is, however, of decreasing significance, especially in light of
the growing number of states that are "opting out" of the federal ex-
emption scheme in favor of state-determined exemptions. 298 Section 522
also is intended to limit the property that ultimately becomes part of an
estate under the definition of "property of the estate" contained in sec-
tion 541 .299 A conclusion that payments under pension plans, for exam-
ple, are not exempt in certain situations is not synonymous with a con-
clusion that those monies must be distributed to creditors in a Chapter
13 plan. It is the latter issue that is raised by section 1325(b). Property
that forms the Chapter 13 estate is not necessarily the property that
ultimately will be distributed to creditors. The purposes served by sec-
tions 522(d)(10) and 1325(b) are very different. Section 522(d)(10) es-
tablishes what a debtor may keep from her existing assets in any case
under the Code (although of primary significance in a Chapter 7 case),
but section 1325(b) determines what a debtor in Chapter 13 must pay
out of her future income. To apply the standard governing what a
debtor may keep out of her existing assets to the context of what the
debtor must pay from her future income in a Chapter 13 case is thus
29 In re Jones, 55 Bankr. at 467.
217 The court in In re Jones fails to note that there are other exemption provisions
that contain similar language. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 522 (d)(10)(D), (d)(11)(B),
(d)(1 1)(C) (1982). As noted above, these provisions were discussed in In re Kitson. See
Kitson, 65 Bankr. 615, 619 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986); see also Morris, supra note 16,
at 158 (finding the analogy to the exemption sections appealing and, while acknowledg-
ing differences in the issues raised by §§ 522(d) and 1325(b), stating that "the same
general approach seems appropriate for the determination of a debtor's reasonably nec-
essary living expenses under a Chapter 13 plan").
299 See Koffler, The Bankruptcy Clause and Exemption Laws: A Reexamination
of the Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 22, 27-28 (1983); see
also E. WARREN & J. WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 204
(1986) (Thirty-nine states have opted out as of 1986.).
29 See In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574, 579 (5th Cir. 1983), which states that property
exempted pursuant to § 522 initially enters the estate and is subsequently excluded
pursuant to the section's provisions.
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inappropriate and unsound."°
An expansive interpretation of section 1325(b) also contradicts fed-
eral policy on wage garnishment. Bankruptcy literature abounds with
references to the fact that one of the principal reasons that debtors uti-
lize the federal bankruptcy laws is to avoid their creditors' threats.30 -
Creditors frequently threaten to garnish a debtor's wages.302 Fearing
garnishment, the debtor seeks relief under the Code. Ironically, the
threat of garnishment is considered to be of such significant force that it
could propel a debtor into Chapter 13. Yet, Chapter 13 as amended
contemplates, at least under the expansive paradigm, what might be
termed "grand-scale garnishment."30 3 Unlike true garnishment, how-
ever, where the amount that can be garnished is limited by statute,
300 One should ask whether analogizing a debtor's ability to pay her debts out of
future income to situations involving nondischargeable debt makes sense. At least one
court and one commentator note that similar issues come up in both contexts. See In re
Kitson, 65 Bankr. 615, 619-20 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986); Boshkoff, supra note 1, at
116-20. Even if a particular debt is nondischargeable, however, it does not necessarily
follow that the debtor must work to pay it off, although such working is at the heart of
the Chapter 13.
301 See BROOKINGS STUDY, supra note 34, at 47. The Federal government also
protects consumers from potentially harmful creditor practices through other laws. See,
e.g., Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1982); Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
303 See D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, supra note 258, at 8.
101 Garnishment is generally defined as "any legal or equitable procedure through
which the earnings of any individual are required to be withheld for payment of any
debt." 15 U.S.C. § 1672(c) (1982). The purpose of garnishment is to enable the plain-
tiff (creditor) to subject to the payment of her claim property of the defendent (debtor)
that is in the hands of third persons (debtor's debtor, usually her employer who owes
her wages). See 38 C.J.S. Garnishment § 2, at 207 (1943). Federal law has set a
virtually absolute ceiling, equal to 25% of one's wages, on the amount of those wages
that are subject to garnishment. See 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a) (1982).
Section 1325(b) of the Bankruptcy Code is similar to garnishment in terms of both
definition and purpose. The similarity ends when one realizes that § 1325(b) has no
absolute ceiling. In fact, 15 U.S.C. § 673(b)(1)(B) (1982) provides an exception, appli-
cable to Chapter 13 cases, to the federal garnishment ceiling. Although there is nothing
in the legislative history of § 1673 to explain this exception, some explanation is found
in the case of Kokoska v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 651 n.11 (1974), where the Court
stated:
Petitioner argues that, since Ch. XIII of the Bankruptcy Act had been
explicitly excluded from the scope of the Consumer Credit Protection Act
* *., it must have intended to include the other portions of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. Chapter XIII permits a wage earner to satisfy his creditors
out of future income under a supervised plan. This particular procedure
resembles the normal credit situation to which the CCPA is directed more
than other bankruptcy situations and, for this reason, the CCPA was not
enforced at the expense of the Bankruptcy procedures.
It is also noteworthy that a Chapter 13 plan cannot extend beyond five years, see
11 U.S.C. § 1329(c) (1982), whereas a garnishment can continue for the life of the
judgment.
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there is no maximum level of garnishment in the Chapter 13 context.304
Creditors could obtain all of the debtor's projected disposable income if
that is what they needed to be repaid in full. The key limitation on
garnishment statutes, namely that creditors can obtain no more than
twenty-five percent of a debtor's disposable earnings,' ° is conspicu-
ously absent from the requirements of Chapter 13. In fact, even if a
debtor's expenses are not cut back by a court as a precursor to confir-
mation, the amount of projected disposable income applied to payments
under a Chapter 13 plan could exceed the federal ceiling.
It is noteworthy that this result does not present a direct conflict in
the Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA), which establishes a ceil-
ing on garnishment. Section 303(b)(1)(B) of that Act explicitly provides
that garnishment restrictions are not applicable to orders of a court in
Chapter 13 cases.306 The legislative history of this specific provision
within the CCPA is sparse, but there is every indication that the Act as
a whole was designed to rectify the severe negative impact of garnish-
ment on individuals. 0 ' Although it is not explicitly stated, a corollary
is that these debtor protections are not necessary in the context of a
Chapter 13 case because Chapter 13 is voluntary.308 A debtor elects to
file and then determines how much of her future income she wishes to
allocate to her creditors.
The rationale for the limited exception to section 303 of the CCPA
is thus undermined by an expansive interpretation of the Consumer
Credit Amendments. The purpose behind the exception is eradicated
because under an expansive interpretation Chapter 13 is not completely
voluntary and a debtor's ability to choose how much income she wishes
to allocate to her creditors is significantly restricted.30 9 Congress could
not have intended to undermine the CCPA by permitting unlimited
garnishment when it is this very issue that causes individuals to seek
relief under the Code in the first instance. 10 The Code should, if any-
thing, further the policy of eradicating excessive garnishment rather
than promoting it under the expansive paradigm. Given the purposes of
the CCPA, it seems much more reasonable to require that the amount
3- 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) requires that the debtor pay all
of her disposable income. See supra note 227.
305 See 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a) (1982).
'" See Consumer Credit Protection Act, § 303(b)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1673(b)(1)(B) (1982).
11 See Kokoska v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650-51 (1973); Long Island Trust Co.
v. United States Postal Serv., 647 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1981).
SoS See supra notes 259-64 and accompanying text.
309 See supra notes 267-71.
310 See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
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of projected disposable income applied to plan payments in a Chapter
13 case should never exceed twenty-five percent of the debtor's income.
This approach would reconcile the Code with the philosophy of the
CCPA.311
B. The Narrow Paradigm
Section 1325(b) does not mandate the expansive interpretation
suggested above. In In re Otero,"'2 one court attempted to circumvent
the difficulties inherent in a broad interpretation of section 1325(b) by
finding that the section is a discretionary rather than mandatory provi-
sion. In Otero, the court confirmed a Chapter 13 plan pursuant to
which the debtor would retain $117 per month above his listed expend-
itures. 13 As expressed by the court:
This Court notes that the statute reads "court may not
approve." The term may possess a voluntary tone, a majority
of the time as opposed to "shall." In the above statute, Con-
gress could have made the section mandatory. However, this
was not done. Therefore, this Court reads the section as a
voluntary section to be applied at the Court's discretion.
The Court further finds that a difference of $117.00 a
month is not a significant or substantial amount to be ex-
tracted from the debtors. It was not intended to take the last
son [sic]. A cushion of money is necessary in Chapter 13
budgeting to guard against life's unexpectancies. It is not in
the public interest to squeeze the last dollar from Chapter 13
debtors to fund a Chapter 13 plan.
3 14
Although the court in Otero clearly recognized that Chapter 13
provides a method of repaying creditors while insuring that the debtor
survives "as a human being" and that there is nothing inherently
wrong in filing a Chapter 13 case as a method of repaying creditors,
the court arrived at these correct conclusions by an incorrect route. The
court reasoned that, if section 1325(b) was intended to be mandatory, it
... Admittedly, one might argue that applying this standard is problematic in light
of the fact that § 303 explicitly contemplates an exception to its terms for Chapter 13
plans. However, as noted, the exception might well be read to reflect a presumption of
voluntariness under Chapter 13. Where the presumption is not respected, the exception
fails of its purpose. Thus, the application of a rule preserving the voluntariness of a
debtor's plan becomes a necessity.
"1 48 Bankr. 704 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985).
313 Id. at 708.
314 Id.
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would have employed the verb form "shall" instead of "may. 31 5 Such
an interpretation plainly ignores section 102(4) of the Code, entitled
"Rules of Construction," which expressly states that the term "may
not" is prohibitive, not permissive .3 1 Therefore, by the Code's own in-
terpretive guidelines, section 1325(b) is mandatory. Thus, another
means to the correct end must be found.
Another approach to section 1325(b)-one fully consistent with
Code language-would be to construe the terms "projected" and "dis-
posable income" narrowly.3 17 In determining disposable income, for ex-
ample, a court could elect not to substitute its judgment for that of the
debtor with respect to expenditures. Hence, the court would not evalu-
ate the debtor's expenditures absent some objective evidence of grossly
excessive spending. This determination would be based neither on what
the court or a creditor believes to be inappropriate nor on the basis of
federal guidelines for particular income levels. Rather, the court's de-
termination would be based on what the debtor's expenditures have
been in the past under her established lifestyle and whether the pro-
jected expenditures are reasonable in that light.
The initial determination by a court to look at a debtor's expendi-
tures merely because they seem "excessive," even if they fall within the
debtor's existing lifestyle, is obviously subjective. The judge's subjective
analysis, however, applies to a narrower range of issues than those con-
sidered under the expansive paradigm. The court would not determine
whether the debtor has the right to spend money in the first instance,
but rather how much should be spent. Consider the court's observation
in In re Grant" 8 that a debtor should not send his college-aged son
$400 per month. While it might be argued as a matter of childrearing
that the son in Grant is old enough to work and should no longer be
financially tied to his parents, it is not the court's place to make that
assessment. On the other hand, if a mother is sending her daughter
$4000 per month, a court could and should take a closer look at this
S15 See id.
3186 See 11 U.S.C. § 102(4) (1982).
317 In that light, the term "dependent" should be broadly construed so as to allow
a debtor to retain sufficient monies to pay her actual expenditures, thereby minimizing
the amount of disposable income available to creditors. See In re Tracey, No. 86-A-
0481 (Bankr. D. Md. Oct. 17, 1986) (LEXIS, Bankruptcy library, Cases file) (deter-
mining whether the debtor's mother was a dependent so as to enable the debtor to
consider expenses for her care in determining what disposable income remained).
318 51 Bankr. 385, 396-97 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985). While Grant involves
§ 707(b), there are certain similarities between finding abuse under § 707(b) and dis-
posable income under § 1325(b). Both sections require, under an expansive paradigm,
a determination with respect to a debtor's lifestyle. See Breitowitz, Installment I, supra
note 19, at 353-55.
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amount. The rationale for deciding that the court should be able to
revisit one decision but not another is significant. Under an expansive
interpretation of the term disposable income, the court would look at
whether any expenditure on behalf of one's college-aged children is jus-
tified. Under a narrow interpretation of the same term, the court would
assume the debtor's entitlement to give money to her daughter; the
question becomes how much money is appropriate. In reaching that
decision, the court should be guided by how much the mother has given
her daughter (and her other children) in the recent past and what other
college-aged children receive from their parents. Therefore, once having
made the subjective determination to look at aparticular expenditure, a
court under a narrow paradigm would use more objective criteria to
determine the "reasonableness" of that expenditure.
There may be isolated circumstances when, even under a narrow
interpretation, the court may determine that an expenditure is im-
proper. Consider a debtor who claims that she needs large sums of
money to support three homes, two of which are used solely for vaca-
tions. The expenditures over and above those needed to maintain the
primary residence hardly seem "reasonable" and "necessary" for the
support of the debtor and her family. There is a vast difference be-
tween saying that the debtor does not need three homes and that the
debtor's primary residence is too "posh" and that she must relocate to
less expensive surroundings.' 19 The narrow interpretation of what one
reasonably needs to support oneself should not be seen as a license for a
debtor to spend excessively while in a Chapter 13. On the other hand,
courts should not be in the business of equalizing all debtors to the
same social standard on the basis of the court's own predilections of
how people in financial trouble ought to live.
The following hypothetical contrasts how a court would handle a
debtor's expenses under the narrow and expansive paradigms. Consider
a debtor who leases two motor vehicles for family transportation. The
debtor and her family have used two cars for the past six years. Unlike
In re Bryant,820 where the cars involved were recent model Buicks
(which the court found objectionable), suppose the leased vehicles were
both Mercedes. Assume as well that the debtor could lease two recent
Buicks and thereby reduce her monthly lease payments by $300. A
court's ordering the debtor to lease less costly vehicles, a result that
319 See, e.g., In re Kitson, 65 Bankr. 615, 621 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986); In re
Jones, 55 Bankr. 462, 467 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985).
320 47 Bankr. 21, 25 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1984). While this case involved § 707(b),
there are, as has been noted, similarities in determinations under §§ 707(b) and
1325(a). See supra text accompanying notes 269-71.
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could be achieved under a narrow interpretive approach, is very differ-
ent from saying that the debtor should not lease any vehicles but should
use public transportation, a result that would be achieved under an
expansive interpretive approach. 21 Imposing reduced lease rental obli-
gations recognizes both the debtor's freedom to use automotive trans-
portation and the creditors' legitimate desire to be repaid.
One can vary this hypothetical to obtain a different result. Con-
sider that the debtor is leasing the vehicles in question from a close
friend and, as such, is paying more than the fair rental value of the
cars. Assume that the debtor could lease the same vehicles for $100 less
per month in the open market. Can the court, under either paradigm,
determine that this $100 is not a reasonable expenditure? It would
seem in this instance that the court is balancing the relative priority
between the debtor's friend (who may well need the money due to her
own financial problems) and the debtor's creditors. In this instance,
under both an expansive and narrow interpretation of the term disposa-
ble income, the creditors appear to be more deserving of the extra $100
per month on the theory that the collective approach is at the heart of
our bankruptcy laws.
It seems that one ultimately comes back to an approach very simi-
lar to the one suggested in the context of section 707(b). 22 Each case
should be handled by application of a flexible standard that recognizes
the debtor's freedom to determine at least the contours of how she lives
while according the court some discretion in balancing that freedom
with the rights of creditors to be repaid. Applying a uniform standard
of how debtors should live, whether based on a court's subjective assess-
ment or a fixed federal standard creates, in essence, a class of bank-
ruptcy poor. A case-by-case approach frees both the debtor and the
court by permitting the court to blend both an objective and subjective
component into its decisionmaking process.
Under the narrow interpretive approach, a court will probably de-
crease the debtor's disposable income, although not dramatically so, and
will more liberally construe the term "reasonable," which is the coun-
321 See In re Rogers, 65 Bankr. 1018, 1021-22 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986). In
Rogers, although the court agreed that the debtor needed at least one of the two cars
owned, it did not confirm the debtor's Chapter 13 plan. The court, applying an expan-
sive approach, objected to the debtor's choice as to which car to keep-a sports car over
an economy sedan. As a result, it concluded that the debtor was maintaining a "hot"
lifestyle at the expense of creditors. In other words, the court identified an asset that
could have been sold to provide more income to the debtor's creditors and essentially
asked her to sacrifice it, with little or no examination of the debtor's past lifestyle.
22 See In re Kitson, 65 Bankr. 615, 620-21 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986), which sug-
gests that there are similarities between the § 1325(b) and § 707(b) inquiries.
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terpart term in conjunction with expenditures. Both of these results
would restore a measure of the debtor's autonomy that an expansive
interpretation would undermine. Using as an example the case of In re
Gunn noted earlier, 23 a narrow interpretation of disposable income
would look at the reasonableness of the debtor's prior expenses occa-
sioned by living separately and apart and deem a continuation of the
same level of expenditures to be appropriate.
If courts do not intervene with respect to a debtor's expenditures,
creditors will be forced to make a more careful evaluation of the risks
of lending to a particular individual. 2" Rather than making the court a
collection agency, creditors ought to do a better job of evaluating credit
risks, with the consequence of an error in that process falling on the
creditors rather than the debtor.3" 5 This shift in risk allocation makes
sense from an economic perspective. Creditors are in the best position
to judge the ability of an individual to repay. If a creditor lends and the
debtor fails to repay, the creditor is better positioned, both by responsi-
bility and financial power, to bear the consequences of an error in judg-
ment.326 Unlike those studies of the credit industry that have focussed
on the rate of return in bankruptcy cases,327 there is demonstrable evi-
dence to prove that filings as a percentage of credit dollars extended
have decreased. 28 The credit industry will, in all likelihood, pass on to
323 For a discussion of In re Gunn, 37 Bankr. 432, 433-36 (Bankr. D. Or. 1985),
see supra notes 272-76 and accompanying text.
2, Senator Metzenbaum stated:
What was there in 1983 that made it right for a debtor to do that [prove
earnings and agree not to have a mortgage in the future]? Merely because
the creditor's lobby wanted it? That was not reason enough. They were
not being hurt. They had an easy remedy. If you do not want people to go
bankrupt and discharge some of their debts, do not lend them money. The
reason the credit industry is a creditor is because it offers credit and that is
how it makes money. It charges for offering that credit and it does not give
that money away nor does anyone expect it to. But it did not have the
right and it does not have the right, and under the law it will not have the
right, to cause a debtor to mortgage his or her future.
129 CONG. REC. S5387 (daily ed. April 27, 1983). For a contrary view, see Eisenberg
I, supra note 8, at 981-83.
3" For a discussion of risk allocation in this context, see A. KRONMAN & R.
POSNER, supra note 192, at 163; see also Weston, Some Economic Fundamentals for
an Analysis of Bankruptcy, in Reform Symposium, supra note 101, at 47, 48-55.
326 See sources cited supra note 324.
327 See, e.g., PURDUE STUDY, supra note 62, at 23-36.
318 See 129 CONG. REC. S5387 (daily ed. April 27, 1983) (Senator Metzenbaum
stated: "[Tihe number of bankruptcies per credit dollar of credit outstanding had actu-
ally decreased since the Amendments of 1980. But the Credit Industry never paid any
attention to the reality of that fact."). For a general criticism of the credit industry
studies, see Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, Limiting Access, supra note 37; see also
Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, supra note 10.
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debtors as a whole any increased cost caused by revised risk allocation,
and this could well take the form of increased credit costs.329 If the
credit risk is diminished, however, credit losses may correspondingly be
diminished, and there will be little added cost to pass along to the bor-
rowing community. 30 Even if this is not the case, the risk of added cost
for all debtors is considerably more palatable than limiting the content
of plans debtors may confirm in Chapter 13 cases. It is likely that all
debtors bear the cost of nonpayment by other debtors; however, the
Code is designed to protect all debtors and will protect those individuals
now paying increased credit costs should they ever become debtors
under the Code.
Additionally, a narrow reading of the term disposable income per-
mits the court to avoid assuming the role of debt counselor, a task that
must be assumed if the court is to determine what a debtor is permitted
to spend. Although many individuals are in need of counselling so that
they can better handle their expenses, a court should not attempt to
perform this function, a task that extends well beyond its duties as an
adjudicator.33 1
1. Interpretation of the Term "Projected"
Interpretation of the term "projected" has not, to date, had much
attention in the case law. 32 Section 1325(b) requires that the debtor
repay only the income projected to be received rather than the income
actually received in the three year period following confirmation of her
plan. Therefore, if a debtor makes a projection based on what she ex-
pects or plans to earn in the forthcoming years, even if she earns more
or changes jobs, her initial determination should be binding, subject to
the provisions of section 1329."' The critical determination that should
I" This consequence was noted by the court in In re Grant, 51 Bankr. 385, 388-
90 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985). It is this risk that was at the heart of the observations of
many of the proponents of the Amendments when these proponents maintained that the
Amendments would ease the cost of and access to credit for middle-class America. See
id. at 389; see also Weston, supra note 325, at 98.
330 One should ask, however, whether this loss will be passed on to consumers and
to which consumers the loss will be passed. See Weistart, The Costs of Bankruptcy, in
Reform Symposium, supra note 101, at 118-19.
"I1 For an example of the authority granted to the court performing its adjudica-
tive role, see 11 U.S.C. § 707 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), which gives the court broad
discretion to dismiss a case on its own motion. This adjudicative function creates diffi-
culties in the context of § 707(b), because the court must also perform a fact-finding
function and hence serve, at least in part, as prosecutor. See supra notes 104-08 and
accompanying text.
"' For example, the court in In re Akin, 54 Bankr. 700, 702-03 (Bankr. D. Neb.
1985), completely ignores the term "projected" and speaks about monies "received."
113 See infra notes 353-92 and accompanying text.
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be made in evaluating the projection is whether it represents a good
faith estimate, taking into account all known variables, of what a debtor
believes she will earn from whatever income-producing activity that she
plans to pursue.
In determining how the term "projected" should be applied, courts
should be cognizant of the possibility that the debtor's determination of
her projected future income will have res judicata effect." 4 The doc-
trine of res judicata has been applied in the context of Chapter 13
plans to prevent relitigation of reorganization issues.8 35 Once a determi-
nation of projected income is made, the debtor should be able to make
certain changes in her life, even if these changes may increase her in-
come. Assuming that the debtor did not intend to make this change at
the time the plan was proposed and that the debtor did not fail to dis-
close any intended change to the court, then this increase in income
should not inure to the benefit of the creditors. 3 Similarly, in the re-
verse situation, where a debtor earns less than her projected income, the
debtor should be bound by her projection, unless she can obtain relief
under section 1329(a).
2. How Voluntary is Voluntary?
The above analysis of section 1325(b) suggests that although
Chapter 13 may be voluntary in the sense that it is the debtor who
elects to file, the true voluntariness of Chapter 13 is thrown into ques-
tion by its requirements. While Congress can condition the debtor's
ability to obtain a Chapter 13 discharge on the relinquishment of cer-
tain rights, the quid pro quo under the present version of Chapter 13
relates to whether or not a debtor is working and to the nature and
amount of her income.337 If the court can condition a discharge on a
I" See In re Shaffer, 48 Bankr. 952, 957-58 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985). But see In
re Chinichian, 784 F.2d 1440, 1444 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding res judicata inapplicable
and revoking its confirmation order where the court specifically had postponed resolu-
tion of the issue in question).
$85 See, e.g., In re Evans, 30 Bankr. 530, 531 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983), affg 22
Bankr. 980 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982); In re Russell, 29 Bankr. 332, 335 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Lewis, 8 Bankr. 132, 137 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1981); see also
Note, ResJudicata and Collateral Estoppel in Bankruptcy Discharge Proceedings, 37
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 281, 286 (1980). Res judicata has not been extended to the
issue of discharge itself, which can be-and frequently is-revisited by the court.
"' Had the debtor proposed her plan, knowing her income was going to increase
and yet failing to provide in her plan for such increase, the court might construe this
failure to account for the increase as fraud. At the least, such failure would support a
basis for denying confirmation of the plan pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1982 &
Supp. III 1985), as the plan would not have been proposed in good faith.
337 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (conditioning confirma-
tion of a Chapter 13 plan on a debtor's promise of full payment to creditors from
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debtor's working in a certain job for a certain time period in order that
the debtor will generate disposable income, then we have come very far
from the intended voluntariness of Chapter 13, which stresses the need
for the debtor to choose whether and how she wants to work.339 On the
other hand, because the debtor's projected as distinguished from actual
earnings are the key to determining payments under a plan, she is re-
quired to continue doing only that which she contemplated doing in
order to obtain a discharge. The debtor made the initial choice.
Consider a physician who files for relief under Chapter 13 and
elects not to practice medicine for a three year period, choosing instead
to pursue her activities as a sculptor, which will generate very little
income. The debtor's expenses, which she believes will be minimal in
her new career, will be paid by way of a gift from a financially well-to-
do fellow artist, who believes in this physician's talent. Although the
debtor will qualify as an individual with regular income,339 she will
have little projected disposable income to distribute to creditors, as vir-
tually all income received, whether from sculpting or by gift, will be
future earnings).
338 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 21, at 120. The creation of this dilemma for
the debtor presents issues similar to those that arise in the context of peonage. In
United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855
(1984), the Ninth Circuit stated:
Conduct other than the use, or threatened use, of law or physical force
may, under some circumstances, have the same effect as the more tradi-
tional forms of coercion-or may even be more coercive; such conduct,
therefore, may violate the 13th amendment and its enforcing statutes. The
crucial factor is whether a person intends to and does coerce an individual
into his service by subjugating the will of the other person.
To date, the available data is insufficient to allow for conclusions as to either the
extent of creditor coercion on debtors or whether, to the extent such coercion exists, it
amounts to a subjugation of the will of the debtor. Creditor coercion has been noted,
however, in the garnishment context and hence is an issue well worth investigating. See
supra notes 277-78, 301-11 and accompanying text.
The interrelationship between choice and peonage was noted by Referee Dryer in
the context of the debates regarding a 1932 congressional proposal to adopt a suspended
discharge. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. He stated:
I do not care what your provisions and exceptions are, the main purpose
of that bill is not to let the wage earner get his discharge if within two
years he can pay his bills out of future earnings. That is not completely
involuntary, because he need not come in, but it is saying, if you come in
you are going into slavery; either go into servitude or stay out of the bank-
ruptcy court.
Joint Hearings, supra note 78, at 622.
3 9 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) provides:
'Individual with regular income' means individual whose income is suffi-
ciently stable and regular to enable such individual to make payments
under a plan under chapter 13 of this title, other than a stock broker or a
commodity broker.
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necessary for support. 340 Assume that the plan as proposed contem-
plates payments to creditors of the same amount that they would have
received in a Chapter 7 case-and thereby satisfies the best interests
test under subsection 1325(a)(4). Can the court refuse to confirm such
a plan when creditors complain that the debtor is not working up to
her earning potential? Had the debtor continued to work as a physi-
cian, she could have repaid her creditors in full. Although the creditors
could not directly force the physician to minister to patients, as that
would be a contract of enslavement, 341 they could try to do so indirectly
by indicating to a sympathetic court that, if the debtor practiced
medicine, her projected disposable income would provide repayment in
full to her creditors. Therefore, the debtor's decision to sculpt was not
in good faith. If a court accepts the creditors' approach, the debtor
would have to resume work as a physician in order to obtain confirma-
tion of her Chapter 13 plan and the desired discharge.
The fact that the court in this example would be conditioning dis-
charge on working is not in itself offensive, primarily because the the-
ory behind Chapter 13 is that one will repay creditors out of one's
future earnings.3 42 Property of the Chapter 13 estate includes future
income.34 3 What is difficult about the hypothetical is that the court is
not just saying that the debtor must work, but it is indicating what type
... Cf 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (excluding from "dis-
posable income" income necessary for support).
"I1 See In re Noonan, 17 Bankr. 793, 798 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); ABC v. Wolf,
52 N.Y.2d 394, 401-02, 420 N.E.2d 363, 366, 438 N.Y.S.2d 482, 485 (1981);
Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CH. L. REV. 351, 372 (1978). One can also
ask whether, even if the debtor agreed to work for a particular creditor at a specific job,
this would satisfy the requirements of § 1325(a)(3), which requires not only that the
plan be proposed in good faith but also that it not be proposed in a manner forbidden
by law. In In re Noonan, 17 Bankr. at 800 n.16, Judge Babbitt addressed but did not
resolve this issue in the context of a potential violation of the thirteenth amendment,
namely, where the debtor is required to work for her creditors under Chapter 11.
"2 Property of the estate, as defined in Chapter 13, includes future income. See 11
U.S.C. § 1306(a)(2) (1982). Property of the estate, as defined in Chapter 7, however,
does not include future income. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). It
should also be noted that 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) requires
that a debtor's Chapter 13 plan provide that all or such portion of future income as is
necessary to effectuate the plan be submitted to the supervision and the control of the
trustee. Significantly, however, this particular provision does not require that the debtor
use her future income; rather, it provides for what the debtor must do if she does use
such income. See In re Lepper, 58 Bankr. 896, 898 (Bankr. D. Md. 1986) (finding that
§ 541's exclusion of earnings as property of the estate begins at conversion, and that
preconversion earnings are not part of the estate, but subject to the trustee's supervi-
sion). For an overview of the differing treatment of wages in Chapters 7 and 13, see
Annotation, Exception from Bankruptcy Estate, Under 11 USCS § 541(aX6), of
Earnings from Services Performed by an Individual Debtor After Commencement of
Case, 76 A.L.R FED. 853 (1986).
"I See 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(2) (1982).
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of work the debtor must perform. Moreover, outside of the bankruptcy
context, creditors would have no control over the debtor's occupation
and would run a risk that the debtor could elect to leave a lucrative job,
thereby changing the original basis upon which credit was extended.
According to creditors, a sum at least equal to what they would have
received in a Chapter 7 case would no longer appear sufficient.
A variation of this hypothetical would be to consider whether the
court would permit confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan if the physician
proposed to work as a physician for only six months a year for the next
three years, devoting the remainder of each year either to pro bono
activity or sculpting.3 44 Suppose that working for this time period
would permit the physician to generate sufficient income to pay for all
of her anticipated annual expenses of support but that it would not
generate enough to leave any disposable income. Again, one must ask
whether confirmation could be denied under either section 1325(a) or
(b). Is it a lack of good faith not to work for one's creditors? If this
question is answered affirmatively, Chapter 13 ceases to be truly volun-
tary since one's ability to obtain a discharge is contingent not only on
one's working but also on one's working in a particular job, that is, one
that generates more money than the job of one's choosing.
345
A debtor should be able to choose not to work at a particular occu-
pation or to work at it only for a limited time period each year, without
that choice affecting confirmation of her Chapter 13 plan. Although the
election not to work or to work for only part of a year has the effect of
limiting the amount of disposable income, courts have repeatedly re-
fused to enforce specifically personal service contracts.346 If courts
broadly construe disposable income to mean that a person must be em-
ployed at a particular job for a particular period of time, then Chapter
13 has become, in essence, a type of contract of enslavement.
34
1
If one accepts that a court can require a debtor to work to obtain a
discharge, then the principle of voluntariness in Chapter 13 is substan-
tially diminished. But perhaps there is another alternative, another no-
tion of voluntariness. For example, because the filing of a Chapter 13
s" One could argue that this means the debtor would not have regular income.
See 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) (1982).
" While Chapter 13 originally contemplated a debtor's being employed, there
had been confirmation, albeit amid controversy, of minimal or zero payment plans prior
to the Consumer Credit Amendments. See, e.g., In re Harland, 3 Bankr. 597 (Bankr.
D. Neb. 1980) (no repayment); In re Cloutier, 3 Bankr. 584 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980)
(no repayment); In re Thebeau, 3 Bankr. 537 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1980) (no repay-
ment); In re Keckler, 3 Bankr. 155, 160 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980) (five percent
repayment).
346 See supra note 341 and accompanying text.
347 See id.
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case is voluntary, 348 a debtor can elect not to file under Chapter 13.
While she would not get the benefits of the broadbased discharge
within Chapter 13, she could fend off her creditors under other appli-
cable federal and state laws. 49 This interpretation of voluntariness also
presents problems. One must wonder whether a filing under Chapter
13 is truly voluntary, especially if one considers that a debtor may have
no practical alternative. Chapter 11, while technically available, is fre-
quently not a realistic alternative.3 50 Chapter 13 may be the sole option
available to a debtor who is ineligible for relief under Chapter 7351 and
who is subject to wage garnishment, lawsuits, and levies on her assets
and those of her spouse. Further, if a debtor is eligible for relief under
both Chapters 11 and 13, because Chapter 11 does not mandate mini-
mum payments out of future income, the debtor may be forced to opt
for relief under Chapter 11, a result completely contrary to the Code's
(and the Amendments') objective of creating incentives for debtors to
seek relief under Chapter 13."' These problems will be further ex-
plored in the context of section 1329(a).
IV. SECTION 1329(a)
The diminution of the voluntariness of Chapter 13 is accentuated
by section 1329." 3 This section, as changed by the Consumer Credit
348 See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
'49 In the peonage context, the courts have observed that it does not matter
whether one voluntarily agreed to enter into a contract involving peonage. Rather, the
key issue is whether, once in that agreement, it subjected the debtor to peonage. As
expressed by the court in Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 243 (1911):
Peonage is sometimes classified as voluntary or involuntary, but this im-
plies simply a difference in mode of origin, but none in the character of
the servitude. The one exists where the debtor voluntarily contracts to
enter the service of his creditor. The other is forced upon the debtor by
some provision of law. But peonage, however created, is compulsory ser-
vice, involuntary servitude.
'50 For a discussion of the effects of a Chapter 11 filing on an individual debtor,
see supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text; see also In re Moog, 774 F.2d 1073,
1074-75 (11th Cir. 1985); A. COHEN & B. ZARETSKY, DEBTORS' AND CREDITORS'
RIGHTS 303-37 (1984).
351 This ineligibility is premised on the debtor's Chapter 7 case being dismissed
pursuant to the expansive interpretation of § 707(b). See supra notes 110-27 and ac-
companying text.
3'52 See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
3-3 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) provides:
(a) At any time after confirmation of the plan but before the completion of
payments under such plan, the plan may be modified, upon the request of
the debtor, the trustee, or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim, to-
(1) increase or reduce the amount of payments on claims of a
particular class provided for by the plan;
(2) extend or reduce the time for such payments; or
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Amendments, provides that a debtor's Chapter 13 plan can be modified
by the debtor, the trustee, or an unsecured creditor.354 In other words,
an unsecured creditor can seek to modify a debtor's Chapter 13 plan by
increasing the amount of the payments the debtor is required to make
after a court has confirmed that plan. 55 Prior to this change, section
1329 was silent as to who could seek to amend a Chapter 13 plan,
although the Code's legislative history and the case law suggested that
only a debtor could seek modifications.3 56 As expressed by the court in
In re Fluharty, "So long as the Plan complies with applicable law, the
Debtor may fashion any Plan of repayment he chooses and the un-
secured creditors must content themselves with the Plan as confirmed
by the Court.
35 7
Because creditors are now expressly permitted and perhaps even
encouraged355 to seek to modify the debtor's plan, the voluntariness of
Chapter 13 is dramatically reduced. A debtor's effort to create a plan
can be undermined by a creditor who can seek to bind the debtor to a
plan the creditor finds acceptable. Phrased differently, a debtor can be
bound by a plan that, although initially acceptable to her, becomes un-
acceptable due to modifications proposed by creditors and permitted by
the court. Such a result is all the more anomalous when one recalls that
creditors are not permitted initially to vote on a debtor's plan. 59 Thus,
(3) alter the amount of the distribution to a creditor whose
claim is provided for by the plan to the extent necessary to take
account of any payment of such claim other than under the plan.
Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 319, 98 Stat. 333, 357 (codified
as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
35" Two recent decisions imply an expansive reading of § 1329(a), without citing
that section, by requiring in one instance that the debtor's plan be evaluated and
amended every six months to include increased income, see In re Bear, 789 F.2d 577,
578 (7th Cir. 1986), and in the other instance that the plan must provide for payment
to creditors of increased income, see In re Akin, 54 Bankr. 700, 702-03 (Bankr. D.
Neb. 1985).
156 See In re Fluharty, 23 Bankr. 426, 429 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982); HousE
REPORT, supra note 21, at 431.
a Fluharty, 23 Bankr. at 429.
a Since pre-Amendments § 1329 did not provide creditors the opportunity to act
in this capacity, the section, as amended, might well be viewed by some creditors as an
invitation for them to act.
'59 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); cf 11 U.S.C. § 1126(a)
(1982) (allowing the creditors in a Chapter 11 case to vote on the debtor's reorganiza-
tion plan). It is noteworthy that although a court's discretion to approve a Chapter 13
plan is limited where the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to the plan, the
court may still under the enumerated conditions approve of the plan. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325(b)(1) (1982 & Supp III 1985). Thus, creditors under Chapter 13 do not have
the same power to reject a plan as do their counterparts under Chapter 11. It is also
noteworthy that a court has recently confirmed a Chapter 13 plan where, although the
plan provided for payments to creditors, the creditors failed to file proof of their claims
and thus were not entitled to payments from the debtor. Consequently, the debtor re-
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section 1329(a) can be viewed as allowing creditors the "vote" by per-
mitting them to second guess the Chapter 13 plan proposed by the
debtor and confirmed by the court. If a court were to share the credi-
tors' perspective, a single creditor could bind a debtor to a Chapter 13
plan not of the debtor's choosing, thereby indirectly voting to defeat the
initial plan and voting in favor of a plan of their choosing. In such a
case, in marked contrast to its historical purpose, 360 Chapter 13 ceases
to be voluntary.
A. The Expansive Paradigm
If one contrasts the purposes behind Chapters 11 and 13, the diffi-
culties of an expansive interpretation of section 1329(a) become readily
apparent. Creditors can propose a Chapter 11 plan after a debtor's ex-
clusive filing period has expired. 6 ' Moreover, creditors vote on a
Chapter 11 plan and at least one class of creditors must accept a plan if
it is to be confirmed." 2 Therefore, the fact that section 1127363 permits
any proponent of a plan, including a creditor, to modify a plan, makes
sense. Section 1127 does not permit a party other than a proponent to
seek modification of a Chapter 11 plan.3 64 The results achieved under
section 1329(a) are dramatic in comparison. A creditor who could
neither propose nor vote upon on a Chapter 13 plan can seek to modify
it, thereby achieving indirectly what this Article has shown that Con-
gress did not intend, namely that Chapter 13 is no longer voluntary
and that creditors control a Chapter 13 case. 65
By jeopardizing the voluntary nature of Chapter 13, section
1329(a) also creates no incentive for a debtor to work to increase in-
come. As previously noted, if a debtor's plan incorporates all of her
projected disposable income and then the debtor works hard to increase
her actual disposable income, a creditor could seek to modify the
debtor's Chapter 13 plan by the amount of this extra income.3 6 While
one could ask whether principles of res judicata would permit such a
ceived a discharge free from the obligation of paying creditors. See In re Hardy, 56
Bankr. 95 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985).
360 See supra notes 250-64 and accompanying text.
361 See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b), (c) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
362 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126, 1129(a)(10) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
3 11 U.S.C. § 1127(a) (1982) (emphasis added) provides in relevant part: "The
proponent of a plan may modify such plan . .. ."
36 See id. (allowing only the proponent of the plan, whether a claiming creditor
or the reorganized debtor, to seek such modification).
365 See supra notes 250-64 and accompanying text.
366 See In re Bear, 789 F.2d 577, 578 (7th Cir. 1986); In re Akin, 54 Bankr. 700,
703 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1985).
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result,367 there is no incentive for a debtor to earn more than the
amount projected. As amended, section 1329 thus exaggerates the er-
rant policies created by section 1325(b). 681 Not only will an individual
debtor have the contents of her Chapter 13 plan governed 6y her future
earnings, but also she will be exposed, for the life of that plan, to an
"ability to pay" standard that allows her creditors to exact even
more.
3 69
The following hypothetical demonstrates this problem. Consider a
debtor who elects to change careers. Assume that the debtor is a high
school graduate who has taken various college-level computer science
courses but who has been working as a short-order cook. She proposes
a Chapter 13 that incorporates the projected disposable income of a
cook's earnings. The plan contemplates that creditors will obtain
twenty-five cents on the dollar. Suppose the debtor decides, after the
plan is confirmed, to further her computer science studies and to work
as a programmer at an annual salary three times that of a short-order
cook. Are the debtor's creditors entitled to her future incremental earn-
ings as a programmer? If the determination of projected disposable in-
come is not given res judicata effect, as was suggested in the context of
section 1325(b),370 then there would appear to be little incentive for the
debtor, during the three year period after the plan is confirmed, to pur-
sue further education and an enhanced career. To do so would inure
solely to the benefit of her creditors. Thus, if there is a definite societal
-need for computer programmers and if, as a matter of economics, it
makes sense for members of society to pursue those jobs for which their
aptitude and training prepares them, then the effect of section 1329(a)
is counterproductive.37 1 While it may benefit a narrow group of credi-
tors over the short run, it will have a negative social and economic
impact over the long haul.
372
867 See supra notes 335-36 and accompanying text.
868 This observation is highlighted by Collier:
To complement its amendment adding section 1325(b), the Bankruptcy
Amendments . . . also amended section 1329 (a) of the Code to provide
that a modification of the plan could be sought not only by the debtor, but
also by . . . the holder of an unsecured claim. This amendment is in-
tended to carry the ability-to-pay standard forward to any modifications of
the plan.
5 COLLIER, supra note 266, at § 1329.01[b].
319 See In re Bear, 789 F.2d at 578; In re Akin, 54 Bankr. 700, 703 (Bankr. D.
Neb. 1985).
370 See supra notes 335-36 and accompanying text.
371 See A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, supra note 192, at 230-61.
372 For a discussion of the policies supporting the fresh start doctrine in bank-
ruptcy law, see supra notes 43-56 and accompanying text.
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If creditors could convince a court to amend a Chapter 13 plan
whenever the debtor seeks to improve herself, the creditors' positions
would be improperly improved. Ostensibly, the creditors evaluated the
credit risks of and extended credit to the debtor when she was employed
as a short-order cook.37 Thus, if the debtor increases her earnings by
enhancing her career status, that increase should not inure to the bene-
fit of the creditors because they never looked to nor bargained for that
increase in the first instance. To give creditors that benefit is to dimin-
ish creditors' lending risks at the expense of debtors and society as a
whole.
Consider, however, the earlier hypotheticals involving the physi-
cian who elected to sculpt rather than minister to patients. In that con-
text, it was argued that the physician should be able to choose not to
carry out a highly valued social function, namely, caring for the sick.
74
Those hypotheticals suggest a critical distinction between sections 1325
and 1329. Consider the physician who calculates projected disposable
income on the basis of her earnings in medical practice. After the
Chapter 13 plan is confirmed, the debtor determines that she wants to
sculpt rather than continue as a physician. In making this election, the
debtor's available future income will drop dramatically. At this junc-
ture, are creditors entitled to payments based on projected as distin-
guished from actual income such that the debtor can be precluded from
modifying her Chapter 13 plan under section 1329? If the determina-
tion of projected income is given res judicata effect, then in this instance
the debtor cannot modify her plan, and, if she cannot make the pay-
ments proposed thereunder, she will be denied a discharge.
This determination is not inconsistent with the hypotheticals in
which the physician made the determination to switch jobs at the time
she proposed her plan. Confirmation of Chapter 13 plans is premised
on projected and not actual income. 75 Debtors are called upon to make
a judgment, at the outset, as to how their creditors will be treated. A
creditor dissatisfied with the result could seek, before confirmation, to
dismiss the Chapter 13 case.37 Where, as in the instant hypothetical,
creditors relied on the debtor's projection only to find, when the debtor
37' For views that are more sympathetic to creditors, see Cyr, supra note 71, at
280-81; Eisenberg I, supra note 8, at 977-991.
37 See supra notes 339-45 and accompanying text.
$11 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1) (Supp. 111 1985); contra In re Akin, 54 Bankr.
700, 702-03 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1985) (debtor's Chapter 13 plan should provide for an
automatic increase in payments to creditors should his actual payments increase).
"' See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). In view of the word "in-
cluding," the bases for conversion specifically enumerated within this subsection are
nonexclusive.
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seeks to lower her income substantially, that their reliance was mis-
placed, the creditors have been deprived of their right to exercise cer-
tain rights that they would have exercised had they known about the
career change possibility at the outset. Therefore, to balance the com-
peting needs of debtors and creditors alike, although debtors should be
able to determine freely at the outset how their projected income will be
generated, they should be bound by their projections, absent a material
change in circumstances. 37 7 Creditors, on the other hand, should not
preclude debtors from working at whatever job they choose. Once a
plan is confirmed, however, these creditors should receive the income
that the particular work relied on to make a projection would generate,
again absent a material change in the debtor's circumstances. A mate-
rial change in the debtor's circumstance would involve the types of is-
sues that enabled debtors to obtain hardship discharges under section
1328-catastrophic illness or incapacity, loss of one's job, national dis-
aster, death of a spouse, and perhaps even birth of new children. 378
This suggested approach leaves open the question of the precise
scope and purpose of section 1329(a). The wording of this section, un-
like that in section 1328(b), does not limit it in applicability to "disas-
ter" situations. 79 Nonetheless, a debtor could still seek to modify her
Chapter 13 plan under section 1329 in the event of a catastrophic event
in those situations in which the debtor would not, at the time of the
untoward event, have paid creditors what they would have received
under Chapter 7.80 Therefore, because the conditions of a hardship
discharge would not be satisfied, one reading of section 1329 would
allow the debtor to seek plan modification under that section so as to
obtain a discharge in Chapter 13. This would avoid requiring the
debtor to convert her case to Chapter 7, under which she would receive
a more limited discharge.
In sum, the difference in whether a debtor can change the nature
of her employment seems to hinge on timing. If the debtor chooses to
37 This material change in circumstances is contemplated by the Code in the
hardship discharge provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b) (1982).
378 See, e.g., In re Mannings, 47 Bankr. 318, 320-321 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985)
(holding that debtor's temporary unemployment entitled him to modify his Chapter 13
plan to include arrearages incurred during his unemployment). Section 1328(b), 11
U.S.C. § 1328(b) (1982), permits the debtor to obtain a discharge if the failure to
complete payments under a Chapter 13 plan is due to circumstances beyond her con-
trol, if she has paid to her creditors at least what they would get in a Chapter 7 case,
and if the plan cannot be modified under § 1329.
37, See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b) (1982) (specifically referencing "circumstances for
which the debtor should not justly be held accountable . . ").
380 Payment of at least what creditors would obtain in a Chapter 7 case is a pre-
requisite for a hardship discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b)(2) (1982).
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change careers before confirmation, the change should be permitted by
the court. If the debtor changes careers after confirmation, she should
be permitted to do so but is not relieved of her obligation to make plan
payments based on the figures utilized for confirmation purposes. In
the one situation where a debtor is discouraged from leaving a well-
paying job to sculpt, the result is justified by the debtor's own choice.
In the other situation, creditors lent and "permitted" confirmation on
certain assumptions. They are entitled to know that these assumptions
will remain in place.
An expansive reading of section 1329(a) also raises the possibility
of another anomalous result. By its terms, section 1322 permits a
debtor to file a liquidating plan under which she would obtain all of
the benefits of the expansive discharge provisions of Chapter 13 while
accomplishing that which is achieved in a Chapter 7.381 Section 1329(a)
can be read expansively to permit creditors to present to the court a
request that the debtor's reorganization plan be amended to provide for
liquidation of the debtor's non-exempt assets. If the court were to ap-
prove of such a modification, creditors would have forced the debtor to
liquidate when the debtor wanted to reorganize. Again, such a result
undermines the Chapter 13 purpose of encouraging voluntary reorgani-
zations s.3 2 Because Chapter 13 is voluntary and creditors cannot force a
debtor to reorganize using her future income,"8' a creditor should not
be entitled to circumvent a debtor's quest for reorganization unless that
creditor can obtain a conversion under section 1307(c). 3 84 Since section
706 precludes a creditor from preventing a debtor from reorganizing,
even if the Chapter 7 case were involuntarily filed, 85 one has to won-
der why the Consumer Credit Amendments should be interpreted in a
manner that would permit a creditor to liquidate a debtor's assets when
the debtor herself wants to reorganize.
A similar problem has been presented to the courts in the context
of farmers. 8 6 Due in large part to the unfairness resulting to the
881 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(8) (1982). For an overview of the application of this
section, see Sherman, Expanding Chapter 13 Eligibility: Liquidating Wage Earners'
Plans Under 11 U.S.C. § 109(e), 1 BANKR. DEV. J. 1 (1984).
82 See supra notes 250-64 and accompanying text.
s8 See 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1982).
8 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c) (1982) provides that, "on request of a party in interest
and after notice and a hearing, the court may convert a case under this chapter to a
case under Chapter 7 of this title."
888 See 11 U.S.C. § 706(c) (1982).
388 See, e.g., Cassidy Land & Cattle Co. v. Commercial Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
747 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Button Hook Cattle Co., 747 F.2d 483 (8th Cir.
1984); In re Rementer, 58 Bankr. 723 (Bankr. D. Del. 1986); In re Huebner, 58
Bankr. 600 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1986); In re Lange, 39 Bankr. 483 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1984). One should note that the new Chapter 12, enacted on October 27, 1986, deals
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farmer who operates a very cyclical business, a creditor is expressly
prohibited from putting a farmer into an involuntary Chapter 7 case.38 7
When creditors attempted to file a liquidating plan in a debtor farmer's
Chapter 11 case, the debtor argued that this was tantamount to filing
an involuntary Chapter 7 case and hence prohibited by the Code. In
permitting confirmation of a liquidating plan, the court in In re Button
Hook Cattle Co.388 observed that, while the Code accorded debtor farm-
ers defensive protection, it did not also accord them offensive protec-
tion.389 Applying the defensive/offensive approach to liquidating Chap-
ter 13 cases, one arrives at a different result than did the Button Hook
court. According a debtor a right to reorganize seems to be an offensive
weapon. Permitting a creditor to force a debtor to liquidate when she
wants to reorganize also seems to be an offensive tool. Therefore, un-
like Button Hook, where the protection from involuntary filings is pro-
tective of the debtor, the debtor's ability to reorganize in a Chapter 13
benefits debtors and creditors alike. Therefore, the quest to balance the
protections accorded debtors and creditors in the context of Chapter 13
cases should not lead to a right of creditors to force a debtor to liquidate
in Chapter 13. Such a result would run contrary to the goal of protect-
ing creditors in a Chapter 13 plan in the first instance.
B. The Narrow Paradigm
There is nothing in section 1329 that mandates that a court take a
position contrary to the fresh start policy. Therefore, in applying sec-
tion 1329, a court should interpret this provision narrowly, allowing it
to counter those debtors who are truly abusing Chapter 13 while avoid-
ing a rewriting of bankruptcy policy. In the context of sections 707(b)
and 1325(b), it was noted that the courts should look at a host of fac-
tors in determining whether a Chapter 7 case should be dismissed or
Chapter 13 plan should be confirmed rather than relying on a rigid
and inflexible standard.390 Similarly, in the context of section 1329(a),
the mere fact that a debtor's income has increased should not, in and of
itself, signal that payments to creditors should increase. Any such ex-
pansive interpretation would reinsert a creditor "vote" on the debtor's
Chapter 13 plan. A narrow interpretation that would preserve the basic
tenets of bankruptcy policy noted throughout this Article would suggest
particularly with farmers and farming operations. See supra notes 3, 10.
317 See 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1982); see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 21, at
321 (describing the cyclical nature of a farmer's business).
388 747 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1984).
389 Id. at 486.
390 See supra notes 159-224, 312-53 and accompanying text.
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that section 1329(a) was intended to permit creditors to seek and courts
to consider approving modification of Chapter 13 plans in several dis-
tinct situations. First, if the debtor, prior to confirmation, has failed to
disclose information that could have altered a creditor's determination
of how to proceed and if the creditor does not want to seek dismissal or
conversion to Chapter 7, the court should consider modifying the Chap-
ter 13 plan to take into account the information not disclosed. Consider
a debtor who failed to disclose a settlement agreement with a former
spouse that, while not yet approved by the applicable court, was all but
a certainty. If this settlement would substantially lower the debtor's
monthly expenditures, a creditor should be entitled to increased
distributions.
Second, if there is a material change in the debtor's circumstances
for the better, due to factors completely outside the debtor's control,
there may be a basis for plan modification.391 Consider a debtor, who
in proposing her Chapter 13 plan contemplated the need to support her
three children. Suppose two of the three children either become emanci-
pated (i.e., through marriage) or no longer require support (i.e., a pu-
tative parent suddenly commences support payments). Under these cir-
cumstances, creditors should be entitled to seek modification of the
Chapter 13 plan. In the example given, the quest to modify the Chap-
ter 13 plan does not curtail the debtor's freedom any more than did the
original Chapter 13 plan. What the modification does do in these in-
stances is prohibit debtors from obtaining the windfall of changed cir-
cumstances outside their control. This is very different from giving
creditors the benefit of changes that were solely in the debtor's control
(i.e., the election to change professions).
This suggested approach is fully consistent with sections 541 and
1306, which define "property of the estate." '92 If a debtor in a Chapter
13 case buys a lottery ticket and happens to win the lottery, these win-
nings become property of the estate. If such an event should happen,
creditors should be entitled to share in these winnings. 393 It is this shar-
ing by creditors that, in part, distinguishes Chapter 13 from Chapter 7
where creditors would not be entitled to any of the winnings if the
lottery ticket was purchased by the debtor, as distinguished from prop-
erty of the estate.
"I See In re Koonce, 54 Bankr. 643, 644 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1985) (court approved
trustee's petition to modify debtor's repayment plan after debtor won a substantial sum
of money in the state lottery). Although the trustee filed the case in Koonce, the effect
on the debtor is the same as it would have been had the unsecured creditors themselves
sought a plan modification.
392 See supra note 342.
a See In re Koonce, 54 Bankr. at 644-45.
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Sections 1325 and 1329 should be applied to encourage debtors to
prepare their projections thoughtfully and reasonably but not to dis-
courage working and obtaining relief from prior financial difficulties. A
narrow interpretation of both of these provisions preserves the debtor's
freedoms without depriving creditors of the repayment of that which is
owed them. The justifications for this balancing of interests form the
conclusion of this Article.
CONCLUSION
Comparison of the risks and benefits of an expansive interpreta-
tion of the Consumer Credit Amendments with those attendant upon a
narrow interpretation suggests that the narrow interpretive approach,
while not a panacea, is preferable. A narrow construction of the Con-
sumer Credit Amendments is consistent with the bankruptcy philoso-
phy underlying the Code. Neither in enacting the Code nor in adopting
the Amendments did Congress articulate an intent to override the fresh
start policy. To the contrary, Congress appears to have been sensitive to
the potential problems that could arise if it adopted a different posi-
tion.394 Nothing in the Code or the Amendments expressly conditions
access to bankruptcy relief upon whether one can repay one's outstand-
ing debts. 95 Nothing in the Code expressly permits creditors to force
an individual debtor to reorganize under Chapter 13 if she wants to
liquidate. 9 ' These, among other factors, suggest that, while Congress
attempted to shift the balance of rights between individual debtors and
their creditors, it did not intend to abolish the fresh start policy.
Recommendation of a narrow interpretation of the Amendments is
not tantamount to saying that the fresh start policy, as presently re-
flected in the Code, is a perfectly functioning doctrine. In fact, there are
aspects of the Code that may not reflect the best balance between the
respective rights of debtors and creditors. To that extent, these provi-
sions should be reevaluated. 97 One also can question whether the fresh
start doctrine is a valuable doctrine in the first instance.398 Before aban-
See supra notes 76, 140, 262, 305.
s See supra notes 9, 124-27.
398 See supra text accompanying notes 251-54.
s See D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, supra note 258, at 905-06 (discussing propriety
of "loading up" on exemptions on the eve of bankruptcy). While this particular behav-
ior has not been discredited by the courts, it does accord a debtor a distinct advantage
over her creditors. The Amendments do prevent the discharge of "prebankruptcy
splurge" items, see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C) (1982), and one can quite correctly ask
why a similar policy should not exist with respect to prefiling restructurings to maxi-
mize exemptions.
398 See T. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 225-48.
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doning an established doctrine that is reflected in a host of interwoven
statutory provisions, however, there should be clear evidence of legisla-
tive intent to do so. 99 Nothing in the legislative history of the Amend-
ments suggests such an intent.
400
A narrow interpretation of the Amendments still permits the erad-
ication of those "abuses" that the consumer credit industry maintained
existed under the Code. While recognizing the existence of these
abuses, a narrow interpretation does not permit the creation of an en-
tirely new category of abuse. Although the consumer credit industry
might well have intended the Amendments to shift the balance more
decisively against debtors, there is every indication that Congress did
not enact wholesale the demands of this particular special interest
group.
In seeking to apply the Amendments to eradicate abuse, one is
confronted with the determination of exactly what abuse the Amend-
ments were designed to eradicate. It would be wholly inconsistent with
articulated bankruptcy philosophy if courts decided that abuse was
synonymous with failing to repay one's debts and choosing to liqui-
date.401 Therefore, abuse must mean something else. The narrow inter-
pretation recommended herein suggests an ambit of that abuse that
avoids many of the pitfalls of the expansive paradigm.
Under the expansive paradigm, it is arguable, although not statis-
tically demonstrable as yet, that fewer individuals will file under both
Chapters 7 and 13. Time may reveal that debtors are uncomfortable
with the Code as amended. If this proves to be the case, creditors may
well find themselves hoist with their own petard. Debtors will seek re-
lief under state law remedies, and creditors, particularly those who lend
transnationally, will have to pursue collection efforts in a vast number
of states and, in some instances, in a variety of courts. Time and money
will be expended chasing assets rather than collecting them.
40 2
Under the narrow paradigm, this individual debtor "fear factor"
should be reduced. Debtors will not be discouraged from seeking relief
under Chapters 7 and 13, which was one of the purposes of the
Amendments in the first instance.40 3 The narrow paradigm is not, how-
ever, so narrow as to emasculate the legislation. Debtors whose actions
cause an affront to the bankruptcy process will still be precluded from
"9 See Boshkoff, supra note 1, at 112-25, who suggests that no clear message is
apparent as of yet.
400 See supra notes 21, 35, 78, 134, 147-48, 324, 368.
40 See supra notes 139-52 and accompanying text.
402 See Breitowitz, Installment II, supra note 19, at 66-67.
403 See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
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obtaining its benefits.4 °4 The difference is in the interpretation of the
term "abuse," not in the suggestion that there is no abuse at all.
Of course, it is considerably easier to say what abuse is not, as
opposed to saying what it is. This Article suggests that the real abuse of
the Code in Chapter 7 cases is the debtor who files in bad faith. In this
context, bad faith comprises something more than being unable to re-
pay one's creditors and living too well.405 It is being unable to repay, at
least in part, because of the nature of the indebtedness and the circum-
stances under which the debt was incurred. Therefore, this determina-
tion will have to be made on a case-by-case basis, rather than on a
summary standard that suggests that being able to repay creditors is a
fortiori abuse.406 Abuse in the context of Chapter 13 cases occurs not
when a debtor lives extravagantly in the eyes of the court, the creditors,
or some fixed standard for how much individuals should spend, but
when, by an objective standard, the debtor is living above her means
within the framework of her existing standard of living.407 Again,
courts will be forced to address how much income a debtor must apply
to her Chapter 13 plan on a case-by-case basis. 08 While case-by-case
determinations may not provide the definitive guidelines creditors, and
perhaps courts, would like, the narrow paradigm does allow courts suf-
ficient flexibility to dismiss cases and confirm Chapter 13 plans with
increased payments when they believe that in doing so the bankruptcy
process would be preserved.
To the extent that courts adopt a narrow interpretation of the
Amendments, creditors should have greater incentive to police their
lending practices more carefully. While there is no definitive study to
date on appropriate allocation of the risk of loss between debtors and
creditors, there is no harm in encouraging greater care on the part of
lenders. At a minimum, creditors have responsibility to lend only to
those whom they reasonably expect will repay. If they fail to carry out
this responsibility, then they must bear some of the loss that occurs
upon the borrower's default. To the extent that lenders spread the cost
of credit among all borrowers, based on the inability of some borrowers
to repay, greater care in choice of borrower could, although it is un-
likely given the realities of the marketplace, decrease the cost of bor-
rowing for all.
When the Amendments read together expansively create conflicts
404 See supra notes 159-220, 312-31, 390-93 and accompanying text.
405 See supra notes 159-68 and accompanying text.
406 See id.
407 See supra notes 241-95 and accompanying text.
408 See supra notes 301-11 and accompanying text.
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with the policy and goals of the thirteenth amendment, as enforced by
the anti-peonage laws, such a result can be avoided by a narrow inter-
pretation of the Amendments. Concerns of peonage in the bankruptcy
context have a long history. Thus, an interpretation of the Amendments
that is sensitive to these concerns is preferable from both a standpoint
of constitutional law and bankruptcy policy. Moreover, a narrow inter-
pretation reinforces other legal theories, including the nonenforceability
of contracts of enslavement and the enforcement of other paternalistic
protections.
Until it becomes so clear that Congress intended to turn existing
bankruptcy law and policy on its head, a narrow interpretation of the
Consumer Credit Amendments provides the most suitable means of ap-
plying these provisions. Although some have suggested that the Amend-
ments were merely clarifying in nature, it is possible to interpret them
to do much more than clarify; the Amendments can be seen as creating
an entirely new approach to the fresh start policy. Such an interpreta-
tion suggests an unwarranted and unnecessary result, indeed, and one
that is avoided by the adoption of the narrow interpretive approach
suggested herein. Whether courts will apply increasingly the narrow
approach is something only time will tell, but, given the frequency with
which these issues arise, that time may not be too far off.
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